[27] SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I subscribe generally to the well-founded dissent of Mr. Justice Summers. Because of the broad holdings of the majority, which may jeopardize other statutes, I feel obliged to make additional observations.

It is a universally accepted principle that a statute is presumed to be constitutional. The burden of establishing unconstitutionality rests upon the party who attacks the statute. State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So.2d 192 (1965); 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, § 172, p. 390.

In the present case, the trial court held no evidentiary hearing before declaring the statute unconstitutional. Apparently, it issued a temporary restraining order on the face of the petition. With the case in this posture, the majority holds the statute unconstitutional.

The extension of constitutional concepts to strike down liquor ordinances based on local option elections had its inception in 1972. In State v. Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794 (1972), a majority of this Court on first hearing held that certain local option ordinances violated "the constitutional right of equal protection." This holding was corrected on rehearing. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, that court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question, finding that the case presented no substantial question under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See 411 U.S. 961, 93 S.Ct. 2147, 36 L.Ed.2d 681 (1973).

Two years later, this Court decided another local option case: State v. Sissons, La., 292 So.2d 523 (1974). Again the unconstitutionality of the ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause was pleaded. The majority, however, rejected the constitutional approach. Instead, the majority held that the local option ordinances had lapsed in 1950 with the enactment of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, because the savings clause in the Revised Statutes was inadequate.

As noted in my Sissons dissent, this holding represented an abrasive treatment of the established jurisprudence, for numerous prior decisions had consistently held that the ordinances were still in effect. See State v. Bradford, 220 La. 176, 56 So.2d 145 (1951); State v. Reed, 220 La. 720, 57 So.2d 413 (1952); State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990, 60 So.2d 897 (1952); State v. Dunning, 224 La. 204, 69 So.2d 16 (1953); 112 Grocery v. Cappel, La.App., 228 So.2d 157 (1969), cert. den. 255 La. 246, 230 So.2d 94 (1970); Melton v. Winn Parish Police Jury, La.App., 228 So.2d 58 (1969), cert. den. 255 La. 153, 229 So.2d 734 (1970); State v. Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794 (1972), appeal dismissed 411 U.S. 961, 93 S.Ct. 2147, 36 L.Ed.2d 681 (1973).

After hundreds of prosecutions, jail sentences, and fines extending over a period of more than twenty years, this Court decided that the basic ordinances had lapsed in 1950.

The present holding of unconstitutionality is based upon two grounds. The majority first holds that Act 41 of 1974, providing for the holding of local option elections, is a local or special law on the following subjects: (1) the holding and conducting of elections; (2) regulating labor, trade, manufacturing, or agriculture; and (3) concerning any civil or criminal action. Secondly, the Court holds that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the state and federal constitutions.

When the statute is tested under the 1921 constitution, it is clear that Act 41 of 1974 is not a "local or special law." The statute applies state-wide. It is true that various parishes are excepted from the parish-wide vote and the low alcoholic content provisions, but these parishes can avail themselves of the remaining local option provisions. If geographical exceptions to state-wide statutes render them invalid, then many statutes on the books reciting "Orleans Parish excepted" are in jeopardy.

General statutes, like the present one, with special provisions or exceptions have been upheld as valid. See Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508 (1941); State v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936).

In Peck v. New Orleans, supra, a 1940 statute authorized the use of voting machines in sixty-three parishes of the State, but made their use in Orleans Parish mandatory. This Court held that the statute was not local or special.

In Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage Dist., 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d 774 (1953), the Court held that a statute ratifying the title of the particular drainage district to certain property illegally purchased at tax sale was not a local or special act.

Thus, I conclude that the statute is not a local or special law.

Because of the possible effect of the majority holding on other statutes, I point out that the prohibition against enactment of special or local laws concerning any civil or criminal action "means merely that the Legislature shall not pass a local or special law affecting any particular lawsuit or regulating the trial of lawsuits, civil or criminal, in a particular locality." See State v. McCue, 141 La. 417, 75 So. 100 (1917); State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103 (1917). The majority errs in applying the 1974 Constitution to the present statute. The current constitution went into effect on January 1, 1975, and is not retroactive. Art. 14, § 26 La.Const. (1974).

