Summary
In Oosterwyk I, the complaint alleged that the razing of the building itself was wrongful, and most, if not all, the damages alleged appeared to flow from the razing itself.
Summary of this case from Smith v. WilliamsOpinion
April 6, 1959 —
May 5, 1959.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: MICHAEL T. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument by Gerhardus Oosterwyk of Milwaukee, pro se.
For the respondent there was a brief by Walter J. Mattison, city attorney, and Peter M. Stupar, assistant city attorney, and oral argument by Mr. Stupar.
Action by plaintiffs Gerhardus Oosterwyk and Efren C. Quiroz originally commenced against the town of Granville for damages allegedly suffered by reason of the razing of certain buildings belonging to the plaintiffs and located within said town. The city of Milwaukee entered the case as defendant after the town of Granville was consolidated with the city. Plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that the charge of $1,500 imposed as a lien against the property was excessive and prayed for relief with respect to said lien. The case was tried to a jury, it being stipulated by the parties that the only issue to be decided was whether the amount of the lien was reasonable or not. From a judgment for the defendant on the verdict, plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs are the owners of about three and one-half acres of land which was located, at the time of the commencement of this action, within the town of Granville, Milwaukee county. In 1950 and prior thereto the plaintiff Oosterwyk maintained on said premises several sheds for the housing of goats, sheep, chickens, and other animals, and for the storing of equipment and tools. While the complaint alleges said buildings were not intended to be used for human habitation, it is alleged in the answer that Oosterwyk had admitted under oath that he lived in one of the structures.
On November 2, 1950, following the complaint of various residents of the area that the plaintiffs' buildings were in a shabby condition and created offensive odors, the town board of the town of Granville, by its building inspector, ordered that the plaintiffs raze the structures in question and remove the debris from the premises within sixty days, in compliance with sec. 66.05, Stats., and the building code of the town of Granville.
Plaintiffs made no application to the circuit court to restrain the building inspector from razing and removing the buildings within the thirty-day period specified in sec. 66.05 (3), Stats., but in May of 1951, they commenced an action in the circuit court for Milwaukee county to review the order of condemnation. In that action defendant's demurrer was sustained and judgment of dismissal granted. An appeal by the plaintiffs to the supreme court from such judgment was dismissed in November of 1952.
In November of 1952, plaintiffs commenced another circuit court action against the building inspector to review the condemnation order, a restraining order against Oosterwyk, and an order requiring Oosterwyk to remove his personal property from the premises within ten days after October 21, 1952. In December of 1952, the court sustained the defendant's plea in bar and entered judgment of dismissal of the action, from which judgment no appeal was taken.
On January 3, 1953, plaintiffs having refused and failed to comply with the order of condemnation and for the removal of personal property, the town of Granville caused the personal property to be removed from the premises and razed the buildings. To accomplish this the town had to employ eight firemen and a fire truck; the town highway department had at least six men on the job at various times, four dump trucks, and a snowplow. Personal property and animals were loaded on the trucks and removed to the barn of Harold Guenther for storage and care.
The cost of razing and removal and other costs incidental thereto were imposed as a lien on the land in the amount of $1,500. Plaintiffs were notified of the removal of the personal property and advised that if they did not claim the same within six months after January 3, 1953, it would be sold for storage. No appeal was taken from said order.
The present action was commenced in May, 1953. The defendant town of Granville moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, which came before Judge RONOLD A. DRECHSLER. The trial court, in denying the motion, determined that there was only one issue for determination, to wit, the reasonableness of the $1,500 lien against plaintiffs' property for the razing of the buildings.
That issue was tried in the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Judge SULLIVAN presiding, in February, 1958. The jury returned its special verdict finding that the lien of $1,500 was reasonable, and judgment was entered accordingly.
The only question involved on this appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the lien of $1,500 was reasonable. Appellant Oosterwyk, acting as his own attorney, dealt with many matters in his brief and oral argument which are outside the record and can have no bearing on the decision in this case.
