MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice MORRIS.

In this post-conviction appeal, Thomas Everett Nix appeals the trial court's order denying forensic DNA testing. We affirm the trial court's order. The background of this case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant's attorney filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See Murphy v. State, 111 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel's brief and a motion in quod erat demonstrandum. In his brief, appellant presents four "responding points" and five issues as arguable grounds for appeal. In his four responding points, appellant complains (1) his appointed counsel on appeal did not conduct a diligent and thorough search of the record; (2) the trial court had no authority to act on the request for DNA testing; (3) appellant's due process rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, or both; and (4) the trial court failed to take note of the efforts appellant made to submit an affidavit. In his five issues, appellant complains (1) the trial court erred in ruling on the request for DNA testing; (2) the trial court erred in finding appellant had asked for forensic DNA testing; (3) the trial court erred in finding appellant was not able to provide the court with an affidavit; (4) the errors in the case were so pervasive that appellant's rights to due process and fundamental fairness were violated; and (5) the trial court failed to properly supervise appointed trial counsel. Appellant further contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. In conducting our Anders review, we review the entire record to determine whether the appeals are "wholly frivolous" or if there are issues "arguable on their merits." See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An appeal is wholly frivolous and lacks merit when it "lacks any basis in law or fact." See McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436, 438 n. 10 (1988). On February 12, 2002, counsel for appellant in his DNA cause of action filed a "request for approval of a defense expert and testing." In her request, counsel stated that appellant was requesting testing of marijuana "roaches" and a telephone cord from the evidence in his previous murder conviction. Counsel requested appointment of a defense forensic expert to assist her. The State filed a response to counsel's motion objecting to the lack of a supporting affidavit from appellant and pointing out that the DNA testing statute does not authorize the appointment of a defense expert. On February 15, 2002, the trial court conducted a short hearing on the request. The trial court concluded that it could not proceed with appellant's DNA testing proceeding until appellant filed the required affidavit. The trial court then abated the proceeding to allow appellant time to file his affidavit. Although appellant and counsel engaged in intensive correspondence about the case, appellant never filed a supporting affidavit. On February 28, 2003, the trial court conducted a status hearing. During the hearing, counsel explained to the trial court that appellant had submitted several draft affidavits to her but she and appellant had "a conflict on the legal theories of what was required" and so the affidavit had not been filed. Counsel informed the trial court that, in her opinion, appellant could not prevail on his motion even if testing was granted. The prosecutor agreed with counsel's conclusion and stated that he would have prosecuted appellant regardless of the DNA evidence. The trial court then issued its order denying testing on the grounds appellant had failed to file an affidavit and he could not show that a reasonable probability existed that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory DNA test results were obtained. In responding points two and four and issues one through five, appellant complains of various alleged errors by the trial court. Appellants contends the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process of law by determining his right to testing prematurely without waiting for counsel to file an appropriate motion for testing and supporting affidavit. Appellant contends the trial court ignored his efforts to prepare and file an affidavit and wrongly relied on defense counsel's determination of what constituted exculpatory evidence. Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that he did not and could not provide the required affidavit. Post-conviction DNA testing is governed by Chapter 64 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01-.05 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Article 64.01 requires an applicant to "submit to the convicting court a motion for forensic DNA testing of evidence containing biological material. The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit, sworn to by the convicted person, containing statements of fact in support of the motion." See Act of April 3, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 2, § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2, 2 (amended 2003) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)). Here, appointed counsel filed a request for forensic testing of identified evidence. Ultimately, the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor all treated the request as a motion for forensic testing. But, over a period of more than one year, appellant never filed a supporting affidavit to accompany the motion. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion for failing to comply with article 64.01(a). Article 64 contemplates that the affidavit will be filed with the actual motion. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 64.01(a). Thus, appellant's complaint that the trial court acted prematurely in denying the motion after allowing appellant one year to file his affidavit is without merit. Moreover, appellant's complaints about due process based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous trial court findings fail as arguable grounds of error, and, in light of the trial court's statutorily justified denial of the motion, these alleged errors are harmless. See Tex.R.App.P. 44.2. Appellant additionally contends in responding points one and three that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both trial counsel and appellate counsel in connection with the Chapter 64 proceeding. This Court has already determined that a Chapter 64 applicant may not raise an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hughes v. State, 135 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd). These complaints therefore also fail as arguable issues on appeal. We have reviewed the record, counsel's brief, and appellant's response. We agree the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's request for forensic DNA testing.