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affirming district court's treatment of Rule 60(d) independent action as a second or successive application under § 2255, and dismissal of the same for failure to obtain authorization from court of appeals
Summary of this case from Taylor v. United StatesOpinion
No. 05-5293.
Filed On: October 31, 2007.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
BEFORE: Henderson, Tatel, and Kavanaugh, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief and appendix filed by appellant. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). It is.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court's orders filed May 19, 2005 and June 21, 2005, be affirmed. Because appellant's Independent Action sought to present a new claim for relief from the criminal judgment against him, the district court properly treated the pleading as a second or successive application under § 2255 and determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion without certification by this court. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-32 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed.R.App.P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.