Summary
holding in a Child Victim's Act ("CVA") case that the Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state diocese
Summary of this case from FOE v. OBLA. OF ST. FRANCIS de SALESOpinion
C.A. No. 09C-04-048 JTV.
April 29, 2010.
On Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. GRANTED.
Robert Jacobs, Esquire, Thomas. C. Crumplar, Esquire, and Jordan Ponzo, Esquire, Jacobs Crumplar, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Thomas S. Neuberger, Esquire, Stephen J. Neuberger, Esquire, and Raeann Warner, Esquire, The Neuberger Firm, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Steven P. Goodell, Esquire, Herbert, Van Ness, Cayci Goodell, PC, Princeton, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendants The Diocese of Trenton and St. Theresa parish
Anthony G. Flynn, Young Conaway Stargatt Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants The Diocese of Trenton and St. Theresa Parish.
ORDER
Introduction
Christopher Naples ("Naples" or "Plaintiff") brought suit against The Diocese of Trenton ("Diocese"), St. Theresa's Parish ("St. Theresa"), and Rev. Terence McAlinden ("Rev. McAlinden") seeking monetary damages for personal injuries from childhood sexual abuse by Rev. McAlinden. The Diocese and St. Theresa's now seeks dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Compl. ¶ 1.
Background
Naples filed the current action in April of 2009, after the enactment of the Delaware Child Victim's Act. Naples alleges that Rev. McAlinden abused him at least 200 times between the ages of 13 and 25, beginning in 1985 and continuing until 1996. As the Director of Youth Ministry for the Diocese, Rev. McAlinden ran and directed all of the Catholic Youth Organization ("CYO") programs in the Diocese. Naples was active in CYO events and met Rev. McAlinden at a CYO leadership conference held in New Jersey in 1985. The Complaint alleges that most of the acts of sexual abuse occurred in New Jersey, but several occurred in Delaware. In 1987, Naples asserts that Rev. McAlinden took Naples on a ferry to Rehoboth, Delaware for an overnight trip and sexually abused him in the hotel room. Again in 1987 or 1988, Rev. McAlinden allegedly took Plaintiff on another overnight trip to Delaware and again sexually abused him in the hotel room. Plaintiff asks the Court to infer that Rev. McAlinden took Plaintiff on trips to Delaware as part of his duties as Director of the Youth Ministry Services through Plaintiff's participation in the CYO.
Compl. ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 46.
Id. at ¶¶ 43, 47.
Id at 1.
Id, at ¶¶ 56-57.
Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.
Pl.'s Reply Br. at 6.
The Complaint states that Naples is not a resident of Delaware. The Diocese is a New Jersey corporation doing business in the State of New Jersey. St. Theresa's is a foreign corporation doing business in the State of New Jersey.
Compl. ¶ 2. The Complaint does not indicate the specific state where Naples resides.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Naples alleges an agency relationship existed between Rev. McAlinden and Defendants. Naples asserts that Rev. McAlinden was a Roman Catholic priest employed by the Diocese as an active priest from 1967 until 2007. In his capacity as a priest, Rev. McAlinden was employed to operate in homes, hospitals, parishes, schools, and churches on behalf of the Diocese and St. Theresa's. Naples asserts that Rev. McAlinden had the power to act on Defendants behalf and any acts done outside the scope of consent were ratified, affirmed, adopted, acquiesced in, and not repudiated by the Diocese and St. Theresa's and that such acts were enabled by the agency relationship.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at 82.
Id. at ¶¶ 83, 84.
Naples further contends that the Diocese and St. Theresa's had actual and constructive knowledge of Rev. McAlinden's acts of sexual abuse and that efforts were made to cover up Rev. McAlinden's actions. By failing to protect and supervise children in the Defendants' care, Defendants breached its duty it owed to Plaintiff. Naples now claims numerous damages as a result of this breach, including, but not limited to, physical problems, failure to trust anyone and to form relationships, shame, anger, guilt, anxiety, panic, depression, substance abuse, failure to maintain employment, PTSD, sexual dysfunction, lack of self confidence, and economic losses.
Id. at ¶¶ 22, 32.
Defendants argue that no allegations were made that Rev. McAlinden ever took Naples to Delaware for trips sponsored by the Diocese or St. Theresa. Furthermore, Rev. McAlinden was not acting as the agent of the Diocese or of St. Theresa when he allegedly committed the acts of sexual abuse and, therefore, any acts of abuse were committed outside the scope of employment and cannot be a basis to assert jurisdiction over Defendants.
