Opinion
Case No. 2:22-cv-04912 HDV MAR
2023-10-19
N. CHAVEZ, Plaintiff, v. Alejandro VILLANUEVA, et al., Defendants.
Stephen Yagman, Joseph Reichmann, Yagman and Reichmann LLP, Venice Beach, CA, for Plaintiff. Justin W. Clark, Paul B. Beach, Tammy Kim, Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC, Pasadena, CA, for Defendants Alejandro Villanueva, Female Deputy Guerrero.
Stephen Yagman, Joseph Reichmann, Yagman and Reichmann LLP, Venice Beach, CA, for Plaintiff. Justin W. Clark, Paul B. Beach, Tammy Kim, Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC, Pasadena, CA, for Defendants Alejandro Villanueva, Female Deputy Guerrero.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [75]
Hernán D. Vera, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of the seizure by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ("LASD") of Plaintiff N. Chavez's ("Plaintiff") handwritten notes as he was being transported from lockup to his preliminary hearing in a criminal case pending in 2022. Plaintiff contends that this work product was necessary for effective cross-examination of witnesses at his hearing, and that the confiscation of these materials forced him to plead no contest and serve a year in prison. Plaintiff's Complaint ("Compl.") [Dkt. No.1] further alleges that this conduct was pursuant to an unlawful LASD policy, and asserts various constitutional violations seeking damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") [Dkt. No. 75] seeks dismissal of all claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that his claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, and that any remedies are further foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
Procedurally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately exhausted his administrative claims sufficient for the present claims to remain viable. However, addressing the merits, the Court grants Defendants' motion on various independent grounds.
First, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the case law on the issue of document confiscation in the custodial setting is not clearly established. While pretrial detainees certainly do retain constitutional rights to their notes and legal papers, those rights are limited in a detention setting, and case law has not established that a custodial policy of temporarily confiscating excess documents during transport constitutes a clear violation of any constitutional right. This is especially true where, as here, the confiscation policy and practice in question provides a mechanism for needed documents to be delivered by the bailiff to the attorney in the courtroom. No case cited by Plaintiff (or identified by the Court) has held otherwise.
Second, the Court finds that the claims must be dismissed under the doctrine laid out in Heck, supra. To prevail here, and as stated in his declaration in opposition to this Motion, Plaintiff must ultimately convince a trier of fact that his plea agreement was "forced"—i.e., not fully voluntary—as a result of his inability to use his papers at the preliminary hearing, thus "imply[ing] the invalidity" of his later plea agreement which is the basis for his conviction and current detention. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002). Since that is the sole basis of Plaintiff's claims for damages, and since he has never challenged or collaterally attacked his conviction, his present claims fall squarely under the Heck doctrine and must be dismissed.
Third, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's compensatory damages claims should be dismissed because there is no genuine dispute of material fact on the necessary element of causation. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had his papers returned that same day, and that his papers were available to him for several hearings before Plaintiff's plea was accepted. Simply put, Plaintiff has not proffered any facts to allege how the temporary confiscation of his papers—which Plaintiff's counsel never produced—caused any injury given the sequence of events.
And fourth, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. California courts have consistently held that sheriff deputies providing courtroom security services function as representatives of the State of California. The LASD deputies providing courtroom security in the lockup area at issue were funded by the State of California and operated at the request of California's courts. They are, for all functional purposes, agents of the State and claims against them in their official capacity are barred.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Confiscation of Plaintiff's Work Product
On May 23, 2022, Plaintiff was transported from the Los Angeles County jail to the Norwalk County Courthouse for a preliminary hearing on a criminal matter. Statement of Uncontroverted Facts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("DSUF") ¶ 1 [Dkt. No. 75-2]. When he arrived at the lockup area that morning, he was carrying various items and documents on his person. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Prior to being allowed in the courtroom, Plaintiff was searched by LASD Deputy Sheriff Dolores Guerrero ("Defendant Guerrero"). Id. ¶ 12.
