Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SC20050234.
SIMS, J.
Months after the trial court issued and served a signed, file-stamped minute order denying defendant Mary Abbott’s motion to set aside the default judgment entered against her in this action, it conducted oral argument on that motion and thereafter granted it.
In our prior unpublished opinion, Okoye v. Abbott (Nov. 9, 2007, C054510) [nonpub. opn.] (Okoye I), we held that the trial court’s written minute order denying Abbott’s motion was not a tentative decision and, after it issued, the trial court lost jurisdiction and had no power to later change its mind and grant her motion.
Following our opinion in Okoye I, Abbott attempted to circumvent its effect by asking the trial court to correct a “clerical error” in the disputed minute order by inserting the words “tentative ruling” into its text. The trial court refused; Abbott appeals.
We shall affirm.
BACKGROUND
Okoye I
The following facts are taken verbatim from this court’s November 9, 2007, unpublished opinion in Abbott’s first appeal:
“This action has its genesis in a legal malpractice action. Okoye obtained a $350,000 judgment in Los Angeles Superior Court against Nevada attorney George Abbott, who had once represented Okoye. George is a Nevada attorney; Okoye registered the Los Angeles Superior Court judgment in Nevada but allowed it to lapse. Okoye renewed the judgment in California and, in 1998, the unsatisfied judgment, plus interest, equaled $564,000. It has never been satisfied.
The amounts of the judgment and accrued interest identified as background facts are approximate.
Because both defendants have the same last name (Abbott), we shall call them by their first names when referring to them individually.
“In 2005, Okoye brought the instant case against George and Mary, individually and as trustees for the Abbott Family Trust, alleging that George had earned a legal fee of $500,000, which he had conveyed to Mary and or the Abbott Family Trust as a means of defrauding creditors, including Okoye. His complaint seeks relief on theories of fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment, and to impose a constructive trust.
George avers that Mary is his ex-wife and former legal assistant.
Okoye also (unsuccessfully) sought relief in Nevada from the allegedly fraudulent transfer.
“Neither of the Abbotts responded, the court entered their default and, in January 2006, it entered a default judgment against them.
“Three months later, the Abbotts moved to quash service of the complaint on the ground jurisdiction in California is improper. Okoye opposed the motion, and the court denied it.
“The Abbotts then moved to set aside the default judgment taken against them in the instant case. Okoye opposed the motion as untimely. The moving and opposing papers state that the hearing on the motion was set for July 14, 2006. On July 14, the court ‘took the matter under submission.’
“The court issued a minute order on July 27, signed by the judge, which stated in pertinent part: ‘The facts and the relevant legal principles were stated in the Court’s ruling on May 26, 2006, denying defendants’ motion to quash. [¶]... [¶] Defendants have not shown a satisfactory excuse for failing to diligently move to vacate the default... and the three-month standard has continually been applied by the appellate courts [citations]. [¶] The motion is denied.’ The court served a copy of the minute order on all parties.
“Sometime thereafter, the clerk contacted counsel to set the matter for oral argument.
“Oral argument on the Abbotts’ motion to set aside the default judgment was held on October 13, 2006. Okoye’s counsel objected at the hearing that the July 27 ruling constituted the final order of the court denying the Abbotts’ motion to set aside the default judgment, after which the court lost jurisdiction and could not conduct further proceedings on the motion.
“The court characterized the July 27 ruling as merely ‘tentative,’ noting that ‘if that was a final order of the Court... then I denied them the right to argue that -- those issues.’
“On October 18, the court issued a ‘Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Default Judgment,’ granted the motion to vacate the default judgment as to Mary only, and denied it as to George.
On the issue of the July 27 ruling, the court stated, “On July 14, 2006, this Court took the matter under submission and on July 27, 2006 this Court issued its ruling denying the motions to vacate. The defendant[s] had 10 days in which to request oral argument and on August 3, 2006 the defendants requested oral argument and oral argument was heard on October 13, 2006.”
“Thereafter, Okoye sought unsuccessfully in the trial court to set aside the court’s October 18 ruling.”
We examined the record, and concluded the trial court’s July 27 signed, served, file-stamped minute order constituted a final order, triggering the 60-day time period for appeal. Accordingly, the order became final on September 25, and the court “had no power on October 17 to conduct oral argument and no power to enter is ruling the following day granting that motion [to set aside the default judgment] as to Mary Abbott.”