Standard of Review
In a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie case to establish the basis for jurisdiction. This burden is satisfied if Plaintiff shows that Delaware's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction. The court first determines if jurisdiction is appropriate under the long-arm statute and, if it is, the court then determines if asserting such jurisdiction would offend the Due Process Clause. In making its determination, the court must view all factual disputes in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.Discussion
Analyzing personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the defendant's actions fall within any provisions of the long arm-statute and, second, the court must determine whether exercising jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible. Delaware's long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104, allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident, or a personal representative, who in person or through an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply services or things in this State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in this State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from services, or things used or consumed in the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses or possesses real property in the State; or
(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person, property, risk, contract, obligation or agreement located, executed or to be performed within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(5), and (c)(6) of the statute require a showing of specific jurisdiction, where the cause of action arises from acts or omissions taking place in Delaware. Subsection (c)(4), however, requires a showing of general jurisdiction, where Plaintiff's claims are unconnected with the nonresidents' activities. General jurisdiction requires more than minimum contacts with the forum state, a showing that defendant or its agent is "generally present" in the forum state is sufficient.
Boone, 724 A.2d at 1155.
Id.
Id.
If Defendants are found to be within the reach of the long-arm statute, the court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction comports with due process. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a nonresident defendant have such minimum contacts with the forum state so that "maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Defendants' conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that Defendants should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."
Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
In the current case, Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction in Delaware is proper based on the alleged agency relationship that existed between Defendants and Rev. McAlinden. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Diocese and St. Theresa's have acted within the forum state via its agent, Rev. McAlinden, for purposes of the long arm statute. Defendants contend that Rev. McAlinden was not acting as the agent of the Diocese or of St. Theresa's when he allegedly committed the acts of abuse. Pursuant to the agency theory of personal jurisdiction, "only acts of the agent that are directed by the principal may serve as a basis to assert jurisdiction over the principal." In applying the long-arm statute, the court "may consider the acts of an agent to the extent that these actions were directed and controlled by the principal." Therefore, the acts must have occurred within the scope of Rev. McAlinden's employment, and the Diocese and St. Theresa's must have directed the acts.
Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5-6.
Computer People, Inc. v. Best Intern. Group, Inc., 1999 WL 288119, *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 1999).
Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F.Supp. 1458, 1465-66 (D. Del. 1991) (citing Sears, Roebuck and Co., v. Sears PLC, 752 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (D. Del. 1990).
Elliot v. The Marist Bros. of the Schools, Inc., C.A. No. 09-611, 10 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2009).
In Elliot v. The Marist Brothers of the Schools, Inc., the District Court of Delaware granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss finding that Plaintiff failed to assert facts to support a finding that the Archdiocese of New York and the Church of the Nativity of our Blessed Lady ("moving defendants") knew of, directed, or authorized the travel to and/or through Delaware or knew of, directed, or authorized the alleged sexual acts that were committed in Delaware by Brother Damien Galligan. Therefore, the Court did not find the long-arm statute reached the moving defendants. The Court also noted that Plaintiff failed to assert facts that the moving defendants purposefully directed activities toward Delaware or otherwise engaged in conduct such that they would reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Delaware and, therefore, held that exercising jurisdiction over Defendants would not comport with due process.
Plaintiff alleges that Brother Damien Galligan sexually abused him in Delaware when they took overnight trips. Id. at 3.
The District Court of Delaware reached a similar holding in Voe #2 v. The Archdiocese of Milwaukee. In Voe #2, Plaintiff asserted an agency relationship existed between moving defendants and Brother David Nickerson ("Nickerson") and, based on this relationship, moving defendants should be held accountable for Nickerson's alleged tortious conduct in Delaware. The Court held that Plaintiff failed to assert facts to establish this relationship because he was not employed by moving defendants. The Court continued its rational and held that even if an employment relationship existed, Plaintiff failed to show how Nickerson's conduct related to his employment and failed to assert specific facts that moving defendants knew of, directed or authorized the tortious conduct that allegedly was committed by Nickerson in Delaware. Furthermore, the Court held that exercising personal jurisdiction over moving defendants did not comport with due process because no facts suggested that moving defendants purposefully directed activities toward Delaware or engaged in conduct such that they would reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Delaware.
C.A. No. 09-543 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2010).
