Opinion
21-P-637 21-P-1077
06-28-2022
SEAN MURPHY v. CAROL A. MICI [1] & another [2] (and a companion case [3]).
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
While incarcerated at the North Central Correctional Institution (NCCI), the pro se plaintiff, Sean Murphy, brought two separate actions against the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) and the Superintendent of NCCI (superintendent). In the first action, Murphy sought judicial review of the denial of four inmate grievances from 2020 related to his claims to certain earned good time (EGT) credits (2020 grievances). In the second action, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking immediate release from confinement, review of the denial of three grievances from 2021 regarding unawarded EGT credits (2021 grievances), and declaratory relief. In each case, a judge of the Superior Court dismissed Murphy's complaints. We affirm both judgments.
Murphy presses only three of those grievances on appeal.
Earned good time refers to the sentence deductions granted by the commissioner under G. L. c. 127, § 129, including for participation in work, educational, and other rehabilitation programs. See Burno v. Commissioner of Correction, 399 Mass. 111, 116 (1987).
Discussion.
1. Standard of review. We review inmate grievance appeals under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. See Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass.App.Ct. 126, 130-132 (2013). To obtain relief, the party seeking review of the agency decision has the burden to show that his substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision was not supported by "substantial evidence" or was "[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See Carey v. Commissioner of Correction, 479 Mass. 367, 369-370 (2018), quoting Ten Local Citizen Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 228 (2010) ("plaintiff challenging an agency interpretation has a 'formidable burden'").
2. Mootness. Before turning to Murphy's claims regarding the denial of his grievances, we first address the defendants' argument that the appeals are moot because Murphy is no longer in State custody. On April 30, 2021, Murphy was released by the Department of Correction (DOC) to a Federal sentence after serving concurrent terms of two years to two years and one day in State prison. However, it is uncontested that Murphy's five-year State probation began upon his release from his Massachusetts sentences. We assume, for the sake of this discussion, that because Murphy is still on probation and the award of EGT credits could impact his probation start date, the issues before us are not moot. See Cordeiro v. Commissioner of Correction, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 690, 690, n.l (1994) (EGT is "to be deducted from a prisoner's parole eligibility date").
3. 2020 grievances. Murphy claims that he is entitled to seven and one-half days of EGT credits he did not receive for March of 2020, the month that the COVID-19 pandemic reached Massachusetts. The onset of the pandemic triggered a statewide shutdown of qualified inmate programs, raising the question of whether inmates could receive EGT credits for the programs in which they were enrolled. On March 27, 2020, the commissioner issued a "Covid-19 Update" memorandum (memorandum) to all DOC inmates stating, inter alia, that "Earned Good Time will be credited for the month of March." The commissioner subsequently credited any inmate who had been signed up for a qualifying program as of March 1, 2020, with full credit of seven and one-half days of EGT for that program. She did not award EGT credit to inmates for programs in which they were not enrolled as of that date. Murphy, who was enrolled in a qualifying work program in March of 2020, received seven and one-half days of EGT credit for participation in that program. Although he had not enrolled in any other programs that month, he grieved the commissioner's failure to award him an additional seven and one-half days of good time based on the language of the memorandum. On appeal, Murphy argues that the commissioner's decision to award EGT credit based on program enrollment was "inherently unfair." We are not persuaded.
The commissioner has the statutory authority to award EGT credits to prisoners enrolled in eligible programs, up to a maximum of fifteen days per month. See Piggott v. Commissioner of Correction, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 678, 684 (1996) (G. L. c. 127, § 129D "unambiguously gives the commissioner discretion whether or not to award earned good time credits for participation in rehabilitative programs"). Nothing in the memorandum altered the commissioner's discretion to determine whether to award EGT or to determine whether and how a prisoner could "satisf[y] . . . the requirements of the program." G. L. c. 127 § 129D (e) ; see Burno v. Commissioner of Correction, 399 Mass. Ill. 116 (1987) (deductions from sentences "are credited against the prisoner's sentence only after he has satisfied the prerequisite for receiving them"). We discern no abuse of discretion in the commissioner's award of EGT credits only to inmates who had enrolled in a qualifying program.