The holding that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause, in my opinion, lacks support in the jurisprudence and may well jeopardize other statutes.

In State v. Guidry, supra, upholding a state trespass statute applicable only to Jefferson Davis Parish, this Court stated:

"The equal protection clause relates to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas. Clearly, the guaranty of equal protection is not a demand that all state laws operate from boundary to boundary. It compels no state to adopt an iron rule of territorial uniformity for legislation. In the enactment of laws, the Legislature may consider the 'needs and desires' of the various sections of the state without infringing equal protection.

* * * * * *

"The rich diversities in the land, people, and culture of Louisiana are matters of common knowledge. They have been celebrated in song and story. Many of these are deeply rooted in history. The rural-urban diversity is but one of several that affect trespass laws. The variegated patterns of topography and land-use militate against state-wide uniformity in trespass legislation.

"The defendant has assailed the statute by motion in arrest of judgment, directed only at defects patent upon the face of the record. LSA-R.S. 15:517. He, of course, has made no showing that the relevant conditions and needs in Jefferson Davis Parish are the same as those of the other parishes. See McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393. The Court cannot assume the absence of differences when there is no proof. Ft. Smith L. T. Co. v. Board of Imp. of Paving Dist. [ 274 U.S. 387, 47 S.Ct. 595, 71 L.Ed. 1112, citation supplied]."

See also Bennett, Public Law Criminal Law, 26 La.L.Rev. 567-577.

Here, as in State v. Guidry, supra, the trial court received no evidence and acted upon the face of the petition. In my opinion, the majority has erred by failing to honor the presumption of constitutionality and holding, contrary to prior jurisprudence, that the statute on its face is unconstitutional.

For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent.

[51] SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).

According to a petition filed by plaintiffs in the district court, the Jackson Parish Police Jury on May 12, 1975 called an election pursuant to a petition of 25 percent of the qualified electors of the parish under the provisions of Act 41 of the Regular Session of the Legislature of 1974. The election was scheduled to be held in Jackson Parish on a parish-wide basis on July 1, 1975, at which time these four propositions authorized by Act 41 were to be presented to the electors of Jackson Parish:

(1) Shall the sale of beverages of low alcoholic content containing more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight, and not more than six percent alcohol by volume, be permitted?

(2) Shall the sale of beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume, but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight, be permitted?

(3) Shall the sale of beverages of high alcoholic content containing more than six percent alcohol by volume for consumption on the premises be permitted?

(4) Shall the sale of beverages of high alcoholic content containing more than six percent alcohol by volume be permitted by package only and not for consumption on the premises?

On the next day, May 13, 1975, after the police jury called the election, plaintiffs presented a petition to the district judge which attacked the constitutionality of Act 41, the authority relied upon by the police jury to call the election. Aside from the numerous grounds alleging the unconstitutionality of Act 41, plaintiffs alleged that they were electors and taxpayers engaged in the business of selling alcoholic beverages of more that 3.2 percent alcoholic content by weight in Jackson Parish and the holding of the election would cause them irreparable harm and damage. They prayed, therefore, that holding of the election be restrained and enjoined.

Based upon this petition, the district judge issued a temporary restraining order declaring that "the provisions of said Act are patently unconstitutional". No other reasons were assigned for this action. Based upon this action of the trial judge, defendants applied to this Court for supervisory writs. Considering the limited time for review prior to the election, certiorari was granted and the case was given preferential assignment.

Defendants' complaint that the temporary restraining order should not have been issued without notice and that Act 41 should not have been declared unconstitutional in a summary proceeding are relegated to a consideration of the constitutionality of the Act on the merits.

Although the majority has chosen to declare Act 41 unconstitutional on one of several contentions urged, in my opinion the error of the majority opinion is best brought to light by disclosing all of the issues presented.

