OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAMURA, J.

Article XIV of the Hawaii Constitution directs "each political subdivision [to] adopt a code of ethics which shall apply to appointed and elected officers and employees" and "include . . . provisions on gifts, confidential information, use of position, contracts with government agencies, post-employment, financial disclosure and lobbyist registration and restriction." It further mandates that non-elected "public officials having significant discretionary or fiscal powers . . . shall make confidential financial disclosures." The ethics code governing the conduct of the employees of Hawaii County, Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1, as amended, thus compels "regulatory employees" of the County to submit disclosures of their income and financial interests biennially to the County Board of Ethics. Rodney Nakano, suing as the representative of the County's "regulatory employees," challenged the code as it applied to them on grounds that it infringed their right to privacy and denied them equal protection of the laws and due process. We have carefully reviewed the code's disclosure requirements as they apply to the plaintiff class in the light of article I, sections 5 and 6 of the Hawaii Constitution. Detecting no constitutional infirmity, we affirm the award of summary judgment to the Mayor and the Board of Ethics of the County of Hawaii.

I.

Article XIV, Code of Ethics, was added to the State Constitution in 1978, and the constitutional demand for the adoption of ethics codes consistent with the article by the State's political subdivisions was implemented by the County of Hawaii in two steps. It first amended the then existing code of ethics in January of 1983 when Ordinance No. 841, which dealt primarily with the conduct of civil service employees, was enacted. Ordinance No. 841 was followed by Ordinance No. 83-7 in August of 1983. The latter, inter alia, implemented the provision in Article XIV that non-elected "public officials having significant discretionary or fiscal powers as provided by law shall make confidential financial disclosures."

The amended code of ethics compels "regulatory employees" to reveal to the Board of Ethics: (1) the source, nature, and amount of income of $1,000 or more, (2) the names of creditors to whom the sum of $3,000 or more was owed, (3) the amount and identity of ownership and beneficial interests held, (4) service as officers, directors, trustees, or fiduciaries of any business, (5) real property interests in the County valued at $5,000 or more, (6) the amount and identity of creditor interests in an insolvent business with a value of $5,000 or more, and (7) the names of clients represented before County agencies for a fee or compensation. Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1(c)(1) to (7). But the income and interests need not be declared in exact amounts. Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1(c)(8). They are reportable in the following ranges: $1,000 to $9,999; $10,000 to $24,999; $25,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $149,000; and $150,000 or more. Id. Though the disclosures must be filed biennially, the reporting period for each filing is the preceding calendar year. Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1(c)(1) to (7).

Shortly before the initial disclosures required by the amended ethics code were due, Rodney Nakano brought a class action seeking to have it declared unconstitutional and its enforcement against "regulatory employees" enjoined. As the putative representative of the seventy employees within the code's definition of "regulatory employees," Nakano, a planner employed by the County's planning department, sued the Mayor of Hawaii County and its Board of Ethics. The class on whose behalf he sued was composed of inspectors employed by the departments of public works and water supply, liquor control investigators, real property tax appraisers, the supervisors of the foregoing employees, buyers and purchasing agents, planners employed by the planning department, and the legislative auditor. See supra note 2.

As we observed, the plaintiff alleged the code's disclosure provisions breached article I, sections 5 and 6 of the Hawaii Constitution. The code, he averred, "violates Article I, Section 6, . . . which provides . . . that `the right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest,'" by requiring "certain employees and officials . . . [to] make disclosures of their personal and private financial information." He further averred the code "violates Article I, Section 5, . . . which provides . . . that persons `shall not be denied equal protection of the law,' and that `no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law;'" because it "does not require certain other employees . . . to make disclosures of their personal and private financial information."

The defendants denied the principal averments of the complaint and challenged the plaintiff's capacity to maintain a class action. They then moved for summary disposition of the case, and the plaintiff followed with his motion for summary judgment. But before the motions were decided, an order establishing the plaintiff's suit as a class action was entered by the circuit court. Subsequently, the court awarded summary judgment to the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

II.

Since both the plaintiff and the defendants sought summary disposition of the case and the appeal is from the award of summary judgment to the defendants, the challenge of the code's disclosure provisions is essentially a facial challenge. The plaintiff argues that rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the State of Hawaii have been infringed and the circuit court erred by not employing "the strict scrutiny test" in judging the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions. He claims the right to privacy embodied in article I, section 6, for one, has been abridged. We begin our analysis of the issues by considering the nature of that right.

