RAPHAEL, J.

Milon Pluas, Joshua Milon, Pasadena, Angel D. Pluas ; Hannemann Law Firm and Brian G. Hannemann ; Law Offices of Marc D. Mabile and Marc D. Mabile, San Diego, for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Roger M. Mansukhani, Los Angeles, Carrie A. Stringham and Andrew S. Wellman, San Diego, for Real Parties in Interest Horizon Personnel Services, Inc., and Stay Safe Staffing, Inc.

Epstein Becker & Green, Richard J. Frey, David M. Prager and Devin S. Lindsay, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest J & J Snack Foods Corp. of California.

OPINION

RAPHAEL, J.

In this employment dispute, the trial court granted motions to compel arbitration for eight employees, each of whom signed one of two versions of arbitration agreements. The ruling was based primarily on a finding that clear and unmistakable delegation clauses foreclosed the court from ruling on either agreement's validity. After the employees filed a writ petition in this court, we issued an order to show cause.

Given the differences between the two arbitration agreements as well as the factual circumstances each employee describes, we grant the petition in part, deny in part, and hold as follows. The first version does not clearly and unmistakably delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, so we grant the writ petition as to the employees who signed that version. As to two of these employees, the trial court must decide whether this first version is unconscionable, guided by our discussion below. As to the other two employees who signed this version, we find that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable for the separate reason of fraud in the execution.

Fraud in the execution also voids the agreement for two of the employees who signed the other, second version of the arbitration agreement. Because the second version has a clear and unmistakable delegation clause that petitioners have not specifically challenged, however, we deny the petition as to the remaining two employees who signed the second version.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2019, petitioners filed suit against real parties in interest Horizon Personnel Services, Inc. (Horizon), Stay Safe Staffing, Inc. (Stay Safe), J & J Snack Foods Corp. of California (J & J), Raul Perez, and Crisanto Vargas, among other defendants, alleging 18 employment-related causes of action. In January 2020, Horizon, Stay Safe, Perez, and Vargas moved to compel petitioners' cases to arbitration. J & J filed notices of joinders to the motions. The motions were based on two versions of arbitration agreements each of the petitioners had signed. The first version, which we will refer to as Version One, was signed by Najarro, Serrano, Mendivar, and Munoz. The other version, which we will refer to as Version Two, was signed by Urias, Velasco, Sanchez, and Rios. Each petitioner signed either Version One or Version Two when they were hired. Seven of the eight petitioners signed Spanish versions of Version One or Version Two; Urias signed an English version of Version Two.

Version One contains the following provisions:

"Binding Arbitration. [¶] ... [¶] This [a]greement is governed by and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. [¶] ... [¶]

"Arbitrator's Authority.... Except as expressly provided for above with respect to group, collective, or representative actions, the arbitrator shall have the exclusive power to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this [a]greement, including but not limited to the assumption that any section of this [a]greement is unenforceable, null or void. [¶] ... [¶]

"Severability. Except as expressly provided above in relation to class, group, or representative actions, if the arbitrator or any judge of competent jurisdiction determines that any provision of the JAMS Rules or this [a]greement is illegal, invalid, or unenforceable, such provisions shall be severed or modified so that the remainder of the [a]greement shall apply to the fullest extent permitted by law." (Bolding and italics omitted.)

Version Two contains the following provisions:

"Arbitrator's Authority. Except as expressly provided for above with respect to group, collective, or representative actions, the arbitrator shall have the exclusive power to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this [a]greement, including the assumption that this [a]greement is unenforceable. [¶] ... [¶]

"Severability. In the event that any provision of the [applicable arbitration rules or standards] or this [a]greement is held to be unenforceable, such provision shall be eliminated or modified without affecting the enforceability of the remaining provisions in the [a]greement. [¶] ... [¶]

"Applicable Legislation. The interpretation and execution of this [a]greement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act." (Bolding omitted.)

In their oppositions, petitioners contended that real parties in interest used coercive tactics to get petitioners to sign the arbitration agreements, including by physically covering the words of the agreements with their hands, stating that the agreements were conditions of employment, pressuring petitioners to sign quickly, refusing to allow petitioners to remove the documents from the work facility, and misrepresenting that the documents related to health and insurance.