It is elementary that every legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and valid unless clearly shown to encroach upon fundamental rights, or unless it is found to be repugnant to express provisions of the constitution. Olan Mills, Inc. of Tennessee v. City of Bogalusa, 225 La. 648, 73 So.2d 791 (1954); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953). Any doubt as to the constitutionality of an act must be resolved in favor of its validity. Johnson v. Collector of Revenue, 246 La. 540, 165 So.2d 466 (1964). The burden of establishing the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute rests upon the party attacking it. Hamilton v. McKeithen, 254 La. 683, 226 So.2d 494 (1969). It is a cardinal canon of constitutional interpretation that if an act of the legislature is susceptible to two interpretations, one favoring the other against constitutionality, the interpretation favoring constitutionality should be adopted by the courts. Pearce ex rel Structural Pest Control Commission v. Sharbino, 254 La. 143, 223 So.2d 126 (1969). It is in light of these principles that we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act.

I. Ex Post Facto

One contention is that Act 41 is retroactive in its effect and for that reason offends Article IV, Section 15, of the Constitution of 1921 providing that "No ex-post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed; . . . ." See also La.Const. Art. I, § 23 (1974).

The constitutional principle which prohibits ex-post facto laws and those impairing the obligation of contracts is well-recognized in Louisiana courts. State v. Ferrie, 243 La. 416, 144 So.2d 380 (1962); State v. Masino, 216 La. 352, 43 So.2d 685 (1949). The principle is embodied in Title 1, Section 2, of the Revised Statutes: "No section of Louisiana Revised Statutes may be construed to be retroactive unless it is expressly so provided." Thus all laws in Louisiana are prospective in their effect unless otherwise declared in the Act. There is no provision of Act 41 declaring that it shall have retroactive effect. To the contrary, the entire theme of the Act amending existing sections of the Revised Statutes pertains to procedures to determine, in the future by local option elections to be held thereafter, whether manufacturing, producing, using, distributing, storing or selling of beverages is to be permitted in political subdivisions.

Only one portion of the Act could conceivably express an intention to have retroactive effect; that being Section 588 announcing that "No provision of this chapter shall be construed as or have the effect of vitiating or affecting any ordinances adopted prior to 1948 . . ." prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages of certain content. Insofar as that language can be construed to validate ordinances declared invalid by this Court in State v. Sissons, 292 So.2d 523 (La. 1974), it can have no effect. Otherwise, however, the Act offends no part of the doctrine of Article IV, Section 15, of the Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws. And, since Section 3 of the Act is a severance clause, particularly pertinent here, it is quoted for emphasis:

"If any provision or item of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items or applications of this Act which can be given effect without the invalid provisions, items or applications, and to this end the provisions of this Act are hereby declared severable."

Plaintiffs' claim that a referendum prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages will divest them of vested rights by putting them out of business, with the loss and damage resulting therefrom, is without merit. Regulation of intoxicating liquors and alcoholic beverages is a valid exercise of the police power involving as it does the health, safety and morals of the population. La.Const. Art. XIX, 18 (1921). The fact that police power is not exercised, presents no obstacle to its exercise in the future. Just as when the authority to exercise the police power is delegated to a subdivision of the State, it may be withdrawn or modified at any time by the legislature.

Act 41 is, therefore, an exercise of the legislature's undoubted right to authorize the public to determine whether they will impose one of four, or all, or none, of the authorized restraints upon manufacturing, producing, using, distributing, storing or selling of beverages of alcoholic content. Such a legislative authorization offends no constitutional guaranty. The Act is, except for Section 588, wholly prospective in its operation.

II. Total prohibition

It is asserted that the purpose of Act 41 is to amend and re-enact Section 588 of Title 26 of the Revised Statutes of 1950 relative to the prohibition of beverages containing under 3.2 percent alcohol and to provide for the revival of ordinances adopted and in effect on a parish-wide, ward or other basis prior to 1948, which prohibited the sale of such beverages.

As contained in the Revised Statutes when enacted in 1950, Section 588 of Title 26 read:

"Prohibition of the sale of any or all alcoholic beverages by a local option election held pursuant to this chapter shall not operate as a prohibition of the manufacturing, producing, using, distributing, storing or selling of beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight."