A.

The right in question was written into the Hawaii Constitution during the most recent decennial review of the State's fundamental law. Thus, article I, section 6 now reads: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right." The proposal to expressly acknowledge the "right of the people to privacy" was offered by the Committee on Bill of Rights, Suffrage and Election of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978. After reviewing the privacy provision in the Hawaii counterpart of the Fourth Amendment, the committee reported "it would be appropriate to retain [this] privacy provision . . . but limit its application to criminal cases, and create a new section as it relates to privacy in the informational and personal autonomy sense." Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 69, in Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978 (Proceedings), Vol. I, at 674.

The recommendation to recognize "privacy in the informational and personal autonomy sense" as a constitutional right was the subject of lengthy debate by the convention, sitting as a committee of the whole. See Proceedings, Vol. II, at 628-44. A committee report reflecting the consensus of the assembly was adopted thereafter, which in relevant part said:

By amending the Constitution to include a separate and distinct privacy right, it is the intent of your Committee to insure that privacy is treated as a fundamental right for purposes of constitutional analysis. Privacy as used in this sense concerns the possible abuses in the use of highly personal and intimate information in the hands of government or private parties but is not intended to deter the government from the legitimate compilation and dissemination of data. More importantly, this privacy concept encompasses the notion that in certain highly personal and intimate matters, the individual should be afforded freedom of choice absent a compelling state interest. This right is similar to the privacy right discussed in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), etc.

Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, in Proceedings, Vol. I, at 1024.

Privacy in the "personal autonomy" sense was an issue in State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983), since the appellant contended her decision to engage in sexual intercourse for a fee in her home was an intimate decision subject to protection under article I, section 6. But we have had no occasion to pass on the scope of the right to privacy in the "informational" sense. Inasmuch as the government's attempt to secure information concerning the financial affairs of its employees is the subject of the constitutional challenge here, we focus on the yet undefined aspect of the right encompassed by article I, section 6.

"The [decisions of the Supreme Court] sometimes characterized as protecting `privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (footnotes 25 and 26 omitted). We think the convention meant to protect the first interest described above when it spoke of privacy in the "informational" sense. And we can only conclude from the committee reports cited earlier that the people of Hawaii have a legitimate expectation of privacy where their personal financial affairs are concerned.

Yet, we cannot say an employee of the State or any of its political subdivisions may reasonably expect that his interest in avoiding disclosure of his financial affairs is protected to the same extent as that of other citizens, for the convention that proposed an affirmation of "the right to confidentiality" also authored constitutional language subjecting him to a code of ethical conduct. See supra note 1. Consequently, the constitution now compels him to "make confidential financial disclosures" if he is a public official with "significant discretionary or fiscal powers." Id. Moreover, these disclosures must "include, but not be limited to, sources and amounts of income, business ownership, officer and director positions, ownership of real property, debts, creditor interests in insolvent businesses and the names of persons represented before government agencies." Id.

That any expectation of financial privacy a public official in the above category may have possessed has been qualified by Article XIV needs no belaboring. Our task then is to determine whether the "regulatory employees" are "officials having significant discretionary or fiscal powers," and if they are, whether the disclosure requirements imposed upon them are consistent with Article XIV.

B.

The plaintiff maintains the defendants "did not state in the lower court that . . . the regulatory employees . . . have either significant discretionary or fiscal power." The record, however, contains evidence presented through affidavits and civil service position descriptions of the responsibilities of the employees in question and their exercise of independent judgment that is not readily reviewable or their authority to expend substantial sums on behalf of the County. This evidence was uncontroverted, since the plaintiff only attempted to demonstrate there were other employees with discretionary authority who had not been subjected to financial disclosures. Furthermore, the plaintiff averred there were no disputed questions of material fact in seeking summary judgment. We therefore turn to the demands made of the plaintiff class by the ethics code to decide whether its disclosure provisions are compatible with Article XIV.

C.

As we noted, members of the class on whose behalf suit was brought are forced to reveal information with respect to their financial affairs under penalty of law. Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1(d)(1), as amended. What must be revealed is set forth in Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1(c)(1) to (7), as amended, and these provisions parallel the informational categories delineated in Article XIV. Reading the requirements of the ethics code in the light of the command that certain public officials "shall make confidential financial disclosures," we perceive no inconsistency between the code's demands and the constitutional provision.