The trial court granted the motions. It determined that the agreements' enforceability must be determined by the arbitrator under the delegation clause and found, in the alternative, that the agreements were not substantively unconscionable. This writ proceeding followed.

II. DISCUSSION

The differences in terms between Version One and Version Two—as well as the factual circumstances alleged by each employee—means that our analysis for each takes different paths, but we summarize our discussion below as follows.

Petitioners contend that both versions are unenforceable, unconscionable contracts and that the court is empowered to rule as such. Real parties in interest, on the other hand, argue that both contracts specify that it is the arbitrator alone who is empowered to determine whether the contracts are enforceable. In other words, real parties in interest argue that there is a valid delegation clause in each of the agreements. But even if the court could rule on either or both agreements' enforceability, real parties in interest contend that the agreements are enforceable.

Version One does not contain a valid delegation clause because its terms do not clearly and unmistakably provide that only the arbitrator may decide enforceability. The court is therefore empowered to determine whether the agreements are enforceable. Here, the trial court held that neither of the agreements were unconscionable because neither showed substantive unconscionability. Petitioners successfully demonstrate, however, that Version One contains at least some substantively unconscionable elements. With regard to procedural unconscionability, the trial court did not resolve a key factual dispute—namely, whether agreement to Version One was a condition of employment—or otherwise determine the existence or degree of procedural unconscionability. We therefore grant the petition as to those petitioners who signed Version One and, with respect to two of them, remand for the trial court to resolve the factual dispute before ruling on Version One's enforceability. With regard to two of the petitioners who signed Version One, we grant the petition with directions to the trial court to deny the motion to compel arbitration on the basis that they have sufficiently demonstrated fraud in the execution.

Version Two, on the other hand, contains a delegation clause that clearly and unmistakably provides for the arbitrator to determine any issues regarding enforceability. Therefore, absent a specific challenge to the delegation clause, which petitioners have not made, we must enforce the delegation clause unless we conclude that no agreement between the contracting parties ever existed due to a lack of mutual assent. As to two of the petitioners who signed Version Two, we find that fraud in the execution has negated that mutual assent. But because there is no basis for us to so conclude for the other two petitioners who signed Version Two, we deny the petition as to them.

A. Version One

1. Delegation Clause

"[P]arties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but also ‘ "gateway" questions of "arbitrability," such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.’ " ( Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 524, 529, 202 L.Ed.2d 480.) But "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so." ( First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985.) This is a "heightened standard," and it "pertains to the parties' manifestation of intent, not the agreement's validity." ( Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 69, fn. 1, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 ( Rent-A-Center ), italics removed.)

Courts have held that "there is no clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator" to decide arbitrability where the contract "includes a severability clause stating a court of competent jurisdiction may excise an unconscionable provision." ( Dennison v. Rosland Capital LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 204, 209-210, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 ( Dennison ); see Hartley v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257-1258, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 [heightened standard not met because severability clause used the term " ‘trier of fact of competent jurisdiction,’ rather than the term ‘arbitrator,’ indicating the court has authority to decide whether an arbitration provision is unenforceable."]; Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1566, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 ["Use of the term ‘trier of fact of competent jurisdiction’ instead of ‘arbitration panel’ or ‘panel of three (3) arbitrators’ suggests the trial court also may find a provision, including the arbitration provision, unenforceable."]; Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 893-894, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 854 ( Baker ) [heightened standard not met where "one provision of the arbitration agreement stated that issues of enforceability or voidability were to be decided by the arbitrator, [but] another provision indicated that the court might find a provision unenforceable"].) In other words, pursuant to an exception discussed below, if a severability clause states that a court may excise unconscionable provisions, the delegation clause does not meet the heightened standard necessary for enforcement, because it is no longer clear that only the arbitrator may decide issues such as unconscionability.

Here, Version One's delegation clause fails to meet the heightened standard because of the severability clause. Under the heading "Severability," Version One provides: "Except as expressly provided above in relation to class, group, or representative actions, if the arbitrator or any judge of competent jurisdiction determines that any provision of the JAMS Rules or this [a]greement is illegal, invalid, or unenforceable, such provisions shall be severed or modified so that the remainder of the [a]greement shall apply to the fullest extent permitted by law." (Italics added.) As with the cases mentioned above, Version One allows a court to determine issues such as unconscionability. Accordingly, following cases such as Dennison and Baker , we find that there is no clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator to decide enforceability.

