By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

Jackson Lewis P.C. and Paul T. Trimmer, Las Vegas; Marc C. Gordon and Tamer B. Botros, Las Vegas, for Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation, Nevada Checker Cab Corporation, and Nevada Star Cab Corporation.

Winner & Carson, P.C., and Robert A. Winner, Las Vegas, for Boulder Cab, Inc.

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation and Leon M. Greenberg, Las Vegas, for Christopher Thomas, Christopher Craig, and Dan Herring.

Joshua D. Buck, Reno; Michael P. Balaban, Las Vegas; Christian J. Gabroy, Henderson, for Amicus Curiae Nevada National Employment Lawyers Association.

Hejmanowski & McCrea LLC and Malani L. Kotchka, Las Vegas, for Amiens Curiae Western Cab Company.

Littler Mendelson and Rick D. Roskelley, Roger L. Grandgenett, Montgomery Y. Paek, and Crystal J. Herrera, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Sun Cab, Inc.

Law Office of Richard Segerblom, Ltd., and Richard Segerblom, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae International Technical Professional Employee Union.

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Bradley S. Schrager and Don Springmeyer, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Progressive Leadership Alliance of Nevada.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

This court determined in Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev. ––––, ––––, 327 P.3d 518 (2014), that the Minimum Wage Amendment, Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution, enacted by the voters in 2006, impliedly repealed NRS 608.250(2)(e)'s exemption of taxicab drivers from minimum wage requirements. In this opinion, we consider whether our holding in Thomas is effective from the date the opinion was published in 2014, only, or whether it should apply retroactively from the date the Amendment was enacted in 2006. As this court's function is to declare what the law is, not to create the law, we conclude that NRS 608.250(2)(e) was repealed when the Amendment became effective.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the 1970s, NRS 608.250 was amended to provide that taxicab drivers were exempt from the existing statutory minimum wage requirements. In 2004 and 2006, Nevada citizens voted to approve the Amendment, which amended the Constitution to set new minimum wage standards in Nevada but did not expressly repeal statutory provisions like NRS 608.250. The Amendment became effective on November 28, 2006.

In 2005, after voters had initially approved the Amendment and while it was pending a second vote, the then-attorney general released an opinion stating that the Amendment likely superseded NRS 608.250(2)'s exemptions of industries from minimum wage requirements. 05–04 Op. Att'y Gen. 12, 21 (2005). However, in 2009, a federal district court reached a different conclusion when it granted a limousine company's motion to dismiss a complaint filed by a group of limousine drivers requesting unpaid minimum wages. See Lucas v. Bell Trans, No. 2:08–cv–01792–RCJ–RJ, 2009 WL 2424557, at *8 (D. Nev. June 24, 2009), abrogation recognized in Thurmond v. Presidential Limousine, No. 2:15–cv–01066–MMD–PAL, 2016 WL 632222 (D. Nev. February 17, 2016). The court was considering whether the NRS 608.250 exemptions from minimum wage requirements were repealed by the Amendment's enactment in 2006, and it concluded that the exemptions were still valid, precluding the drivers' minimum wage claims. Id.

On June 26, 2014, this court published its opinion in Thomas, disagreeing with the Lucas decision and concluding that the Amendment impliedly repealed NRS 608.250(2)(e). 130 Nev. at ––––, 327 P.3d at 522. As a result, taxicab companies were required to pay taxicab drivers the minimum wage set forth in the Amendment. Id.

In two separate cases, real parties in interest Christopher Thomas, Christopher Craig, and Dan Herring (collectively, the taxicab drivers) filed class actions in district court against petitioners Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation, Nevada Checker Cab Corporation, Nevada Star Cab Corporation, and Boulder Cab, Inc. (collectively, the taxicab companies), seeking unpaid taxicab driver wages dating back to the effective date of the Amendment. The taxicab companies filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing that our holding in Thomas applied prospectively, not retroactively, which the district courts denied. The taxicab companies then filed these writ petitions challenging the district courts' orders, arguing that, under these circumstances, caselaw from the United States Supreme Court and this court provide that Thomas should apply only prospectively. Given the identical legal issues, we consolidate these writ petitions for disposition. See NRAP 3(b).