Defendant Guerrero allowed Plaintiff to take several documents that were visibly court-related but confiscated various items including three pieces of paper that form the basis of Plaintiff's legal claims here. Id. ¶ 14. According to Plaintiff, one of those three documents was a handwritten letter that he had drafted to the judge discussing his dissatisfaction with his then-current counsel and requesting that a new public defender be appointed. Id. ¶ 7. The other two pages were allegedly handwritten notes with questions that Plaintiff believed should be asked of the arresting officer and victims at the preliminary hearing he was about to attend. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
Defendants produce a video of the lockup area showing Defendant Guerrero's interactions with Plaintiff right before he is brought inside the courtroom. See Kim Decl., Ex. F. The video, which has no audio, clearly shows Defendant Guerrero reviewing Plaintiff's paperwork, taking several papers, and handing him several to take with him to the hearing. Id.
At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he gave these documents to his current counsel, Stephen Yagman, months before his deposition. DSUF ¶ 65. Despite multiple discovery requests, however, Plaintiff's counsel has never produced these three documents and the Court has not reviewed them. Id. ¶¶ 64-67. The Court further notes that, when Defendants' counsel asked during a break at deposition where these documents are being held, Plaintiff's counsel replied on the record, "They are where the sun doesn't shine and you can look up there anytime you want." Deposition of Noel Arnulfo Chavez, April 19, 2023, 106:19-20 (attached as Ex. N-1 to the Declaration of Tammy Kim ("Kim Decl.")) [Dkt. No. 75-4]. Outrageous. It should go without saying that this abusive and unprofessional conduct by Mr. Yagman has no place either in litigation or in any other forum.
Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Guerrero that he needed the three documents for his upcoming hearing. Kim Decl., Ex. N-1 at 55. Plaintiff testified in deposition that Defendant Guerrero's response was, "pick what you want and leave the rest." Id. Plaintiff further alleges that, despite that statement, Defendant Guerrero did not in fact let him take those papers into the courtroom. Id.
This point is disputed by Defendant Guerrero, who stated in her declaration that she does not remember Plaintiff saying he needed those documents. See Declaration of Dolores Guerrero ("Guerrero Decl.") ¶ 7. [Dkt No. 75-4].
Once inside, Plaintiff did not alert either the judge or his attorney that there were confiscated papers that he needed. DSUF ¶ 19. Plaintiff's public defender cross-examined the only prosecution witness at that preliminary hearing and made a motion for insufficiency of the evidence, which was denied. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff did not raise a Marsden issue regarding his counsel at that time. Id. ¶ 24. At the conclusion of the hearing, as Plaintiff was being returned to the Los Angeles County jail, the confiscated papers were returned to him. Id. ¶ 25.
B. Plaintiff's Subsequent Plea Agreement
On July 6, 2022, Plaintiff had a further hearing on his then-pending criminal matter. DSUF ¶ 26. On that date, Plaintiff made an oral Marsden motion to remove the public defender present at his initial hearing, Ms. Gil, and to have different counsel appointed. Id. The request was heard by the Court and denied. Id. ¶ 27.
Several weeks later, on August 4, 2022, Plaintiff pled no contest to a felony conviction and was given a two-year prison sentence. DSUF ¶ 30. He was represented by the same public defender at that sentencing hearing and had several opportunities to meet with his attorney prior to his plea agreement and sentencing, id. ¶ 32, presumably including various opportunities to discuss with his counsel the two pages of notes that were confiscated temporarily on May 23, 2022. Plaintiff admitted in deposition that he pled no contest because he believed it was in his best interests to do so, id. ¶ 33, was not coerced into entering his plea, id. ¶ 35, had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charges and the consequences of his plea with his attorney prior to pleading guilty, id. ¶ 32, and has never filed an appeal or otherwise attempted to set aside his conviction, id. ¶ 36.