Relying on Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 ( Aanderud ), real parties in interest contend that cases such as Dennison do not apply. In Aanderud , the severability clause provided for severance of a provision if it was " ‘held to be invalid, prohibited, or otherwise unenforceable by an arbitrator or court of competent jurisdiction.’ " ( Aanderud, supra , at p. 894, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 225.) The provision thus seemed to be ambiguous as to whether a court could determine enforceability. However, because elsewhere the agreement stated that the parties agreed to resolve disputes "through binding arbitration or small claims court instead of courts of general jurisdiction," the court found no ambiguity, and the heightened standard was met. ( Id. at pp. 886, 894, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 225.) The court construed the arbitration provision to mean the agreement "expressly state[d] that any disputes, which include those over the scope and applicability of the arbitration provision, are to be resolved through binding arbitration except those within small claims court jurisdiction. Since arbitration is not at issue in a small claims court action, the small claims court can only find unenforceable provisions of the [agreement] other than the arbitration provision." ( Ibid. ) In other words, Aanderud found it clear enough that the term "court of competent jurisdiction" in the severance clause could only mean small claims court.

Real parties in interest contend that Aanderud applies here because Version One's use of the phrase "any judge of competent jurisdiction" in the severability clause necessarily refers to class, group, and representative actions, just as the reference to a "court of competent jurisdiction" in Aanderud referred to small claims court. The comparison has some initial appeal when we look only at Version One's delegation clause and the central, operative provision in the severability clause.

The problem with real parties in interest's argument here, however, is that the severability clause itself does not apply to class, group, or representative actions. In other words, Version One's severability clause begins with a carve-out for those actions: "Except as expressly provided above in relation to class, group, or representative actions , if the arbitrator or any judge of competent jurisdiction determines that any provision of the JAMS Rules or this [a]greement is illegal, invalid, or unenforceable, such provisions shall be severed or modified so that the remainder of the [a]greement shall apply to the fullest extent permitted by law." (Italics added.) Accordingly, it cannot be the case that the phrase "judge of competent jurisdiction" in the severability clause necessarily refers only to such collective actions, in the way the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" in Aanderud necessarily referred to small claims court, because the severability clause here does not apply to collective actions at all. There therefore remains an ambiguity as to whether a court has the power to sever unenforceable provisions, and thus there is no clear and unmistakable delegation of the issue to the arbitrator.

In short, we find that the parties to Version One "did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration." ( First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra , 514 U.S. at p. 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920.) It follows that "the court should decide that question just as it would decide any other question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely, independently." ( Ibid. ) We therefore turn to petitioners' contention that Version One is unenforceable, starting with the doctrine of unconscionability.

2. Unconscionability

" ‘ "One common formulation of unconscionability is that it refers to ‘ "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." ’ [Citation.] As that formulation implicitly recognizes, the doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results." ’ " ( Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812, 353 P.3d 741 ( Sanchez ).)

" ‘ "The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability." [Citation.] But they need not be present in the same degree. "Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves." [Citations.] In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’ [Citation.] Courts may find a contract as a whole ‘or any clause of the contract’ to be unconscionable." ( Sanchez, supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 910, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812, 353 P.3d 741.)

We begin with the trial court's finding that Version One contained no substantive unconscionability. This was error, as Version One is substantively unconscionable in at least two ways.

First, by stating that any covered dispute (such as claims for unpaid wages or rest or meal periods) "must be arbitrated in [an] individual capacity and not as a claimant or member of an alleged collective, group or representative action," Version One required those who signed it to waive any right to bring a representative action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) ( Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq. ), despite the fact that "an employee's right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable" ( Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129 ). It is irrelevant that petitioners have not brought a PAGA action. (See Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 201, 212, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 838 [noting, in finding that PAGA waiver demonstrated substantive unconscionability, that the "question in determining unconscionability ... does not involve comparing the terms of the arbitration clause with the nonarbitration claims" being pursued].)