Nickerson allegedly sexually abused Plaintiff between 1974 and 1982 each time he visited a mutual friend in Delaware. Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
The facts of Elliot and Voe #2 are similar to the current case and this Court follows the reasoning of those prior Opinions in granting the Motion before the Court. To satisfy Delaware's long-arm statute, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(3), Naples must establish that an agency relationship existed between Rev. McAlinden and the Diocese and St. Theresa's in order to hold Defendants accountable for the alleged tortious conduct that occurred in Delaware. Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff alleges that the Diocese employed Rev. McAlinden during the relevant time period, however, employment alone does not establish an agency relationship for personal jurisdiction purposes. As noted above, Delaware law requires that the act must have occurred within the scope of the agent's employment and the principal must have directed the act. Naples fails to assert facts that demonstrate the Diocese and St. Theresa's knew of, directed, or authorized the travel to and/or through Delaware. Furthermore, Naples fails to allege any facts that the Diocese and St. Theresa's knew of, directed, or authorized the tortious conduct that allegedly was committed in Delaware. Therefore, this Court finds that the long-arm statute does not reach defendants.
Even if an agency relationship did exist, the Court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants would not comport with due process. Plaintiff has failed to assert facts supporting a finding that Defendants purposefully directed activities toward Delaware or engaged in conduct such that they would reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Delaware. As noted in Elliot, the acts of the Diocese, not the acts of the priest, are considered when deciding if the Diocese purposefully availed itself of the protections of the forum state's laws or if it could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. In the current case, of the numerous alleged acts of abuse, the Complaint only alleges two occurred in Delaware. Additionally, the Diocese and St. Theresa's are incorporated in New Jersey and do business in New Jersey. There is no indication that Defendants could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Delaware or that suit in Delaware would be fair and reasonable. Accordingly, the Court does not find that due process is satisfied. Therefore, Defendants' Motion is granted.
Elliot, C.A. 09-611, at 11 (citing Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, Inc., 918 P.2d 17, 23 (N.M. App. 1996)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ORDER
AND NOW, TO WIT, this 29th day of April, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:Background
Plaintiff Christopher Naples ("Naples") filed the current action in April of 2009 after the enactment of the Delaware Child Victim's Act. Naples brought suit against The Diocese of Trenton ("Diocese"), St. Theresa Parish ("St. Theresa"), and Terence O. McAlinden ("Rev. McAlinden"), seeking monetary damages for personal injuries arising from childhood sexual abuse by Rev. McAlinden. Naples alleges Rev. McAlinden abused him at least 200 times between the ages of 13 and 25, beginning in 1985 and continuing until 1996. Most of the acts of sexual abuse occurred in New Jersey, but Naples alleges several acts of sexual abuse occurred in Delaware.
McAlinden is being sued as an individual and in his official capacity. Id. at ¶ 5.
Compl. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id.
Naples is not a resident of Delaware. Rev. McAlinden is a resident of New Jersey. The Diocese is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in New Jersey as a private religious organization that operates a church. Rev. McAlinden was employed by the Diocese as an active priest from 1967 until 2007. Beginning in approximately 1985 and continuing until 1988, Rev. McAlinden worked as the Director of Youth Ministry Services for the Diocese and was in charge of running and directing the CYO programs. The Diocese was allegedly responsible for the management and control of all of its parishes, including St. Theresa's, and for employing McAlinden to perform priestly functions at St. Theresa's.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. Rev. McAlinden was then transferred to inactive ministry, but continued to receive monetary compensation from the Diocese. Id.
Id. at. ¶¶, 24, 46.
Id. at ¶¶ 7-8
On June 15, 2009, in response to the Complaint filed against him, Rev. McAlinden filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Rev. McAlinden argues that New Jersey is a more appropriate forum and, therefore, the case pending before this Court should be dismissed. Specifically, Rev. McAlinden argues that New Jersey is a more proper forum because: (1) the Diocese and St. Theresa's originate out of New Jersey; (2) 98% of the alleged incidents of abuse took place in New Jersey; (3) the majority of the potential witnesses are located in New Jersey; (4) the majority of evidence which exists or may be offered at trial originates out of New Jersey; and (5) it would be an overwhelming hardship for the Defendant at age 68 to defend this matter in Delaware.
Naples opposes the Motion arguing that Rev. McAlinden has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that litigating in Delaware would impose and "overwhelming hardship." Oral arguments on this matter were heard before this Court on March 3, 2010. Based on the record before the Court, the Court is not convinced that Defendant's burden is satisfied and, therefore, the Motion is denied.