C. LASD's Confiscation Policies
Defendant Guerrero confiscated the documents in accordance with an LASD policy that prohibits "excess paperwork" from being introduced into a courtroom. DSUF ¶¶ 38, 45. Specifically, the LASD policy, contained in its "Court Services Division Manual" states:
All County inmates are searched on arrival at court. Any contraband, including excess property or items that are not necessary to be in the possession of the inmate while at court, may be taken from the inmate, stored, and returned to the inmate just prior to departing the court facility. If the search turns up any questionable property or illegal material, the Branch Supervisor shall be notified.Kim Decl., Ex. H-9 at 1 [Dkt. No. 75-5]. Defendants contend that this policy is for the safety of inmates, court personnel, and the public, and have introduced uncontradicted evidence that paperwork has in the past been used by inmates to conceal contraband. DSUF ¶¶ 40-41.
Defendant Guerrero's declaration provides further detail on the LASD policies and practices vis-à-vis lockup searches prior to entry into the courtroom. She asserts that, "I further understand and have been trained that represented inmates are prohibited from passing items to others, including their attorney, but that authorized items may be passed to or from the inmate by LASD personnel." Guerrero Decl., ¶ 5. She explained:
[M]y training and practice at Norwalk Courthouse as lockup deputy is to allow the self-represented inmate, after inspection of any papers, to maintain possession of their paperwork. For inmates who are represented by counsel, my training and practice is to allow the inmate to retain obvious legal paperwork but to retain excess paperwork with lockup deputies in the lockup area. For these inmates, if papers are retained in lockup, my training and customary practice is to inform the inmate to advise their attorney or bailiff that the papers are needed and that such papers will be passed by the bailiff or lockup deputies. In addition, I customarily advise the bailiff of the inmate's request for paperwork from the lockup area.Id. ¶ 6.
D. Legal Claims
Plaintiff filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act against Los Angeles County Sheriff Alejandro Villanueva, Deputy Dolores Guerrero, and ten unidentified named Sheriff's deputies. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts nine causes of action: (1) unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) liability under Monell; (4) interference with Plaintiff's right of access to the federal courts; (5) obstruction of justice; (6) deprivation of Plaintiff's right to counsel in a criminal proceeding; (7) violation of jus cogens norms of international law; (8) violation of jus dispositivum treaty obligations; and (9) liability under the civil RICO statute. Id. ¶¶ 11-159.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Nat'l Ass'n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To carry its burden of production, the moving party must either: (1) produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense; or (2) show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party has met its initial burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)); see also Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Rule 56 requires the parties to set out facts they will be able to prove at trial."). "In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). "Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.
The parties each raise a number of evidentiary issues. Defendants request judicial notice of Plaintiff's certified criminal docket, hearing transcripts in Plaintiff's criminal case, and plea/sentencing order. Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exhibits A-D [Dkt. No. 76]. Since Plaintiff's criminal proceedings are directly related to the issues underlying this action, judicial notice is proper. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011). In addition, because the source of the County of Los Angeles Board Resolution and Memorandum of Understanding and Comprehensive Security Plan can accurately and readily be determined, judicial notice of that document is also appropriate. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Plaintiff also asserts evidentiary objections. He objects to the use of his deposition transcript because he was unable to obtain it and there was no compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 30(e) and 30(f). Opposition ("Opp.") at 2. Although Plaintiff's counsel states the transcript was never provided to Plaintiff, he provides no evidence nor argument that he requested to review the transcript. Declaration of Stephen Yagman ¶ 10; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e). Additionally, whereas Plaintiff's counsel states he has not been able to order a transcript, he does not allege that he attempted to order and pay "reasonable charges", as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(3). Plaintiff also objects to the use of Deputy Sheriff Chavez's declaration for failure to provide a written expert report. However, since Deputy Sheriff Chavez was not retained as an expert under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), a written expert report was not required. See Opp. Exs. at 21 [Dkt. No. 80-1] (Plaintiff's copy of Defendants' Rule 26 Disclosure of Experts). In sum, Plaintiff's evidentiary objections are meritless and overruled.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Defendants initially argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred on the ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The PLRA requires that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions [under Section 1983], or any Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement is mandatory and applies to all inmate suits about prison life. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002).