Second, there is a lack of mutuality given that none of the Version One agreements were signed by any of the real parties in interest. In Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 86, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 42 ( Carmona ), the Court of Appeal found a lack of mutuality in an arbitration clause between car wash companies and employees where "only the employees initialed next to the clause, and only they signed the agreement." Citing our Supreme Court's decision in Armendariz, Carmona noted that " ‘the lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the agreements does not provide as by what it does.’ " ( Carmona, supra , at p. 86, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 42, citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. , (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 120, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 ( Armendariz ); see also Davis v. TWC Dealer Group, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 662, 674, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 443 ["there is what can be argued to be a lack of mutuality, illustrated by the fact that the agreement was signed only by the Davises, not by anyone at TWC"].) Actually, it is not only the fact that none of the Version One agreements were signed by any of the real parties in interest: Version One does not even purport to identify who the employee's counterparty is supposed to be. Throughout, Version One refers to the "Company," but Version One never identifies it as a specific person or otherwise specify which real party in interest is the other contracting party.

As to procedural unconscionability, the trial court assumed, but did not find, that Version One was procedurally unconscionable. This means that the court did not resolve a core factual dispute between the parties, namely, whether those who signed Version One were required to do so as a condition of their employment. Each of the petitioners who signed Version One stated that they were told that they needed to sign Version One in order to be hired. Real parties in interest, on the other hand, directly dispute this, contending that employment is not conditioned upon the signing of an arbitration agreement. As our Supreme Court has stated, "[a] procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion’ " ( OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 447 P.3d 680 ), and there can be "little dispute" that a contract is one of adhesion where it is "imposed on employees as a condition of employment" with "no opportunity to negotiate" ( Armendariz, supra , 24 Cal.4th at pp. 114-115, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 ).

Under both California and federal law, in determining whether parties should be compelled to arbitration, factual conflicts must be resolved at the trial court level. Accordingly, we are in no position to fully resolve the issue of procedural unconscionability here, and remand so that the trial court can resolve the dispute. (See Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903 [in determining petitions to compel arbitration, "the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination"]; Jin v. Parsons Corporation (D.C. Cir. 2020) 966 F.3d 821, 827 ["Section 4 [of the FAA] makes clear that the parties are entitled to have the correct venue—court or arbitration—established at the outset and, accordingly, requires any dispute on that issue be decided ‘summarily’ through a trial."]; Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2d Cir. 2017) 868 F.3d 66, 74 ["If a factual issue exists regarding the formation of the arbitration agreement ... remand to the district court for a trial is necessary"]; Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. (10th Cir. 2014) 748 F.3d 975, 984 [noting that although "[i]t's understandable that everyone might want us to give the case a firm nudge (one way or the other) so the parties' dispute can finally progress past preliminary venue questions to the merits," "unresolved material disputes of fact block our way"].)

We nevertheless agree with petitioners that, at a minimum, Version One demonstrates some degree of procedural unconscionability, whether or not those who signed them had an opportunity to negotiate its terms. By incorporating JAMS arbitration rules into Version One without providing petitioners a copy of those rules at the time they were asked to sign, petitioners establish at least some degree of procedural unconscionability. (See Harper v. Ultimo (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1406, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 ["Here is the oppression: The inability to receive full relief is artfully hidden by merely referencing the Better Business Bureau arbitration rules, and not attaching those rules to the contract for the customer to review. The customer is forced to go to another source to find out the full import of what he or she is about to sign—and must go to that effort prior to signing"].)

We therefore conclude that two of the petitioners who signed Version One are, at a minimum, entitled to writ relief and the trial court's consideration of whether Version One is unconscionable. As we now discuss, we additionally hold that, issues of unconscionability aside, petitioners Martha Serrano and Maria Munoz, who signed Version One, are entitled to relief on the ground that their arbitration agreements are void for fraud in the execution.