DISCUSSION

Writ of mandamus

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. ––––, ––––, 312 P.3d 484, 486 (2013) (quoting Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) ); see NRS 34.160. Generally, “[w]rit relief is not available ... when an adequate and speedy legal remedy exists.” Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. “While an appeal generally constitutes an adequate and speedy remedy precluding writ relief, we have, nonetheless, exercised our discretion to intervene under circumstances of urgency or strong necessity, or when an important issue of law needs clarification and sound judicial economy and administration favor the granting of the petition.” Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906,908 (2008) (footnote and internal quotations omitted).

We are aware of at least five other cases that have been filed in Clark County raising the same or similar question we consider in these writ proceedings. Moreover, the issue impacts employees statewide. Thus, these petitions raise an important legal issue in need of clarification, and this court's review would promote sound judicial economy and administration. We therefore exercise our discretion and consider these writ petitions to clarify whether our holding in Thomas is to be applied prospectively or retroactively.

The Nevada Constitution's minimum wage requirements became effective on the day the Amendment was enacted

The taxicab companies argue that under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), and Breithaupt v. USAA Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 110 Nev. 31, 867 P.2d 402 (1994), the holding in Thomas should apply purely prospectively because inequitable results will occur if taxicab drivers are provided back wages for work performed prior to the 2014 opinion. The taxicab companies further contend that they should not have been expected to predict that NRS 608.250(2)(e) was impliedly repealed, because the legal issue in Thomas was so close that three justices of this court dissented and the federal court in Lucas reached a different conclusion.

United States Supreme Court retroactivity precedent regarding civil laws on direct appeal

In Chevron Oil, the United States Supreme Court considered whether to apply its decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969), retroactively. 404 U.S. at 97–98, 92 S.Ct. 349. In Rodrigue, the Court concluded that state law remedies apply to claims filed under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act). 395 U.S. at 357–59, 89 S.Ct. 1835. As a result of Rodrigue, the Court in Chevron Oil determined that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations would typically apply to the injured respondent's action under the Lands Act. 404 U.S. at 99, 92 S.Ct. 349. However, if the one-year statute of limitations was applied against the injured respondent, his claim would have been barred because he filed the claim more than a year after the accident. Id. at 105, 92 S.Ct. 349.

The Court then considered whether retroactive application of its holding in Rodrigue was inappropriate under the circumstances presented. Id. at 105–08, 92 S.Ct. 349. The Court articulated three factors to consider when determining retroactivity before declining to apply Rodrigue, and the state one-year statute of limitations, against the injured respondent in Chevron Oil. Id. at 106–07, 92 S.Ct. 349. The Court reasoned that the injury at issue had occurred three years before the Rodrigue decision, and the lawsuit was filed one year before that decision. Id. at 105, 92 S.Ct. 349. The Court also noted that Rodrigue was a case of first impression in the Supreme Court, and it had overruled a long line of federal court precedent applying admiralty law, including the doctrine of laches. Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. 349. Ultimately, the Court concluded that it would be unfair and inconsistent with the Land Act's purposes to retroactively impose the one-year limitations period on the injured respondent. Id. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 349.

More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has strongly disapproved of the Chevron Oil factors when considering federal civil law. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94–97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (providing a comprehensive review of cases that call Chevron Oil into question). In American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, four dissenting justices concluded that limits on retroactivity in civil cases, such as those placed by Chevron Oil , are inappropriate. 496 U.S. 167, 218–24, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia concurred with the judgment, but agreed with the dissenting justices that:

prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be. The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide today—whether our decision in Scheiner shall “apply” retroactively—presupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is. Such a view is contrary to that understanding of “the judicial Power,” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, which is not only the common and traditional one, but which is the only one that can justify courts in denying force and effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 [5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60] (1803) —the very exercise of judicial power asserted in Scheiner.

Id. at 201, 110 S.Ct. 2323 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Subsequently, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, the Court determined, in plurality and concurring opinions, that in a civil context “it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so.” 501 U.S. 529, 540, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). The Court reasoned:

[L]itigants [should not] be distinguished for [retroactivity] purposes on the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive application of the new. It is simply in the nature of precedent, as a necessary component of any system that aspires to fairness and equality, that the substantive law will not shift and spring on such a basis.

Id. at 543, 111 S.Ct. 2439.