In a motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA, a defendant bears the initial burden of proving an administrative remedy was available, and the prisoner did not exhaust that remedy. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show exhaustion or that "the existing and generally available administrative remedies [were] effectively unavailable to him." Id. The "ultimate burden of proof" remains with the defendants. Id.
The PLRA requires "proper exhaustion." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). This "requires an inmate not only to pursue every step of the prison grievance process but also to adhere to the critical procedural rules of that process." Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90, 126 3.Ct. 2378) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]t is the prison's requirements, not the PLRA that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007).
Here, Defendants have met their initial burden to show that there is an adequate administrative remedy. Inmates at Twin Towers Correctional Facility are able to file administrative grievances. Declaration of Jose R. Velasquez ("Velasquez Decl.") ¶¶ 4-13 [Dkt. No. 75-4]. Indeed, Plaintiff himself filed twenty-seven requests and grievances from May 3, 2022 to November 9, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, Exs. L-1, L-2, M. There is no evidence indicating Plaintiff could not file an administrative grievance relating to the claims underlying this action. Defendants also provide evidence of LASD's three-part procedure for proper exhaustion: after an inmate files an initial complaint form and receives a written disposition on it, there are two levels of additional review to appeal. Velasquez Decl. ¶ 11.
The burden, therefore, shifts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff provides his own declaration, signed and dated May 26, 2022, which states, "I turned in a grievance dated May 24, 2022 in an internal mailbox in the Twin Towers Correctional Facility (271-BPOD) to be exact." Declaration of Noel Chavez ("Plaintiff's Decl.") ¶ 3 [Dkt. No. 80-1, p. 6]. He also furnishes a copy of Form SH-J-420, titled "Inmate Grievance Form," dated May 24, 2022, stating, "On May 23, at about 7:30AM, I [got] off an L.A. County Jail bus. I approach the entrance to Norwalk Superior Court. The jailer 'Guerrero' searches me and takes my legal mail off my person, I advised her its my legal mail and she continued taking my mail and then made me walk into the tank (holding)." Opp. Exs. [Dkt. No. 80-1, pp. 7-11]. In addition, Plaintiff provides a copy of a handwritten document, titled, "Grievance Appeal" dated June 9, 2022, which states, "I am appealing custody personnel from 5/24/22. I appeal like this because I have not received a response and I do not waive my right to appeal by not responding. I am appealing because I had legal mail and Dep. Guerrero would not let me take it to my public defender." Id. [Dkt. No. 80-1, pp. 12-13]. Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this evidence is sufficient to show that Plaintiff exhausted his available remedies.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that all claims brought against them in their individual capacity should be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Motion at 9-15. The Court agrees.
For this reason, all damages claims (including Plaintiff's claim for nominal damages) are dismissed. See C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming court's finding of qualified immunity and dismissing nominal damages claims).
In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014). Under the first prong, courts consider whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show an officer's conduct violated a federal right. Id. Under the second prong, courts consider whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Id. Although "a case directly on point" is not required "for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7-8, 211 L.Ed.2d 164 (2021). The inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). "If the law did not put the officer on notice that the conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. at 195, 121 S.Ct. 2151. It is within the "sound discretion [of the Court] in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Moreover, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011).
In Claim One, Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." One's property is considered "seized" when there is a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). And although the Ninth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect prison inmates from the seizure of their property, Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989), it has also observed that pretrial detainees have greater rights than convicted prisoners. Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Stone v. City & Cty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992)). In determining whether an individual seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, courts consider the totality of the circumstances and balance the need for the particular seizure against the invasion of personal rights that the seizure entails. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013).
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts Claim One as a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 17, the Court agrees with Defendants that he fails to allege a cognizable claim because an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) ("[A] negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner's property fails to state a claim under section 1983 if the state has an adequate post deprivation remedy. California Law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations." (internal citation omitted)).