Discussion
The standard governing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens is well-settled in Delaware law. The burden rests on Defendant to show that litigating in Delaware would impose an "overwhelming hardship." This creates a heavy burden for Defendant and only in a rare case will a complaint be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs seeking to litigate in Delaware are afforded the presumption that its forum is proper and even more weight is given to Plaintiff's choice of forum where, as here, there are no other previously filed actions pending. Furthermore, whether there is an alternative forum that would be a more appropriate or convenient location for the litigation is not part of the analysis.The Court's analysis to determine whether the defendant has met his burden relies on the consideration of the six factors set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in General Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc. (" Cryo-Maid factors"). These factors are:
198 A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964).
(1) The relative ease of access to proof;
(2) The availability of compulsory process for witnesses;
(3) The possibility of the view of the premises, if appropriate;
(4) Whether the controversy is dependent upon application of Delaware law which the courts of this State more properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction;
(5) The pendency or nonpendency of a similar action or actions in another jurisdiction; and
(6) All other practical problems that would make trial of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
Warburg, Pincus Ventures, L.P. v. Schrapper, 774 A.2d 264, 267 (Del. 2001).
Defendant must show that one ore more of these factors imposes an "overwhelming hardship" on the defendant. It is not enough that the Cryo-Maid factors favor Defendant, instead, the trial court must weigh the factors in the particular case to determine whether any or all of them "truly cause both inconvenience and hardship."
Ison, 729 A.2d at 838.
Id.
In the current case, McAlinden continuously argues that New Jersey is the more convenient and appropriate forum for litigating the current case, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly held in Ison that this Court may not rest its analysis on the finding of a more appropriate forum. Accordingly, that argument is irrelevant to the current issue before the Court.
After reviewing the record before the Court and hearing oral arguments from both parties, the Court does not find that dismissal is warranted on forum non conveniens grounds. Defendant has failed to show, based on the Cryo-Maid factors, that requiring litigation to proceed in Delaware will result in overwhelming hardship.
The first Cryo-Maid factor, dealing with the relative ease of proof, does not support dismissal. Although some potential witnesses and evidence may be located in New Jersey, McAlinden fails to show how the distance between New Jersey and Delaware creates an undue hardship. Witnesses can be subpoenaed to attend Court in Delaware and evidence can be transported to this State. Additionally, at least some witnesses and evidence are already located in Delaware based on the allegation that several acts of abuse occurred locally.
The second Cryo-Maid factor is closely related to the first. The Court acknowledges that some potential witnesses may be required to travel from out of state if the suit proceeds in Delaware, however, Defendant has failed to prove that an overwhelming hardship exists if the case remains in Delaware.
The third factor, the possibility of a view of the premises, does not weigh in favor of dismissal. Although most alleged acts of abuse occurred in New Jersey, an actual viewing of where these acts occurred is unnecessary. Pictures and diagrams of the different locations of the alleged abuse are likely sufficient.
The fourth Cryo-Maid factor concerns the application of Delaware law. McAlinden argues that the application of Delaware law is limited because 98% of the alleged incidents of abuse took place in New Jersey. However, the Delaware Supreme Court has noted that it is not unusual for courts to "wrestle with open questions of the law of sister states or foreign countries" and has repeatedly held that "the application of foreign law is not sufficient reason to warrant dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens." Therefore, this argument does not persuade the court that this case warrants dismissal.
Taylor v. LSI Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Del. 1997).
The fifth factor concerns the pendency or nonpendency of a similar action in another jurisdiction. It is the Court's understanding that no other action is pending between the same parties in another jurisdiction. In the absence of a prior pending action in another jurisdiction, this fact weighs heavily against dismissal.
In re Asbestos Litig., 929 A.2d 373, 387 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
Lastly, the sixth Cryo-Maid factor considers all other practical problems that would make the trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. The only additional argument McAlinden makes in support of his Motion is that he would suffer overwhelming hardship due to his age and financial status if he has to defend in Delaware. However, McAlinden fails to provide any support for this argument, besides making this general claim. Although proceeding in Delaware may be more inconvenient for McAlinden, the Court must find an overwhelming hardship exists to warrant dismissal of the case.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Kolber v. Holyoke Shares, Inc. reversed the decision to grant dismissal pursuant to forum non conveniens despite a showing that all parties, all potential witnesses, and all events relating to the allegations of the complaint were located in New York City. Although none of the Cryo-Maid factors favored plaintiff's choice of forum, the Court did not find that the combination and weight of the factors balanced overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant to justify dismissal. Unlike in Kolber, at least some of the Cryo-Maid factors favor Plaintiff's choice of forum in the current case, which makes an even stronger finding in favor of Plaintiff to deny this Motion.
213 A.2d 444 (Del. 1965).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 447.
Because McAlinden has failed to show that the Cryo-Maid factors establish that he would suffer overwhelming hardship or inconvenience if forced to litigate in Delaware, Plaintiff's choice of forum must be honored and the Motion denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.