Next, Murphy asserts that he should be awarded fifteen days EGT credit for every month from March 2020 until "the [Covid-19] pandemic ends" regardless of whether he participates in any programs during that time. He contends that the language of chapter 227 of the Acts of 2020 (chapter 227) and Chief Justice Gants' concurrence in Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 1)_, 484 Mass. 698, 734 (2020), §_.C. 488 Mass. 643 (2021), required the commissioner to implement new programs, and argues that discontinuation of certain existing programs was arbitrary. Again, we are not persuaded.
Section 2 of line item 8900-01 of chapter 227 of the Acts of 2020 states that DOC "shall consider . . . the maximization of good time by eliminating mandates for participation in programming for those close to their release dates."
Chapter 227, which was enacted three months after Murphy filed the relevant grievances, does not aid him. This budgetary line item was advisory and imposed no obligation upon or limit to the commissioner's statutory discretion. See Piggott, 40 Mass.App.Ct. at 684. With respect to the concurring opinion in Foster (No. 1), 484 Mass. at 739, Murphy cites language encouraging the DOC to "devise new programs that can be accomplished by inmates in the midst of a pandemic that would enable them to earn the full complement of possible good time." It is axiomatic, as Murphy himself acknowledges, that a concurring opinion does not set binding precedent. The precatory language in the Foster (No. 1) concurrence does not supersede the commissioner's authority. See Piggott, 40 Mass.App.Ct. at 684.
Finally, there was no error in the judge's failure to exercise his equitable authority to award EGT credits where the commissioner had declined to do so. See Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 440 Mass. 1, 9 (2003) ("Awarding credits where an inmate has not satisfactorily participated in such programs is contrary to the statutory language, the purpose, and the policy behind § 129D, and is thus not a proper subject for an equitable order") .
4. 2021 grievances. In his second appeal, Murphy argues that he improperly was denied EGT for certain "boost credits"and "completion credits" for (1) a qualifying course that he was not able to complete before release and (2) completed courses that the commissioner had not deemed eligible for boost or completion credits. Denial of boost or completion credits under these circumstances was well within the commissioner's discretion. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 411.08(2) ("an inmate may receive deductions from sentence only for participation in those approved programs and activities specifically set forth on such lists"); Commonwealth v. DeWeldon, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 626, 632-633 (2011) ("A prisoner does not have any entitlement to earned good time until the commissioner acts"); Ladetto v. Commissioner of Correction, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 2-3 (1979) (absent statutory grant, prisoners have no right to particular rehabilitative program).
"Boost credits" are "an additional deduction of sentence of up to 10 days for a prisoner's successful completion of a program or activity, as designated by the commissioner." G. L. c. 127, § 129D (a).
Up to eighty days of "completion credits" may be awarded "for successful completion of a program or activity, as designated by the commissioner." G. L. c. 127, § 129D (c).
Murphy's additional claim that the DOC's policy of denying boost and completion credits to inmates during the last ninety days of their sentence contravenes regulatory requirements under 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 411.10(6) and is fundamentally unfair likewise misses the mark. The decision to apply EGT credits against an inmate's minimum term rather than the maximum sentence is consistent with the unambiguous language of G. L. c. 127 § 129D, and was interpreted reasonably by the commissioner. See Dexter v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst., Concord, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 325, 329 (2015) (DOC's reasonable interpretation of regulations entitled to deference).
In relevant part, G. L. c. 127, § 129D states: "Such [boost credits] and such completion credits granted . . . shall be added to any deduction to which the prisoner is entitled . . . for reducing from the minimum term of the sentence."
Lastly, Murphy's reliance on chapter 227 and on the concurrence in Foster (No.1) to support his arguments for boost or completion credits fails for the reasons already discussed above.
We need not address Murphy's additional argument that G. L. c. 127, § 130B unconstitutionally conflicts with the award of EGT credits under § 127D, because Murphy does not argue, nor does the record suggest, that his parole plan was rejected by the Parole Board. See Libertarian Ass'n of Massachusetts v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 538, 547 (2012) ("declaratory relief is reserved for real controversies, and is not a vehicle for resolving abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot questions").
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.