PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Donna O'Brien (Claimant) appeals from an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming a decision of the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissing her reinstatement petition as being untimely filed under Section 413 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act).

On March 5, 1983, Claimant, while working as an L.P.N. at Montefiore Hospital (Employer), suffered a work-related injury for which she received compensation pursuant to a notice of compensation payable. After numerous supplemental agreements and decisions by WCJ's adjusting the amount of Claimant's compensation based upon her ability to work, the parties entered into their final supplemental agreement on July 7, 1987, that disposed of all of the pending petitions before the WCJ. That agreement provided that Claimant was entitled to partial disability in the amount of $72.99 per week for a maximum of 411 weeks. On that same date, the Board commuted Claimant's partial disability payments to $30,000.00. Claimant received her payment on July 31, 1987.

In the latter part of July, 1990, Claimant filed a reinstatement petition alleging a recurrence of her work-related disability. After she had gained employment, Claimant voluntarily withdrew that petition. On December 13, 1990, however, Claimant again filed a reinstatement petition contending that she signed the commutation petition under the mistaken belief that her back condition would improve. In her petition, Claimant contended that her back condition had, in fact, worsened, and she requested reinstatement of compensation.

After holding evidentiary hearings, the WCJ concluded that, because the petition had not been filed within three years from the date of the commutation award, it did not fall within the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Relying upon Mason v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Acme Markets), 625 A.2d 1271 (Pa.Commw. 1992), the WCJ dismissed the petition. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ's decision, and this appeal followed.

Claimant first contends that the Board erred in determining that her reinstatement petition was time-barred under Mason. In Mason, this Court held that, for purposes of determining whether a petition is time-barred after a commutation of benefits, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date that the claimant received the lump sum payment of commuted benefits. 625 A.2d 1273. If the petition has not been filed within three years from that date, then it does not fall within the statute of limitations period. Id. Unlike in Mason, Claimant argues, Employer has continued to pay her medical expenses which should be considered compensation. Because she has continued to receive medical benefits up to the time that she filed her reinstatement petition, Claimant contends, the three-year statute of limitations would begin to run from the date upon which she received the last reimbursement for medical expenses, and not, as found by the WCJ and the Board, from the date that she received her commutation payment.

The issue presented, therefore, is whether the medical benefits Claimant received from Employer constitute "compensation" as that term is used in Section 413 of the Act. No Pennsylvania case law directly addresses this issue, nor does the Act define "compensation." Rather, the determination of whether medical benefits are to be included as part of a claimant's compensation must be made on a section-by-section basis, looking to the language of the section and the legislative intent behind it. See Berwick Industries v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Spaid), 537 Pa. 326, 643 A.2d 1066 (1994); Insurance Company of North America v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Kline and Packard Press), 586 A.2d 500 (Pa.Commw. 1991), aff'd, 533 Pa. 112, 619 A.2d 1356 (1993); Furhman v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Clemens Supermarket), 515 A.2d 331 (Pa.Commw. 1986), appeal dismissed, 518 Pa. 59, 540 A.2d 267 (1988); Glinka v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Sears, Roebuck, and Co.), 462 A.2d 909 (Pa.Commw. 1983).

For example, in Berwick Industries, our Supreme Court held that medical benefits are to be considered compensation for purposes of determining whether their recovery is precluded under the statute of repose set forth in Section 315 of the Act. After observing that the term "compensation" was not defined in the Act, our Supreme Court examined Section 315 and noted that it is a statute of repose that completely extinguishes a claimant's right if he or she has failed to file an action to enforce that right within the prescribed period. 643 A.2d at 1068. The Supreme Court then examined a related provision in the same article of the Act which established an employer's liability and which included medical expenses within "compensation." Our Supreme Court reasoned that Section 315, which extinguishes an employer's liability, must be read parallel to the section establishing that liability, and therefore, medical expenses were considered to be compensation for purposes of the statute of repose. Id. at 1069.

On the other hand, this Court addressed the issue of whether medical expenses are to be considered part of "compensation" where a claimant was seeking reimbursement for medical expenses after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations for a petition to set aside final receipt. Furhman v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Clemens Supermarket), 515 A.2d 331 (Pa. Commw. 1986), appeal dismissed, 518 Pa. 59, 540 A.2d 267 (1988). In Furhman, the claimant was no longer receiving compensation because he and his employer had executed a final receipt. More than three years after signing the final receipt, the claimant filed a claim petition for payment of medical expenses. In ruling that the petition was not time-barred, we examined the language of Section 306(f.1)(9) and determined that, under that section, it was not necessary for an employee to sustain a loss of earning power to qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses arising out of a work-related injury. Section 306(f.1) suggests that there may be reimbursement for medical expenses after the statute of limitations has expired, and separates the concept of "medical services" from the concept of "compensation." Id. at 334. Because medical expenses and compensation are considered separate items under Section 306(f.1), we determined that the statute of limitations was wholly inapplicable to the payment of medical services pursuant to Section 306(f.1). Id. at 335.

While Furhman was concerned with the issue of whether reimbursement for medical expenses can be barred by the three-year statute of limitations, and not, as here, whether the payment of medical expenses can toll the statute of limitations, its reasoning is nevertheless applicable to the present case. Section 306(f.1)(9) draws a distinction between compensation and medical benefits. Where an employer's liability to pay compensation for a work-related injury has previously been determined, the payment of medical expenses are wholly independent of the statute of limitations on a petition to modify or reinstate benefits and cannot, in turn, toll that statute of limitations.

To hold otherwise would lead to an illogical result under the Act. Section 306(f.1) of the Act requires an employer to pay a claimant's reasonable and necessary medical expenses arising out of the work-related injury. However, if the employer complies with this duty, and were we to consider medical expenses to be compensation as that term is used in Section 413 of the Act, then the statute of limitations would never expire so long as the employer is paying the claimant's medical expenses. This would be true even though the claimant has never filed a claim petition seeking compensation.

Even if Employer's payment of her medical expenses does not toll the three-year statute of limitations, Claimant contends that Mason is not dispositive of her reinstatement petition. Claimant argues that the commutation of her benefits is nothing more than a lump sum payment of compensation that is otherwise payable over the remaining period of partial disability. Here, Claimant argues, the commutation agreement recognized that she would suffer an ongoing partial disability for a period of 411 weeks, and therefore, the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the last week of her disability period has expired.

This argument was recently addressed by this Court in Waratuke v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Handee Marts), 687 A.2d 1219 (No. 2124 C.D. 1996, Pa. Commw., filed January 23, 1997). In that case, we followed Mason and held that the three-year statute of limitations period began to run on the date when the claimant had received the final commutation payment, and therefore, a reinstatement petition filed more than three years after that date was untimely. Id. Likewise, in the present case, because Claimant filed her reinstatement petition on December 13, 1990, more than three years after she had received her commutation payment, her petition is also untimely.

Accordingly, the order of the Board affirming the WCJ's dismissal of Claimant's reinstatement petition as untimely is affirmed.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 1997, the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board at No. A94-2150, dated June 28, 1996, is affirmed.