3. Fraud in the Execution

In addition to raising unconscionability, petitioners also broadly allege that all of the arbitration agreements were procured through fraud. The only type of fraud they specifically raise and discuss, however, is fraud in the execution. Accordingly, we address only fraud in the execution and find that petitioners Martha Serrano and Maria Munoz have made sufficient showings on this issue. "California law distinguishes between fraud in the ‘execution’ or ‘inception’ of a contract and fraud in the ‘inducement’ of a contract ... in the former case ‘ "the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission." ’ " ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 415, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061 ( Rosenthal ).) "[C]laims of fraud in the execution of the entire agreement are not arbitrable under either state or federal law. If the entire contract is void ab initio because of fraud, the parties have not agreed to arbitrate any controversy." ( Id. at p. 416, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.)

Notably, with regard to whether an agreement is void for fraud in the execution, our Supreme Court has held that "[o]ne party's misrepresentations as to the nature or character of the writing do not negate the other party's apparent manifestation of assent, if the second party had ‘reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract.’ ( Rest.2d Contracts, § 163, p. 443.) If a party, with such reasonable opportunity, fails to learn the nature of the document he or she signs, such ‘negligence’ precludes a finding the contract is void for fraud in the execution." ( Rosenthal, supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 423, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.)

Although Rosenthal held that misrepresentations by themselves would not deprive the other party of a reasonable opportunity to discover the essential terms of an agreement, it also held that misrepresentations made to a party who had a limited understanding of English might warrant a different result. ( Rosenthal, supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 428, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061 ["In light of plaintiffs' prior relationship with [the corporation], which they were led to believe was also the employer of Divine and Daikovich, their limited ability to understand English, and Divine and Daikovich's representations that their oral recitals accurately reflected the terms of the agreements, plaintiffs would not have been negligent in relying on the [corporation's] representatives instead of reading the agreements themselves."].) In so holding, Rosenthal relied on C.I.T. Corp. v. Panac (1944) 25 Cal.2d 547, 154 P.2d 710 ( C.I.T. Corp. ), an earlier case where our Supreme Court held that the fact that the defendant "did not have an understanding of the English language," "did not know they were signing a negotiable instrument," and were subjected to " ‘high pressure’ selling methods" supported a finding of fraud in the execution. ( C.I.T. Corp., supra , at pp. 558-559, 154 P.2d 710, cited in Rosenthal, supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 428, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) Although Rosenthal and C.I.T. Corp. addressed individuals' inabilities to understand English, its reasoning applies to other languages when a disputed contract is in that language.

In her declaration, Martha Serrano stated that she was born in Mexico and attended school up to the second grade, but has no formal education beyond that. As a result, she does not know how to read Spanish, and she does not know how to speak or read in English. She went to Horizon to seek employment at J & J. Once there, she was presented with a stack of documents to sign without an explanation of what each document meant. She was told she could not take the documents home. Serrano stated that she had a difficult time completing the paperwork because she did not know how to read. She was asked, " ‘do you want to work or not?’ " She replied, "[W]hat do these documents say? I don't know how to read," to which she was told, "It's okay, if you don't know how to read, then just sign them," adding that it was "nothing important." She signed a Spanish version of Version One. Nowhere in their motion to compel Serrano to arbitration, motion for joinder, or reply did real parties in interest refute these statements from Serrano with evidence.

Given Serrano's inability to read either Spanish or English, the fact she was told that her arbitration agreement and other agreements were unimportant, statements pressuring her to sign ("do you want to work or not?"), a lack of an explanation as to what she was signing despite her professed inability to understand, and an omission of any factual dispute as to these issues, we conclude that Serrano has adequately established fraud in the execution under Rosenthal and C.I.T. Corp.

Maria Munoz does not describe any difficulty understanding Spanish, but her declaration shows a lack of mutual assent as well. Munoz went to J & J to seek employment and went to a "glass window" where she was given a packet of documents to complete and sign. When she turned in the stack at the window, she expressed that she "did not understand some of the documents" she was signing, but nobody attempted to explain the documents to her. She continued: "While at the glass window, [d]efendants handed me another document to sign, which I believe to be the [a]rbitration [a]greement, stating, ‘sign here,’ without an opportunity to read what I was signing. Defendants just flipped to the signature page, put their hand over the document and had me sign, stating, ‘it's just a requirement to work for the company,’ and did not permit me to read it."