Though the code more fully describes information subject to reporting, it does not expand the particular areas where the framers of Article XIV contemplated there should be disclosure. For example, § 2-91.1(c)(1) does not make all sources and amounts of income reportable; it narrows the scope of disclosure here to "income of $1000 or more." In similar fashion, § 2-91.1(c)(2) directs the revelation of the names of creditors "to whom the value of $3,000 or more was owed during the preceding calendar year and the original amount and the amount outstanding." Moreover, § 2-91.1(c)(8) does not require that the financial information be submitted in exact figures; it permits amounts to be reported in given ranges. And the "financial disclosure statements required [of the `regulatory employees' are] confidential and accessible only by action of the board of ethics." Hawaii County Code § 2-91.1(e). The intrusion into financial privacy here is consistent in all respects with the diminished privacy public officials may reasonably expect.

III.

But the plaintiff also claims the county legislation does not afford "regulatory employees" equal protection of the laws because financial disclosure requirements have not been extended to other officials vested with discretionary powers. He maintains the circuit court was obliged to subject the relevant code provisions to "strict scrutiny" and such an inquiry could only have led to a conclusion that the "regulatory employees" were denied equal protection.

A.

Whenever a denial of equal protection of the laws is alleged, as a rule our initial inquiry has been whether the legislation in question should be subjected to "strict scrutiny" or to a "rational basis" test. Nagle v. Board of Education, 63 Haw. 389, 392, 629 P.2d 109, 111 (1981). The former has been applied where fundamental rights or "suspect" classifications are implicated in the challenge of the legislation on equal protection grounds. Id. at 392, 629 P.2d at 112. Otherwise, "this court has traditionally employed the rational basis test [in assessing the constitutionality of the challenged legislation]. State v. Cotton, 55 Haw. 148, 150, 516 P.2d 715, 717 (1973); State v. Johnston, 51 Haw. 195, 203, 456 P.2d 805, 810 (1969)." Id. at 393, 629 P.2d at 112.

We do not see that we are considering a right basic in the concept of liberty embodied in the Hawaii Constitution, for "the right to work at least with respect to government employment, is not fundamental." Id. at 399-400, 629 P.2d at 116; Cf. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (The "Court's decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental."). And of course, we have decided a public official's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters has been qualified by Article XIV; that interest, therefore, can hardly be deemed basic.

Nor do we see that the disclosure requirements are directed at a "suspect" classification. We realize "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . may call for a . . . searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938). Yet we have no cause to think "public officials having significant discretionary or fiscal powers" constitute a minority "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), quoted in Nagle v. Board of Education, 63 Haw. at 392 n. 2, 629 P.2d at 112 n. 2. Thus, we proceed with the task of determining "whether the classifications drawn in [the ethics code] are reasonable in light of its purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).

B.

The plaintiff complains the "regulatory employees" have been burdened with disclosure while other officials with significant discretionary authority have not. In other words, the claim of constitutional infirmity here is one of "underinclusiveness." "Underinclusive classifications do not include all who are similarly situated with respect to a rule, and thereby burden less than would be logical to achieve the intended government end." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 997 (1978). True, others with discretionary powers have not been subjected to financial disclosure. The decision of the Hawaii County Council not to classify other officials as "regulatory employees," however, is not one so lacking in logic that it vitiates the ethics code.

The unassailable purpose of the code is the promotion of high standards of conduct among public officers and employees. Its particular objectives obviously include the deterrence of corrupt conduct and conflicting interests. Yet, "[e]vils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). "Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." Id. (citation omitted). And equal protection does not mean government "must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).

Here, there was a directive that the ethics code include provisions requiring confidential financial disclosures of "officials having significant discretionary or fiscal powers." Haw. Const. art. XIV. Following the mandate the County Council designated the "regulatory employees" as those from whom confidential disclosures would be sought, presumably because they were the employees who possessed such powers. Nothing in the record tells us this act of the Council would not further the purpose of the code in a rational manner. That others seemingly with authority of somewhat similar character were not included in the class gives us no reason to invalidate the disclosure provisions, especially where the constitutional challenge is a facial one. "[A] party assailing a classification . . . has the burden of showing, with convincing clarity that the classification does not rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Nelson v. Miwa, 56 Haw. 601, 605, 546 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1976) (citations and footnote omitted).

Since the plaintiff has not met his "burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt," Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw. 25, 31, 564 P.2d 135, 139 (1977) (citations omitted), the circuit court's award of summary judgment to the defendants is affirmed.