ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

EDWARD RAFEEDIE, United States District Judge

The Court has read and considered the papers filed in connection with the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration, and after hearing the oral arguments of the counsel in this case, hereby GRANTS Defendant's motion for the following reasons:

[1] First, under the recent Supreme Court decision of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001), the arbitration agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Plaintiffs argument that arbitration of her FEHA and CFRA claims are foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit decision in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens Company, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) is misplaced. The Duffield decision, which was pre-Circuit City, held that Title VII and FEHA claims could not be subjected to compulsory arbitration, and specifically declined to apply the general federal policy in favor of arbitration. However, the Supreme Court in Circuit City upheld an arbitration clause against plaintiffs FEHA claim. The Court noted that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination, and that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by statutes; it only submits their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Circuit City Stores, Inc., 121 S.Ct. at 1310. Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duffield should not preclude arbitration of Plaintiffs FEHA or CFRA claims.

[2] Second, Plaintiff made a knowing agreement to arbitrate her claims. Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment agreeing to submit all claims regarding termination to arbitration which explained that Plaintiff was agreeing to submit to a neutral arbitrator and not a judge in a court of law. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff made a knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to bring her ADA and other discrimination claims into Court.

[3] Third, the Court FINDS that the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable because (1) the agreement plainly advised the employee of the requirement to arbitrate, and thus was within the reasonable expectations of the Plaintiff; and (2) the agreement is bilateral, equally binding both the employer and the employee to raise all claims in arbitration, thus reflecting that the terms of the agreement were not oppressive. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Svcs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).

[4] Fourth, the Defendant has not waived its right to compel arbitration. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Circuit City, Defendant could not bring a motion to compel arbitration because the FAA did not extend to contracts of employment in the Ninth Circuit. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 10 93 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, Defendant's delayed filing of its motion to compel until now does not constitute a waiver because it was the first opportunity for Defendant to file such a motion. See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 837 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1988) (delay in filing a motion to compel arbitration because to do so earlier would be futile does not constitute inconsistent conduct leading to waiver).

[5] CONCLUSION: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff must submit her claims to arbitration. Plaintiffs complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice, so it may be properly submitted to arbitration under the employment agreement. Consistent with the terms of the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff shall have 180 days from today to bring her claims to arbitration. Furthermore, due to the dismissal of this case, Defendant's summary judgment motion hearing set for April 30, 2001 is HEREBY VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve, by United States mail or by telefax or by email, copies of this Order on counsel for the parties in this matter.