By Act 705 of 1972 the foregoing provision was reenacted with this additional language:

"Provided, however, this section shall not be construed as or have the effect of vitiating or affecting any ordinances adopted prior to 1948 by any political subdivision which prohibited the sale of beverages containing alcohol of more than one-half of one percent by volume; to preserve those ordinances of local subdivisions that prohibited the sale of beverages containing under 3.2 percent alcohol which were adopted prior to and were in effect in 1948, and any court decisions to the contrary are legislatively overruled."

In this posture, Section 588 of Title 26 was considered by this Court in State v. Sissons, 292 So.2d 523 (La. 1974). There the Court noted that the language added to Section 588 by Act 705 of 1972 purports to direct the manner in which the section was to be construed and "to preserve those ordinances" prohibiting beverages of less than 3.2 percent alcoholic content. This attempt to interpret the law by the legislature was rejected as a usurpation by that body of a judicial function. It was further noted that Section 588 as amended did not refer to parish-wide prohibition ordinances.

Thereafter Act 41 of 1974 was enacted, and Section 588 was again amended as will appear in the appendix to this opinion. During the same session in 1974, Act 325 was enacted again superseding that portion of Act 41. This later Act 325 was declared unconstitutional insofar as the Act sought to "revive" ordinances in effect prior to 1948. Tolar v. State decided April 24, 1975. The Tolar Court further declared: "Local option ordinances can be brought into effect in these parishes in only one way — each parish that seeks to have local option ordinances must conform with the specific requirements for calling local option elections and enacting ordinances pursuant to the election."

In the context of the instant case, the election is being called precisely according to the requirements of Act 41, and in keeping with the mandate of the Tolar Case, to establish the base for enactment of the necessary ordinance. This case does not concern in any respect the provisions of Section 588, and that section is not, as it cannot be, relied upon in any way. Any contention which seeks to inject Section 588 into the problems here are without effect. Section 588 has been amended by Act 325 of 1974 and that amendment has in turn been held to be invalid insofar as Section 588 is concerned.

Thus there is no statutory prohibition regulating or prohibiting alcoholic beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume, but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight.

When Act 41 authorizes an election to be conducted "to determine whether or not the business of manufacturing, producing, rectifying, distilling, blending, using, storing, distributing and selling alcoholic beverages" will be prohibited or regulated, the election determining that question becomes the will of the legislature. It is only necessary thereafter to implement that proposition with the necessary ordinance prescribing the appropriate penalties as authorized by Section 595 of Title 26 of the Revised Statutes:

"When the majority of qualified electors voting in an election held under the provisions of this Chapter determine that any or all of the businesses described shall not be licensed, the governing authority calling the election may provide for the prohibition by ordinance, and may provide penalties for the violation of the ordinances. The penalties shall not, however, exceed a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both."

As the Constitution of the United States makes clear, when the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, the transportation, possession and use of intoxicating liquors within a state were to be regulated thereafter by state law. Louisiana's authority to enact Act 41 is therefore plenary.

III.

Act 41 authorizes prohibition of alcoholic beverages on a parish-wide basis and the prohibition of beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume, but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight. It further declares that the authorization shall apply and is available for use only in the parishes of, or the wards or municipalities of, Beauregard, Washington, Rapides, Natchitoches, Red River, Grant, LaSalle, East Carroll, West Carroll, Bienville, Jackson and Winn.

The Act further provides that the exercise of this local option authority elsewhere in the state shall be confined to propositions 1, 3 and 4 to which reference has been made. Therefore, only proposition 2 is special to the parishes named above, the other three propositions being available throughout the state.

Plaintiffs contend that these provisions of the Act, applicable in certain aspects only to certain enumerated parishes, offend the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 2 and 14th Amendment.

In Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 58 S.Ct. 952, 82 L.Ed. 1424 (1938), it was held that the Twenty-first Amendment rendered the equal protection clause inapplicable to imported intoxicating liquors. Further, State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 57 S.Ct. 77, 81 L.Ed. 38 (1936), held that the Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors unfettered by the Commerce Clause. As the state is not so limited by the federal constitution, it is likewise not limited by any similar provision of the State Constitution. Plaintiff's argument in this respect is without merit.

IV.

Acts 37 and 41 of the Regular Session of 1974 were enrolled June 20, 1974, signed by the appropriate officials on June 20, 1974, sent to the Governor for approval on the same day, approved by the Governor June 26, 1974, and received by the Secretary of State on June 27, 1974.

Act 37 is enrolled on pages 1310 and 1311 of Volume I of the House Journal, while Act 41 is enrolled on page 1311. Aside from the fact that Act 41 follows Act 37 and is therefore a later act, the two enactments do not conflict. Act 37 is an additional procedure for certain enumerated subdivisions, while Act 41 is comprehensive general legislation governing local option elections state-wide, making the parishes already enumerated exceptions with regard to the sale of beverages containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by volume, but not more than three and two-tenths percent alcohol by weight. The acts are not in conflict.

V.

It is asserted by plaintiffs that Act 41 is a local and special law which is enacted contrary to the constitutional prohibition that "The Legislature shall not pass any local or special law on the following specified subjects: For the holding and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the place of voting ...." La.Const. Art. IV, #4. Except to assert the Act's unconstitutionality on this basis, no further argument is advanced nor is any authority cited. Notwithstanding that this contention was not considered by plaintiffs to deserve further treatment, the majority has seized upon this tenuous issue to declare Act 41 unconstitutional. Generally, I understand, it has been considered that this constitutional prohibition applies to election of public officials and not to the referendums authorized by Act 41 of 1974. However, I shall proceed to set forth my understanding of the law applicable to the issue.

Section 2 subd. B of Act 41 permits the exercise of the local option provisions in the wards and incorporated municipalities located in all parishes, except those enumerated, to submit three propositions to the electors and no other. However, Act 648 of the same session (La.R.S. 26:586.)1 was enacted adding an additional procedure permitting proposition 2 to be submitted by any ward or incorporated municipality in the State, thus eliminating the exception created by Section 2, subd. B of Act 41.

Thus, the narrow question upon which plaintiffs must rely to support their claim that Act 41 is local and special is the fact that parish-wide local option elections on proposition 2 are limited to twelve parishes all situated together geographically in the north central part of the State. As noted, this same proposition can be presented to the electorate in wards and municipal elections in other areas of the State. Therefore, although the parishes not included in the enunciation of the statute may not conduct a parish-wide election, they may attain the identical result by elections conducted by ward or municipality.

These enumerated parishes exercised the right by ordinances to regulate and prohibit the use of alcoholic beverages of certain content under the authority of Act 17 of 1935 and Act 372 of 1948 which authorized the exercise of local option by wards and municipalities. By this Court's decision in State v. Sissons, 292 So.2d 523 (La. 1974), it was held that the authority for the enactment of these ordinances was repealed by the enactment of the Revised Statutes in 1950. See my dissent in the Sissons Case and State v. Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794 (1972), in which the majority's equal protection rationale in the case at bar was rejected. The facts nevertheless demonstrate the strong need of these parishes for regulation of intoxicating beverages, located as they are in areas where custom is compatible with this legislation.

Since the decision in State v. Sissons, the legislature has sought by repeated enactments to preserve the right of those parishes to regulate the use of alcoholic beverages within their boundaries. See Act 705 of 1972, Act 235 of 1974 and the legislation mentioned in this opinion.