But although precedent clearly establishes pretrial detainees' Fourth Amendment rights in other circumstances, no clearly established precedent exists in the "specific context of the case" here. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. In other words, there is no clearly established case law relating to whether confiscation of paperwork in the process of transporting a detainee to a criminal hearing violates that detainee's constitutional rights. Indeed, after examining all the cases cited in the parties' briefs and further reviewing all relevant cases in the Ninth Circuit, the Court concludes that there is no case even indirectly on point, much less one that "clearly establishes" the specific principle being advanced here. What is most challenging in terms of the qualified immunity analysis is the fact that Defendant Guerrero did not confiscate all of Plaintiff's legal papers; she let Plaintiff take into the courtroom papers that were obviously legal and confiscated what she believed to be "excess paperwork", thereby putting the onus on Plaintiff to take what he needed or to request the paperwork through his attorney. No case comes close to analyzing these analogous facts in the context of a lockup setting. In sum, Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that such a Fourth Amendment right existed that was "beyond debate". See Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1109. Since the law did not put Defendants on notice that confiscating these documents would be clearly unconstitutional, qualified immunity on Claim One is proper.
In Claim Four, Plaintiff asserts Defendants interfered with his First Amendment right of access to courts. To establish a violation of the right of access, a prisoner must establish that they have suffered an actual injury, that is, "actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim". Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-49, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the plaintiff's allegations that several of his pending suits were dismissed as a result of the defendants' actions was sufficient to allege an actual injury), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 135 S.Ct. 1759, 191 L.Ed.2d 803 (2015); Hathaway v. Cote, 622 F. App'x 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Where the adverse decision in the case underlying an access-to-courts claim would have necessarily occurred anyway, and no other adverse impact (such as difficulty preserving the claim for appeal) can be shown, no such link can be established."). But, once again, Plaintiff is unable to cite to any case establishing that Defendants' conduct clearly violates his right to access the courts, and for that reason qualified immunity applies here as well.
Plaintiff's Claim Four fails for the independent reason discussed in IV.C., infra, since there is no triable issue of fact regarding any injury to Plaintiff as a result of the underlying document seizure. Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence to establish an actual injury resulting from a violation of his right to access the courts and Claim Four, therefore, fails.
Plaintiff's Claim Six asserts that Defendants' conduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the Sixth Amendment, individuals being criminally prosecuted have a right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Government's deliberate interference with the relationship between a criminal defendant and his defense counsel violates the Sixth Amendment if it substantially prejudices the criminal defendant. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584-85 (9th Cir. 2004). "Substantial prejudice results from the introduction of evidence gained through the interference against the defendant at trial, from the prosecution's use of confidential information pertaining to defense plans and strategy, and from other actions designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial." Id. at 585 (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff submits no evidence to show that the prosecution gained an unfair advantage in his criminal case. He provides no evidence to support his allegation that his inability to give his counsel the at-issue documents on the day of his hearing caused his counsel to inadequately represent him or caused him to ultimately plead no contest to the charge against him. And, again, he cites no case law to support his claim that Defendants' conduct violated a clearly established right.
Plaintiff's personal liability claims under Count Two (conspiracy) and Count Five (obstruction of justice) are dismissed for the same reasons. Moreover, although Plaintiff raises Count Five as a claim under Section 1983, obstruction of justice is a criminal charge that does not provide for a private cause of action. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997).
C. Heck v. Humphrey
As an independent basis for summary judgment, Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Again, the Court is persuaded that dismissal is required.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that Section 1983 claims are not cognizable if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Id. The Heck doctrine has been applied to cases involving plea agreements, and in those contexts courts have analyzed whether the conduct would implicate the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea itself. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Conspicuously missing from this case is any contention that Ove and Forest's pleas were illegal, involuntary or without factual bases."); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2018) (same); Bosworth v. United States, No. CV 14-0283-DMG-SS, 2014 WL 7466985, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2014) (finding plaintiff's claims to be Heck-barred because "the claims in the instant action depend entirely on Plaintiff's allegedly involuntary confession, false plea, and unlawful conviction."); Fuller v. Powell, No. CV 14-0217-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 176543, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 14, 2015) ("Plaintiff has not alleged that his plea agreement was rendered involuntary or otherwise impacted in any way by the delay he describes in Count One, and in any event, such a claim would be barred by Heck . . . .").