Munoz was not given a reasonable opportunity to understand the arbitration agreement she signed. While at the window, a J & J employee presented her with Version One, flipped to the signature page, obstructed her view of the document, and instructed her to sign. Unlike any other documents she may have signed then, she had no opportunity to review Version One's terms on her own, and the J & J employee refused to explain it to her in any amount of detail. On these facts, we conclude that Munoz has made a sufficient showing of fraud in the execution. Accordingly, independent of whether Version One is unenforceable due to unconscionability, we find that fraud in the execution renders Version One void and unenforceable as to petitioners Martha Serrano and Maria Munoz.

B. Version Two

The delegation clause in Version Two was clear and unmistakable. Accordingly, under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rent-A-Center , we must enforce it unless a challenge is made specifically to the delegation clause. ( Rent-A-Center , supra , 561 U.S. at p. 72, 130 S.Ct. 2772.) Because petitioners have not made such a claim, only an arbitrator may rule on Version Two's validity. However, Rent-A-Center did not change a court's ability to determine "whether any agreement between the parties ‘was ever concluded.’ " ( Id. at p. 70, fn. 2, 130 S.Ct. 2772.) We apply "ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts" ( First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan , supra , 514 U.S. at p. 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920 ), including fraud in the execution, which, as discussed above, renders a contract void for lack of mutual assent. For petitioners Fidel Urias and Paloma Rios, we find that their contentions do not rise to the level of fraud in the execution and thus deny the petition as to them. For petitioners Emerson Velasco and Maria Sanchez, however, we find sufficient facts for fraud in the execution, and thus grant the petition for reasons similar to those discussed above with Serrano and Munoz.

1. Delegation Clause

In contrast with Version One, Version Two clearly and unmistakably delegates issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Under the heading "Arbitrator's Authority," Version Two provides: "Except as expressly provided for above with respect to group, collective, or representative actions, the arbitrator shall have the exclusive power to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this [a]greement, including the assumption that this [a]greement is unenforceable." Version Two also contains no severability clause that would allow a court to sever unconscionable provisions. The fact that a court might have an ability to excise unconscionable provisions under Version Two in "group, collective or representative actions"—because such actions are carved out of the delegation clause—does not make the delegation clause ambiguous, because this is not a class, collective, or representative action. (See also Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 848 F.3d 1201, 1209 [holding, regarding similar contractual language, that "the delegation provisions clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator for all claims except challenges to the class, collective, and representative actions waivers" in the arbitration agreements].) Additionally, the fact that petitioners claim real parties in interest used coercive tactics to obtain the contracts does not mean a court must rule on the contract's validity as a whole before enforcing the delegation clause. Although a dissenting minority of justices in Rent-A-Center supported this view, the majority rejected it, and we are bound by the majority's reasoning. (See Rent-A-Center , supra , 561 U.S. at p. 82, 130 S.Ct. 2772 ["when a party raises a good-faith validity challenge to the arbitration agreement itself, that issue must be resolved before a court can say that he clearly and unmistakably intended to arbitrate that very validity question"] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).)

Given that Version Two contains a valid delegation clause, under Rent-A-Center , in the absence of a specific challenge to the delegation clause (as opposed to challenges to the entirety of the arbitration agreement), we may only determine whether Version Two was entered into. (See Rent-A-Center , supra , 561 U.S. at pp. 72, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2772 [arbitrator must determine validity because plaintiff had "challenged only the validity of the contract as a whole" and "did not make any arguments specific to the delegation provision"].) Petitioners have not specifically challenged the delegation clause. Those petitioners who signed Version Two must have their enforcement challenges determined by the arbitrator unless they can show that they never entered into any agreement at all.

2. Whether an Agreement Was Ever Concluded

Despite the existence of a clear and unmistakable delegation clause, a court remains able to determine "whether any agreement between the parties ‘was ever concluded.’ " ( Rent-A-Center, supra , 561 U.S. at p. 70, fn. 2, 130 S.Ct. 2772.) In making this determination, courts apply "ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." ( First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra , 514 U.S. at p. 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920.) As noted earlier, claims of fraud in the execution are not arbitrable, because when fraud in the execution is involved, "the parties have not agreed to arbitrate any controversy." ( Rosenthal, supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 416, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) "Fraud in the inducement, by contrast, occurs when ‘ "the promisor knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud, mutual assent is present and a contract is formed, which, by reason of the fraud, is voidable. In order to escape from its obligations the aggrieved party must rescind. " ’ " ( Id. at p. 415, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.)