As a basic proposition, the law on the subject was succinctly set forth in City of Bogalusa v. Gullotta, 181 La. 159, 159 So. 309 (1935):

"The state may, under its police powers, enact laws regulating the liquor traffic, or it may prohibit the traffic altogether, either state-wide or in specified localities, and such statutes are constitutional. State v. Kenny, 141 La. 594, 75 So. 422; State v. McCue, 141 La. 417, 75 So. 100. Or it may prohibit the sale of liquor to certain persons, at certain places, or on certain days. Section 6, Act No. 176 of 1908, as amended by Act No. 21 of 1910, prohibits the sale of intoxicants to women, girls, or minors, and prohibits the sale in the same building to persons of the Caucasian and Colored races. Act No. 102 of 1890 prohibits the sale of intoxicants to inebriates or habitual drunkards. Act No. 43 of 1894 prohibits the employment of females in liquor saloons. Act No. 79 of 1908 prohibits the drinking of intoxicating liquors on railroad trains. Act No. 289 of 1910 prohibits the sale of such liquors on election days, and Act No. 18 of 1886 prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sundays. These are all special laws enacted under the police powers of the state, and we discover nothing in Act No. 15 of 1934 to indicate that the lawmakers intended by its adoption to wipe out such laws or any local prohibitory statute." (emphasis added.)

This authority makes clear that the regulation of intoxicating beverages is the exercise of the State's police power. State v. Gardner, 198 La. 861, 5 So.2d 132 (1942). The constitution emphatically declares that "The exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged." La.Const. Art. XIX, § 18. This means, quite obviously, that any other provision of the constitution which seeks to limit the police power must give way to the overriding considerations which require that the State's police power be unimpaired. Walmsley v. O'Hara, 182 La. 213, 161 So. 587 (1935). Even the essential right of due process must yield to a proper exercise of the police power. State ex rel Porterie v. Walmsley, 183 La. 139, 162 So. 826 (1935).

Whether a law is local or special is determined by equal protection arguments and they are not for that reason alone unconstitutional. The same is true of local or special legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The special and local law prohibition is aimed at maintaining equal protection and equality of persons as such, rather than between areas. Thus legislation which is limited to the area within which it is to operate is not prohibited. All that is required is that the laws be general in the locality in which they operate. Under this reasoning it is held that a classification is not illegal because certain cities are included while others are omitted from the operation of a statute. State ex rel Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N.W. 111 (1926); and the legislature may exercise its police power to fit the needs of the various sections of the state as it deems proper. Croft v. Lambert, 228 Or. 76, 357 P.2d 513.

In State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So.2d 192 (1965), we upheld a trespass statute defining criminal trespass in only one parish against the claim that it denied equal protection of the law, saying:

"Clearly, the guaranty of equal protection is not a demand that all state laws operate from boundary to boundary. It compels no state to adopt an iron rule of territorial uniformity for legislation. In the enactment of laws, the Legislature may consider the 'needs and desires' of the various sections of the state without infringing equal protection."

In like manner the voting machine law of 1940 has been upheld, making the use of voting machines mandatory in New Orleans, and granting to other parishes of the state the option of determining whether they will adopt voting machines or not. This Court held that this was not a "special law" or "local law". Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508 (1942). There the attack upon the voting law, conceding that special laws could be enacted based upon geographical classification, contended that the classification must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the Act, and it can never be arbitrary. In rejecting the contention the Court held:

"We cannot coincide with this line of reasoning for it is not the function of this court to charge the Legislature with making arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in the absence of clear manifestation that such was the case. On the contrary, in adopting the instant legislation there may have been many salutary reasons for requiring the use of voting machines ...."

The same is true in this case. Except for conclusory allegations, no facts have been set forth or affidavits attached which would establish that this is a local or special law concerning elections denying equal protection to these plaintiffs or other affected. True Act 41 does affect elections, but its primary object is the regulation of intoxicating liquors which in one narrow particular is applicable only to twelve parishes. It is not a matter of constitutional dimensions. Even if an act affects elections it must also be local or special in the sense that it unreasonably offends the doctrine of equal protection before it runs counter to the constitution. See Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemine Drainage District, 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d 774 (1953); State v. Capdeville, 104 La. 561, 29 So. 215 (1901). The conditions prevailing in those parishes, and their customs, which we recognize, La.R.S. 15:422, are a rational basis for the legislative action, and the attack is not well-founded.

In my view the Act is not constitutionally infirm.