That standard applies squarely to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's declaration filed in opposition to this motion could not be clearer that he believed his plea to be essentially involuntary—or "forced" upon him—due to his inability to access his papers at the preliminary hearing: "As a direct result of Guerrero confiscating my legal papers, I thereafter was forced to plead no contest to the criminal charges against me, and as a result of my plea I ended up spending nearly a year in prison." Plaintiff's Decl. ¶ 4. Indeed, his discovery responses are replete with references to his belief that he did not receive a fair trial and that but for the alleged conduct he would not have received the criminal conviction to which he pled. See, e.g., Ex. N-4 (Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to Special Interrogatories) [Dkt. No. 75-7] at 4 (". . . because I was not fully prepared for a fair trial."), at 5 ("I have a strike on my record now that could have easily been dodged or avoided by getting charges dropped to a simple misdemeanor at my preliminary hearing without having to take it to jury trial . . . ."), at 5 ("I could have got charges dropped completely and took a way lesser punishment/sentence . . . ."), at 8 ("I didn't get a chance to the Marsden Motion at preliminary hearing to postpone, get a new lawyer, and prepare for court, so I can have a fair trial."), at 9 ("I believe I lost income due to this two year incarceration which could have been avoided . . . ."); see also N-2 (Plaintiff's Responses to Requests for Admissions) [Dkt. No. 75-5] at 11 ("It took my lawyers opportunity to beat my case or get a much lower prison sentence to me and get charges dropped"), at 14 ("As a result of the incident I have sustained legal damages resulting in a 2 year prison sentence and a strike on my criminal record."). In short, Plaintiff's entire theory of the case is, at bottom, a direct challenge to the voluntary nature of his plea agreement. Indeed, in order to prevail and receive the relief that he is requesting (i.e., damages for the time spent in detention), Plaintiff would have to argue (and show) "the invalidity of his sentence." Heck, 512 U.S. at 488, 114 S.Ct. 2364. As such, his claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.
D. Causation
"[T]he basic purpose of § 1983 damages is to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights." Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's compensatory damages claims must be dismissed in their entirety because Plaintiff has failed to advance a coherent theory of causation that logically connects the alleged constitutional violations to the alleged damages. Although Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to plead no contest "as a direct result of" Defendant Guerrero's actions, Plaintiff's Decl. ¶ 4, even if the Court assumes arguendo that Defendants' conduct was violative of Plaintiff's rights, there is no evidence in the record to show that these violations were the cause of any harm. Of the three pieces of paper confiscated on May 23, 2022, the first was a letter written by Plaintiff asking the judge to appoint new counsel. DSUF ¶ 7. No causal link to recoverable damages can even conceivably apply to the confiscation of this document since Plaintiff in fact made an oral Marsden motion at the very next hearing on July 26, 2022. Id. ¶ 26. Similarly, no causation has been shown for the other two pieces of paper purporting to be suggested cross-examination questions for the preliminary hearing. Nor can it be, given that Plaintiff had the documents returned to him, and presumably available for use by his attorney, for nearly three months before his plea agreement in August 2022. Because Plaintiff cannot show that the temporary loss of use of these documents had any effect on his criminal case, his claims must be dismissed.
E. Supervisory Liability Against Former Sheriff Villanueva
Defendant Villanueva moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff alleges no facts to support any theory of supervisory liability. An official may be liable as a supervisor only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there exists a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A sufficient causal connection requires that the supervisor either set in motion or knowingly refused to terminate acts by others that he knew or had reason to know inflict constitutional injury. Id. at 1205-06.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, "Defendant [Villanueva] is legally liable for [Defendant Guerrero's] conduct because, with deliberate indifference, he caused it, ratified it, condoned it, or otherwise made it possible, by their actions and/or inactions, and caused and/or created LASD policies, practices, procedures, and/or customs, that caused the LASD officers' unconstitutional conduct, and because all of them failed in their duty to train police in proper, allowable, constitutional policing and jail procedures, and their failures amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Compl. ¶ 10.
