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concluding plaintiff's failure to oppose an argument amounted to concession of that argument
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Case No. EDCV 14-02308-VAP (KKx)
06-17-2015
CRYSTAL A. MULLER, Plaintiff, v. MORONGO CASINO, RESORT, AND SPA; ET AL., Defendants
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 14) WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
[Motion filed on April 8, 2015]
Plaintiff worked as a slot attendant at a casino owned and operated by the Morongo Band of Mission Indians ("Morongo"), a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Morongo provided her several leaves of absence under a policy it implemented that afforded its employees protections based on the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. During one such approved leave, Morongo discharged Plaintiff for drug use. Plaintiff alleges her drug use at the time was connected to the illnesses for which she received the leave in the first place.
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on March 10, 2015. (See Doc. No. 7 ("FAC").) On April 8, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. No. 14 ("Notice"); Doc. No. 14-1 ("Motion").)
After considering the papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion, and the arguments presented at the June 1, 2015 hearing, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff began working as a slot attendant for the Morongo Casino, Resort & Spa ("MCRS") in about 2002. (FAC ¶ 5.) MCRS is owned and operated by Morongo, an Indian tribe. (Id. ¶ 2(b).)
The Court at times refers to MCRS and Morongo interchangeably.
In 2010, Plaintiff was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and chronic migraine headaches. (Id. ¶ 6.) As a result, Plaintiff qualified for, and received, several leaves of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), as implemented by Morongo. (Id.)
On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff received another leave of absence that was due to expire on August 8, 2013. (Id. ¶ 9.) On July 26, 2013, while Plaintiff was at work, an unnamed manager sent Plaintiff home because "it was brought up that [she] was taking drugs for her disability for years." (Id. ¶ 11.) On July 31, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter from Morongo notifying her she had been discharged "because of her drug use[,] which interfered with her ability to perform her job." (Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff made several calls to the Human Resources Department and requested "to appear before the Tribal Counsel" because she had been terminated during an approved leave of absence. (Id. ¶ 13.) She alleges that the drugs she was taking did not impair her ability to perform her work. (Id.) Plaintiff also repeatedly wrote to Morongo. (Id. ¶ 15.) She sought "to arbitrate the matter" (id.), because she had "been informed by Human Resources that Morongo had adopted federal standards for employees under the FMLA[,] and that she could not go to court but could arbitrate" (id. ¶ 14).
Plaintiff alleges an agreement that Morongo entered into with the State of California states, "[T]he Tribe waives its right to assert sovereign immunity with respect to the arbitration and court review of such claims but only up to the limits of the Policy." (FAC ¶ 17.)
On August 29, 2014, Morongo responded to Plaintiff's letters. (Id. ¶ 16.) It informed her that arbitration was not available for employment-related claims, such as hers. (Id.)
B. Procedural Background
On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. (See Doc. No. 1.) On March 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed her FAC, titled, "Plaintiff Crystal A. Muller's First Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief or, in the Alternative, Petition to Compel Arbitration." It is not clear what equitable relief Plaintiff seeks other than to compel arbitration.
Plaintiff asserts three claims in her FAC: (1) violation of the FMLA (see id. ¶¶ 18-21); (2) violation of the California Family Rights Act (see id. ¶¶ 22-23); and (3) wrongful termination (see id. ¶¶ 25-27). She alleges these claims against the following Defendants: MCRS, Morongo, Kandi Kelley, and Briton Cook (collectively "Defendants").
Plaintiff sues the Morongo Tribal Council, which is the tribe's elected governing body. (Motion at 5.)
On April 8, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion. On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Doc. No. 17 ("Opposition").) She attached to her Opposition several exhibits. (See, e.g. Doc. No. 21, 23.) Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. No. 19 ("Reply").)
C. Exhibits Filed by Plaintiff in Connection With Her Opposition
Plaintiff has attempted numerous times to file exhibits with her Opposition. She has failed each time.
Plaintiff initially filed the exhibits as Doc. No. 18. The Court ordered that document stricken because Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Haney, failed to redact Plaintiff's sensitive information, including her home address and telephone numbers, as required by the Central District's Local Rules. (See Doc. No. 20.) Ms. Haney timely re-filed the exhibits as Doc. No. 21, this time with the appropriate redactions. With this filing, Ms. Haney submitted her own declaration and simply attached the exhibits without attempting to authenticate them. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) ("To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is."). Her declaration discussed, inter alia, her conversations with opposing counsel on the merits of the lawsuit without referencing the attached exhibits. Defendants, therefore, objected to the declaration and exhibits. (See Doc. No. 22.)
The day after Defendants filed their objection, Ms. Haney filed a document titled, "Notice Errata; Declaration of Gloria Dredd Haney." (Doc. Nos. 23 ("Errata").) In it, she explained that the declaration she filed as Doc. No. 21, although relating to this case and the instant Motion, "was an inadvertent error and mistake." (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 3.) She "was . . . completely surprised that the wrong declaration was filed," Ms. Haney stated. (Id.) Attached to the Errata was a new declaration, signed only by Ms. Haney, which attempted to authenticate the exhibits. (See Doc. No. 23-1 ("Haney Decl.").)