Finally, in Harper, for the first time, a majority of Justices joined in a majority opinion that held:

When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.

509 U.S. at 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510.

The Chevron Oil factors are inapplicable to this case

The taxicab companies argue, in effect, that NRS 608.250(2)(e) was not expressly or impliedly repealed at the time Article 15, Section 16 was passed; rather, the repeal happened when Thomas was decided. We conclude that this argument fails because, as stated by Justice Scalia, “[t]o hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it.” American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 201, 110 S.Ct. 2323 (Scalia, J., concurring). Furthermore, to conclude that Thomas applies only prospectively would be to “presuppose[ ] a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is.” Id.

The principles supporting Nevada's Separation of Powers Clause, Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1, preclude this court from having the “quintessentially legislat[ive] prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.” Harper, 509 U.S. at 95, 113 S.Ct. 2510 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

“The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others....”

Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1. “[L]egislative power is the power of law-making representative bodies to frame and enact laws, and to amend or repeal them. This power is indeed very broad.” Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 20, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967) ; see also Harper, 509 U.S. at 107, 113 S.Ct. 2510 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, not what the law shall be” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

Based on these principles, we hold that when we interpret a constitutional amendment and conclude that it impliedly repeals a statute, that decision applies retroactively to when the amendment was enacted regardless of the balance of equities. Thus, in Thomas we simply declared what the law was upon enactment of the Amendment in 2006, we did not create the law in 2014.

For these reasons, we must also reexamine our injection of the Chevron Oil factors into this court's analysis in Breithaupt. In Breithaupt, the appellant sued her automobile insurance company after a 1988 car accident claiming that the insurance company failed to comply with a statutory requirement that automobile insurance companies notify consumers about their uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage options. 110 Nev. at 32, 867 P.2d at 403. In reviewing the statute at issue, the Breithaupt court recognized that in Quinlan v. Mid Century Ins., 103 Nev. 399, 741 P.2d 822 (1987), the court previously interpreted the statute as requiring insurers to simply notify consumers that specific coverage was available. Breithaupt, 110 Nev. at 33, 867 P.2d at 404. However, this court further recognized that in 1990 the Legislature amended the statute to impose a heightened notice requirement, leaving “no doubt that ... Quinlan's notice standard [was] inapplicable to insurance transactions which occur after the effective date of the statute.” Id. at 35, 867 P.2d at 405.

The appellant in Breithaupt contended that the “[L]egislature considered Quinlan to be wrongly decided” and urged this court to instead retroactively apply the heightened standard imposed by the statute. Id. at 35, 867 P.2d at 405. In declining to apply the statute retroactively, we concluded that the legislative history for the 1990 amendment did not indicate the Legislature considered Quinlan wrongly decided. Id. However, reciting the Chevron Oil factors, we also stated that even if Quinlan was wrongly decided, we would still not apply the heightened notice requirement retroactively because “[t]he overruling of a judicial construction of a statute” is generally applied prospectively, and based on the potential for “highly inequitable” results. Id. at 35–36, 867 P.2d at 405–06.

Although we agree with Breithaupt's holding, we disagree with its reference to the Chevron Oil factors because the issue in Breithaupt involved whether a rule passed by statute—the heightened notice requirement—should apply retroactivity. The 1987 Quinlan decision pronounced what statutory notice requirement was in effect at that time. The Legislature amended that requirement in 1990, but did not express an intent to apply the heightened standard retroactively—this court's analysis should have ended there. See Pub. Emps. Benefits Program v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 124 Nev. 138, 154, 179 P.3d 542, 553 (2008) (“In Nevada, as in other jurisdictions, statutes operate prospectively, unless the Legislature clearly manifests an intent to apply the statute retroactively.” (internal quotations omitted)). It is not the duty of this court to determine whether rules adopted in statutory amendments apply retroactively based on equitable factors.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that MRS 608.250(2)(e) was repealed when the Amendment was enacted in 2006, not when Thomas was decided in 2014. Further, we decline to apply our caselaw in a purely prospective manner when considering the effect of a constitutional amendment on a statute. Accordingly, we deny the petitions for writs of mandamus.

We concur:

Parraguirre, C.J.

Douglas, J.

Cherry, J.

Gibbong, J.

Pickering, J.