Allegations are not enough. Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendant Villanueva was personally involved in the taking of his documents, that he knowingly refused to intervene in Defendant Guerrero's acts, or that he ratified any policy that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. To the contrary, the only evidence proffered on this issue is that Defendant Villanueva had no involvement. DSUF ¶ 46. Accordingly, summary judgment as to Defendant Villanueva is granted.
F. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants argue that all claims made against them in their official capacity (including all Monell claims) are barred by the sovereign immunity afforded to states under the Eleventh Amendment. Motion at 15-18. Claims against parties in their official capacities are "the same as a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent". McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). County agencies may qualify for Eleventh Amendment state immunity from lawsuits where the agency is an arm of the state. Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing factors for determining whether a governmental agency is an arm of the state).
The relevant analysis is whether the government employee functioned more as a state representative rather than a local representative. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 783-84, 117 S.Ct. 1734. Recent California cases have held that "sheriffs—and thus deputies as well—function as representatives of the state and not the county when providing courtroom security services." Rojas v. Sonoma Cnty., 2011 WL 5024551, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2011). For this reason, California courts have increasingly and consistently pointed out that sheriff deputies act as state officials in this context, thus enjoying Eleventh Amendment protection for official acts. See Jackson v. McMahon, 2019 WL 8647818, at *2 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2019) ("Several district courts in this circuit have determined that when county sheriffs in California are providing security for state court, they act as state officials, and are thus entitled Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued in their official capacity."); Black Lives Matter-Stockton Chapter v. San Joaquin Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 398 F. Supp. 3d 660, 667-71 (E.D. Cal. 2019) ("When San Joaquin County sheriffs are providing court security to the Superior Court, they are acting as state employees.").
Here, Defendant Guerrero (as part of the LASD) was providing courtroom security to the Norwalk Courthouse pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between the County of Los Angeles and the State of California. DSUF ¶ 43. The State of California was solely responsible for the funding of court security and court-related functions provided by LASD personnel. Id. ¶ 44. In short, Defendant Guerrero at all relevant times was paid by and functioning as an arm of the State of California. Eleventh immunity thus applies to all the official capacity claims (including the Monell claims) asserted against Defendants.
To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must "demonstrate that the policy or custom of a municipality reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants." Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). Such deliberate indifference is shown "[w]here a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens." Id. at 1076 (emphasis in original). Defendants argue—as an independent basis for challenging Plaintiff's Monell claim—that the claim fails because there was no such deliberate indifference that caused the alleged violation. Motion at 18-19. The Court agrees. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of Defendant Guerrero's conduct. She was following LASD policy and the Court concludes that this policy did not, in itself, reflect deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the inmates being transported for hearings in the courthouse.
G. Claims Seven, Eight, and Nine
As to Plaintiff's remaining claims, Plaintiff asserts a violation of jus cogens norms of international law (Claim Seven) and jus dispositivum treaty obligations (Claim Eight). Compl. ¶¶ 27-31. But the Ninth Circuit has not recognized a private right of action based on these claims. See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1255-57 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff's opposition does not argue otherwise. These claims are dismissed.
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's RICO claim (Count Nine) must be dismissed as well. To state a civil RICO claim, "plaintiffs must allege (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (5) causing injury to plaintiffs' business or property." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). As discussed fully in Section IV.D., supra, however, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any facts showing that Defendants' conduct was the cause of any concrete injuries given that the documents were returned many weeks before Plaintiff entered his plea. Nor is there any showing here that Defendants' conduct caused injuries to Plaintiff's "business or property."
