The plaintiffs herein are a partnership, known as O'Keefe Construction Company. The partnership is engaged in the contracting business, principally earth moving and grading in connection with highway construction at various places in the state of Wisconsin. The partnership consists of John R. O'Keefe, the father of the other partners, who resides in the city of De Pere, and owns a 36 per cent interest, Robert L. O'Keefe, who resides in the town of Lawrence, J. Patrick O'Keefe, who resides in the city of De Pere, Thomas R. O'Keefe, who resides in the city of Green Bay, all in Brown county, Wisconsin, each owning an 18 per cent interest, and Mary L. O'Keefe Stanton, who resides in the city of San Diego, California, and owns a 10 per cent interest. The partnership agreement provides that John, Robert, and Patrick will devote their time to the partnership business as their principal occupation and provides for the determination of a salary for Thomas in the event that he does so.

The O'Keefe Construction Company has a permanent establishment in the town of Ashwaubenon, Brown county, consisting of a permanent building for repair and storage of machinery and equipment, and a storage yard. The repair shop is used for reconditioning and repair of machinery and equipment during the winter months. Every machine and piece of equipment is returned to the shop for reconditioning and repair several times during its useful life, except a few large pieces of equipment, impractical to transport, which are left at locations where work is being done.

The partnership office is maintained in a house trailer. The office is located on the job in the summer, and at the storage yard in the town of Ashwaubenon during the winter. The residence of John O'Keefe, De Pere, Wisconsin, is used as a mail address for the partnership during the winter, and also as an address for such things as income-tax returns. During the construction season, the mail address of the partnership is the post office serving the location of the partnership office at the jobsite. Change-of-address cards are filed at each post office for forwarding mail when the office address changes so that all first-class mail is either addressed to the then current post-office address of the partnership, or forwarded to it.

The income-tax returns of the O'Keefe Construction Company showed the city of De Pere as the location of the partnership, and the mailing address was that of the residence of John R. O'Keefe in De Pere, Wisconsin.

None of the partnership personal property has ever been located or customarily kept in the city of De Pere.

For the year 1957, the city of De Pere assessed the partnership personal property, and levied a tax in the amount of $7,312; the town of Ashwaubenon also assessed the property, and levied a tax in the amount of $1,200; both were paid under protest. On August 4, 1958, this action was brought to determine which defendant could lawfully levy the tax and to recover any amount unlawfully collected.

On March 20, 1959, the court entered its judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint as to defendant town of Ashwaubenon, and for recovery by the plaintiffs from the city of De Pere of the sum of $7,312, plus interest and costs. The city of De Pere appealed.

FAIRCHILD, J.

Sec. 70.13(1), Stats., provides:

"All personal property shall be assessed in the assessment district where the same is located or customarily kept except as otherwise specifically provided. Personal property in transit within the state on the first day of May shall be assessed in the district in which the same is intended to be kept or located, and personal property having no fixed location shall be assessed in the district where the owner or the person in charge or possession thereof resides, except as provided in sub. (5) of this section." (Emphasis supplied.)

The personal property with which we are concerned on this appeal is limited to those items which are never returned to the shop and are conceded to have no fixed location. The question where they shall be assessed is to be decided by applying the italicized language just quoted.

It is argued that because a partnership is not an entity, Westby v. Bekkedal (1920), 172 Wis. 114, 120, 178 N.W. 451, the words "district," "owner," and "resides" should be construed in the plural in this instance. This construction would lead to assessment in each of three municipalities in Wisconsin. Assessment of full value in each would tend toward the absurd, and suggest a constitutional question. Assessment by each of the three municipalities of the percentage of full value equal to the percentage of ownership of the partners resident in such municipality would be cumbersome. This formula would require a further formula for deciding where the 10 per cent interest of the partner residing outside Wisconsin should be reflected. The difficulties resulting from this construction do not recommend it as a probable intention of the legislature.

Sec. 70.18(1), Stats., provides in part:

"Personal property shall be assessed to the owner thereof, except that when it shall be in the charge or possession of some person other than the owner or person beneficially entitled thereto in the capacity of parent, guardian, husband, agent, lessee, occupant, mortgagee, pledgee, executor, administrator, trustee, assignee, receiver, or other representative capacity, it shall be assessed to the person so in charge or possession of the same."

It should be noted that while the word "person" includes a partnership (sec. 990.01(26), Stats.), a partnership is not expressly listed in the category of persons having charge or possession under sec. 70.18(1). None of the parties to this action claims that anyone other than the partnership has charge or possession of this personal property.

Sec. 70.21, Stats., provides in part:

"The personal property of a partnership may be assessed in the names of the persons composing such partnership, so far as known or in the firm name or title under which the partnership business is conducted, and each partner shall be liable for the taxes levied thereon."

We do not view this latter section as controlling the place where the property is to be assessed, but as providing for liability of each partner, whether the property be assessed in the firm name, or title, or the names of the known partners. The existence of this section does show that the legislature gave special notice to the ownership of personal property by partnerships and intended that each partner be liable for the entire tax rather than for his proportionate share.

Sec. 70.21, Stats., seemed to the circuit court to contain a sufficient recognition of the entity theory of a partnership to warrant regarding the partnership as an entity for the purpose of applying sec. 70.13(1) to the personal property here involved. It does make each partner liable for the full amount of the tax. The governmental service and protection furnished by the municipality where the partnership has its principal place of business may reasonably be said to benefit all the partners. It is at least as reasonable to permit that municipality to collect the tax from partners residing elsewhere as to permit any other to do so.

We conclude that the circuit court reached the most practicable and sensible construction of sec. 70.13(1), Stats. For the purpose of this subsection, the partnership is "the owner" and its "residence" is its principal place of business. See Walter G. Hougland v. McCracken County (1947), 306 Ky. 234, 206 S.W.2d 951, concerning residence or domicile of a partnership entity, and 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, p. 1073, sec. 1158, concerning residence of a corporation for purpose of venue.

Notwithstanding the use of the address of the residence of John O'Keefe for certain partnership purposes, the evidence supports the determination of the circuit court that the partnership's residence for the purposes of sec. 70.13(1), Stats., was at its permanent place of business in the town of Ashwaubenon.

We reach this decision by construction of the particular statute and do not intend to modify any general principle of partnership law.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.