As to petitioners Fidel Urias and Paloma Rios, we find that their claims regarding fraud would show, at most, fraud in the inducement, which would not negate the mutual assent necessary for a contract to exist in the first place. Their claims of being told that the arbitration and other agreements were unimportant (or even that the agreements related only to health and insurance) do not show fraud in the execution. "Such statements, even if falsely and fraudulently made, do not void a written contract, because it is generally unreasonable, in reliance on such assurances, to neglect to read a written agreement before signing it. One party's making of such an assurance does not, by itself, deprive the other party to a prospective contract of the reasonable opportunity to discover the character and essential terms of the agreement." ( Rosenthal, supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 424, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061, footnote omitted.) Additionally, their claims that they were not given sufficient time to read the agreements, even if accepted as true, would not show a lack of mutual assent. (See ibid. ) Each of these petitioners was given an opportunity to go through the documents given to them on their own after being handed a stack of documents. Unlike Serrano, none of these petitioners stated that they could not read or understand Spanish, the language of Version Two they signed (in Urias's case, English). We therefore find that these petitioners "had ‘reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract.’ " ( Id. at p. 423, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061, citing Rest.2d Contracts, § 163.)

Velasco and Sanchez, however, both described experiences similar to Munoz in that they were only presented with arbitration agreements after submitting other documents, not given an opportunity to review them on their own, and told to sign without either a basic explanation of its terms or even an opportunity to view it unobstructed. Velasco stated that when he applied for work at J & J, he turned in some of the required paperwork and asked for Spanish versions of documents he did not understand. He was presented with those documents the next day. He stated: "Defendants provided me with Spanish versions of the documents they still needed me to sign in order to continue working." "Defendants presented me with the documents, flipped to the signature pages and pointed where I needed to sign, and would not allow me to read over the documents, stating that they were the Spanish version of the documents that I had been provided with the day before and there was no need for me to read them." He continued: "I asked [d]efendants what the documents were for and they told me that the [c]ompany required that its employees sign these documents for ‘insurance’ purposes. Again, [d]efendants flipped to the signature page and told me to sign, without giving me even a few minutes to read over the documents. I believe these documents included the [a]rbitration [a]greement."

Sanchez similarly was never given a reasonable chance to review Version Two: After turning in some of the required paperwork at the window, she stated that "[d]efendants then printed out another document instructing me to sign, which I believe was the [a]rbitration [a]greement. Defendants put their hand over the document pointing where I needed to sign, not allowing me to read over the document. Defendants told me to hurry up and sign because it was late in the afternoon and they ‘need[ed] to go soon.’ Defendants did not explain what the document was for, and simply told me that I had to sign the documents if I wanted to work for the company and to ‘just sign.’ "

We do not see how someone in Velasco or Sanchez's position would have had a reasonable opportunity to understand what they were agreeing to. Not only were they repeatedly pressured to sign, they were never given any opportunity to review the agreement on their own and could not have even seen Version Two in full. We therefore find that Version Two is void and unenforceable as to Velasco and Sanchez, despite the presence of a valid delegation clause, due to fraud in the execution.

III. DISPOSITION

Let a writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to (1) vacate its decisions on real parties in interest's motions to compel and joinder for Yeni Najarro, Soraya Mendivar, Maria Munoz, Martha Serrano, Emerson Velasco, and Maria Sanchez, (2) enter a new order consistent with the views expressed in this opinion determining whether Yeni Najarro and Soraya Mendivar may be compelled to arbitration, and (3) enter a new order denying the motion to compel and joinder for Maria Munoz, Martha Serrano, Emerson Velasco, and Maria Sanchez. The petition is denied as to petitioners Fidel Urias and Paloma Rios.

Petitioners are DIRECTED to prepare and have the writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proofs of service on all parties. The order to show cause is discharged and the stay previously ordered by this court is lifted when this opinion becomes final.

Petitioners to recover their costs.

We concur:

CODRINGTON, Acting P. J.

SLOUGH, J.