H. Injunctive Relief
The Court turns next to Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, based on the alleged violation of the same constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff's damages claims are barred under qualified immunity, Heck, and the Eleventh Amendment, these doctrines do not immunize Defendants from a claim for injunctive relief. See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to damage liability; it does not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief."); Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a court must dismiss a § 1983 claim if (1) it seeks to recover damages for 'harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid' . . . ."); Hason v. Med. Bd. of California, 279 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief brought against state officers 'in their official capacities, to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law.' ") (quoting Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Injunctive relief is appropriate in cases involving challenges to government policies that result in a pattern of constitutional violations. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974) (noting that a permanent injunction is proper when there is a persistent pattern of government misconduct); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding permanent injunctive relief "based on findings that the INS engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct violating aliens' rights"). The state official sued for prospective injunctive relief "must have some direct connection with the enforcement of the [allegedly unconstitutional] act." Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. March Fong Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted). In the present case, current Los Angeles County Sheriff Robert G. Luna is a proper defendant for purposes of injunctive relief and, pursuant to Rule 25(d), is automatically substituted as former Sheriff Alejandro Villanueva's successor.
"In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Supreme Court held that although prisoners do not check their constitutional rights at the prison gates, a relaxed standard is used in determining the constitutionality of all prison regulations." Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). In recognition of this limiting principle, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that "a prison regulation impinging on inmates' constitutional rights 'is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' " Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254). Legitimate penological interests include "security, order, and rehabilitation." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989). And these limitations also apply, as here, to pretrial detainees. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed,2d 447 (1979) ("[P]retrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners. But . . . simply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and limitations . . . . A detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.").
The standard to be applied in reviewing jail-related searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is a "reasonableness" standard. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-59, 99 S.Ct. 1861. "Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conduced." Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (internal citations omitted). Stated differently, "there must be a 'mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.' " Id. at 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Moreover, "when an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee . . . the practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977). To that end, "judicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial." Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800.
In this case, LASD's stated "penological interest" for inspecting for and confiscating "excess paperwork" is expressly security related. DSUF ¶ 42. In support Defendants provide evidence that LASD personnel are required by policy to inspect legal mail for contraband that threatens the health and safety of inmates and staff and to address known methods for smuggling drugs and illicit substances on or within paperwork. Declaration of David Chavez ("Chavez Decl.") ¶¶ 4-5. Defendants also proffer evidence that, in 2021, the LASD published a bulletin alerting staff of an increase of inmates receiving documents saturated with narcotics, and stated that "special attention should be given to examining the consistence of any paperwork . . . ." Id., Ex. 1-1.
To that end, the LASD policy contains several components that attempt to strike a balance. First, sheriff deputies are instructed to search inmates upon arrival at court and confiscate all excess property and papers "not necessary to be in the possession of the inmate while at court . . . ." See Chavez Decl., Ex. H-9. Detainees are allowed to bring into the courtroom "obvious legal paperwork." Guerrero Decl., ¶ 6. And there is another mechanism to ensure that detainees can have access to what is needed: inmates are told when entering to advise their attorneys that papers have been held and the bailiff will then bring in the papers if requested. Id. All of this is consistent with Plaintiff's deposition testimony of what Defendant said to him outside the courtroom. Kim Decl., Ex. N-1 at 55 ("[P]ick what you want and leave the rest.").
Based on this record, the Court concludes that these policies (at least as stated) are not unreasonable and do not constitute a violation of a detainee's constitutional rights sufficient to allow the case to proceed on an injunctive relief theory. While the legal conclusions are disputed, the relevant facts are not. And while the Court is troubled that so much discretion is delegated by LASD to sheriff deputies to confiscate excess paperwork that can potentially be legal in nature, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the policies are facially invalid. In the end, given the clear Supreme Court guidance discussed above, the Court finds that the LASD policies on this issue are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and provide sufficient safeguards to protect detainees' cognizable interests in accessing their legal documents.
V. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all claims and theories of relief.
Based on this conclusion, Plaintiff's pending Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses from Answer [Dkt. No. 52] is hereby resolved as moot.