Our opinion in Okoye I was filed on November 9, 2007. Abbott did not seek rehearing.
Current Proceedings
After our opinion in Okoye I became final, Mary Abbott attempted to avoid its effect by filing the instant motion to “correct[] clerical error nunc pro tunc,” by adding the words “tentative ruling” to its July 27, 2006, order.
In support of her motion, Abbott declared that, since our opinion in Okoye I issued, respondent Okoye has been executing on his unsatisfied judgment by, among other things “attempt[ing] to seize all of my income including all deposits in my checking account; payment to me upon a reverse mortgage upon my home and my social security payments.”
Without a hearing, the trial court denied Abbott’s motion to “correct” its July 27, 2006, order.
DISCUSSION
Abbott insists the trial court “had the absolute duty” to “correct” its July 27, 2006, order by labeling it a “tentative” decision. She insists the trial court “clearly found” that order was a tentative ruling and, having done so, it cannot refuse to cure the omission.
Abbott also acknowledges that what she really seeks is the relief to which she contends she is “entitled... as a matter of law”: an order setting aside the default judgment taken against her.
She is mistaken.
Ordinarily, “‘[a] court of general jurisdiction has the power, after final judgment, and regardless of lapse of time, to correct clerical errors or misprisions in its records, whether made by the clerk, counsel or the court itself, so that the records will conform to and speak the truth. [Citations.]’” (Ames v. Paley (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 668, 672.) This inherent power is confirmed by statute. Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), states: “The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed....” (Id. at pp. 672-673.)
We find no error in the trial court’s refusal to amend the July 27, 2006, order to add “tentative ruling” to its title, and nothing in the record compels the conclusion that this “correction” was necessary for the order to “speak the truth.” (Cf. Ames v. Paley, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 672.) The trial court’s intention with respect to the finality of the July 27, 2006, order is well-ploughed ground. As we explained in Okoye I: “In addition to containing the indicia of finality required by the Rules of Court--the judge’s signature and the court’s file stamp (as we noted above)--nothing on the face of the July 27 minute order indicates the court intended it to be merely ‘tentative.’ The word ‘tentative’ appears nowhere in the text of the order or otherwise; rather, the order states that ‘the motion is denied’ and it does not indicate any further order on the topic will be prepared.”
To defeat the effect of these facts, Abbott makes the same arguments here we rejected as dispositive in Okoye I: that the court’s true intention that the July 27 order be merely tentative was reflected in (1) a July 14, 2005, “tentative ruling #5” declared that the court’s ruling on defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment would be another “tentative” one; and in the court’s post hoc statement it had “treated” the July 27 minute order as a tentative ruling.
We rejected those arguments and determined to the contrary that “we must look to the July 27 order itself to determine whether it was intended to be a final order. And, as we have explained, it has all indicia of a final order and none of the indicia of a tentative one.”
Having established in Okoye I that neither a self-identified July 14 tentative ruling nor the court’s post hoc statements transformed the court’s July 27 final decision into a tentative one, we find that determination to be the law of the case. “‘“The doctrine of the law of the case is this: That where, upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and, as here assumed, in any subsequent suit for the same cause of action, and this although in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.”’ The principle applies to criminal as well as civil matters....
“[¶]... [¶]
“The principal reason for the doctrine is judicial economy. ‘Finality is attributed to an initial appellate ruling so as to avoid the further reversal and proceedings on remand that would result if the initial ruling were not adhered to in a later appellate proceeding.’ [Citation.] Because the rule is merely one of procedure and does not go to the jurisdiction of the court [citations], the doctrine will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where there has been a ‘manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice’ [citation], or the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate determinations [citation]. The unjust decision exception does not apply when there is a mere disagreement with the prior appellate determination.” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786–787.)
It is immaterial whether the trial court recognized the proper application of the law of the case to Abbott’s motion to “correct” the July 27 order, or whether it found that acceding to her request would not cause the order to “conform to and speak the truth.” (Cf. Ames v. Paley, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 668, 672.) There was no error.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Okoye shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., NICHOLSON, J.