The razing of the appellants' buildings, out of which this action arises, was done by the town of Granville pursuant to the provisions of sec. 66.05, Stats. Sub. (1) of said section provides that where, in the judgment of the inspector of buildings of a municipality, a building is so old, dilapidated, or out of repair and unrepairable, as to be "dangerous, unsafe, insanitary, or otherwise unfit for human habitation, occupancy, or use," the inspector may order the owner of the premises to raze and remove the building. The order shall specify the time in which the owner shall comply therewith and shall be served on the owner in the same manner as a summons is served. Sub. (2) of the section provides that if the owner shall fail or refuse to comply within the time prescribed, the inspector shall cause such building to be razed and removed and the cost of such razing and removal shall be charged against the real estate, be a lien thereon, and be assessed and collected as a special tax.
Sec. 66.05 (3), Stats., provides that "Anyone affected by any such order shall within thirty days after service of such order apply to the circuit court for an order restraining the inspector of buildings or other designated officer from razing and removing such building or part thereof or forever be barred. . . ."
Sub. (5) of sec. 66.05, Stats., provides for the issuance and service of an order for the removal of personal property by a certain date, and if it is not removed "the inspector may store the same, or may sell it, or if it has no appreciable value he may destroy the same." In case the property is stored the amount paid for storage shall be assessed and collected as a special tax against the real estate. The owner must be notified of the place of its storage, and if it is not claimed by him, it may be sold after six months and the proceeds, if any, after deducting the expenses of razing and removal, remitted to the circuit court with a report of the sale. Anyone affected by such order may appeal as provided in sub. (3).
The proceedings outlined by the statute were adhered to by the town of Granville in this matter. Appellants were duly served with the order of condemnation of November 2, 1950. There was no compliance with the order and no attempt by appellants to follow the provisions of sec. 66.05 (3), Stats., for a review of the condemnation order.
On May 21, 1951, appellants were served with an order to remove personal property from the premises within ten days. They failed to comply.
On January 3, 1953, the buildings were razed by the town, the personal property having been removed therefrom by the building inspector.
On March 19 and 20, 1953, appellants were notified of the place where the personal property was stored and if they did not claim it within six months from January 3, 1953, it would be sold. The property was not claimed and there was no appeal from that order, as provided by sec. 66.05 (5), Stats.
Sec. 66.05, Stats., has been held constitutional. Baker v. Mueller (7th Cir. 1955), 222 F.2d 180. The remedy provided in sub. (3) of the statute being exclusive and the appellants not having seen fit to pursue it, they are "forever barred."
The evidence as to the expenses incurred by the town of Granville in connection with the razing and removal of appellants' buildings shows the following facts: Appellants' personal property and animals were removed to the farm of Harold Guenther for storage and care. Guenther's charges therefor, covering the period January 3, 1953, to August 3, 1953, amounted to $1,583. His charges for care and feeding of the goats, sheep, and poultry were based upon charges made by the humane society for boarding animals. In August the town sold Guenther the animals and personal property for the amount of the care and storage.
The town employed four dump trucks to remove the personal property and animals from appellants' premises. It used a snowplow to push the sheds down. Six highway department workers were employed in these operations. The debris was set afire and eight firemen and a fire truck were on the scene for two to three hours. The use of the fire engine alone had a value of $500 an hour, that being the amount agreed upon between the town of Granville and the village of Bayside for use of a piece of Granville fire equipment at a Bayside fire. The town paid $209.53 for labor.
Lawrence G. Wickert, attorney for the town of Granville, testified that on the basis of $15 per hour for his professional services, the legal work he had done with respect to the razing and removal, including time necessarily spent on the several actions brought by appellants against the town in this matter, totaled $1,500 in legal fees, which Wickert was paid by the town.
There is evidence that the town invited bids for the razing of the buildings and received a bid in the amount of $994. This amount covered razing and removal only. Even if the town had accepted the bid instead of razing the buildings itself, it would still have incurred the expenses of removing and storing the personal property, as well as Wickert's legal fees.
Appellants presented no evidence whatever to show that the charges recited above were unreasonable and excessive. On the contrary, it appears that the amount of the lien is considerably less than the evidence would have warranted. We must conclude that the evidence amply supports the jury finding that the amount of the lien was reasonable, and the court properly entered judgment on the verdict.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.