The Errata did not contain Ms. Haney's signature. She therefore filed a correction that same day. (See Doc. No. 24.)
As identified by Defendants' additional objections to the Haney Decl. and the attached exhibits (see Doc. No. 25), Ms. Haney does not state whether she has personal knowledge of Exhibits A-Q, or whether she is able to authenticate these exhibits. Ms. Haney only states that these are documents sent or received by her client. That, however, is insufficient for authentication purposes. See, e.g. Barefield v. Bd. of Trustees of CA State Univ., Bakersfield, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 (E.D. Cal. 2007) ("An attorney's declaration may lay a foundation for authentication if the attorney drafted the document, witnessed the author draft the document, or is familiar with the author's signature. . . . Where these threshold requirements are not met, the evidence is inadmissible."); see also Fed. R. Evid. 602 ("A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter."); Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Ms. Haney's declaration does not authenticate Exhibits A-Q. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants' objections (see Doc. No. 25) and does not consider Exhibits A-Q attached to Doc. No. 23.
The only other exhibit Ms. Haney included is Exhibit R, which is a publicly available document that Defendants request the Court take judicial notice. The Court, therefore, considers this document.
* * *
On the merits, the Court finds it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case due to tribal sovereign immunity. It therefore GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When invoked, tribal sovereign immunity deprives a federal court of jurisdiction and requires dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Alvarado v. Table Mtn. Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007). A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be "facial" or "factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)); Kohler v. CJP, Ltd., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2011). In a facial attack, the challenging party asserts that the allegations in the complaint are, on their face, insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. In a factual attack, the challenging party disputes the truth of the allegations that otherwise would be sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id.; Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
In general, when reviewing a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Safe Air For Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (citing Lee, 227 F.3d at 1242). The court does not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, and it "is ordinarily free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary." Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); see also O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1977).
III. DISCUSSION
"Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations' that exercise 'inherent sovereign authority.'" Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Comty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). They possess "the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Therefore, "an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); see also White v. Univ. of California, 765 F.3d 1010, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Suits against Indian tribes are therefore barred absent congressional abrogation or a clear waiver from the tribe itself."). "Tribal sovereign immunity may extend to subdivisions of a tribe," Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2008), and "to tribal officials when acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority," Cook v. AVI Casino Enterprises, Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff asserts this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her lawsuit based on the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See FAC ¶ 1.) The only federal claim she asserts is under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. As discussed below, however, tribal sovereign immunity precludes Plaintiff's lawsuit.
She asserts subject-matter jurisdiction under several other statutes (see FAC ¶ 1), but these other statutes do not apply in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (defining terms); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (conferring jurisdiction over civil rights claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (conferring jurisdiction "of any civil action pr proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies"); 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (conferring jurisdiction for "[c]ivil actions by individuals denied equal educational opportunities or by Attorney General").
Plaintiff does not allege a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"). She does, however, appear to imply such a claim. (See, e.g. FAC ¶ 22.) Even if Plaintiff did allege a claim under the ADA, it would fail: Congress has not abrogated a tribe's immunity to suit under that statute. See Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Indian Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1131-34 (11th Cir. 1999). The ADA specifically exempts Indian tribes from its definition of "employer," see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i), and Plaintiff does not argue otherwise.
A. Morongo Is a Federally-Recognized Tribe, and MCRS Is an Arm of the Tribe
The 2015 Federal Register recognizes the "Morongo Band of Mission Indians, California." See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942, 1945 (Jan. 14, 2015). "Inclusion of a tribe on the Federal Register list of recognized tribes is generally sufficient to establish entitlement to sovereign immunity." Larimer v. Konocti Vista Casino Resort, Marina & RV Park, 814 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo and Casino, 676 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (E.D. Cal. 2009)).
A "district court may take judicial notice of the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations." See Crimm v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 750 F.2d 703, 710 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1982)). The Court, therefore, GRANTS Defendant's request for judicial notice of the relevant portions of the Federal Register. (See Motion at 3 n.3; Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 1 ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Morongo is an "Indian Tribe." (FAC ¶ 2(a).) The Court therefore considers Morongo a federally-recognized Indian tribe.
"Tribal sovereign immunity not only protects tribes themselves, but also extends to arms of the tribe acting on behalf of the tribe." White, 765 F.3d at 1025. When "determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity as an 'arm of the tribe,'" courts in this Circuit apply several factors: (1) the method of creation of the economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe has over the entities; (4) the tribe's intent with respect to the sharing of its sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the entities. Id.
Defendants assert Morongo is the sole owner of MCRS (see Motion at 12 (citing, inter alia, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A))), and the California Gambling Control Commission Website lists MCRS as a casino associated with the tribe. These facts alone are sufficient under White to recognize MCRS as an arm of the tribe. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In light of the purposes for which the Tribe founded this Casino and the Tribe's ownership and control of its operations, there can be little doubt that the Casino functions as an arm of the Tribe. It accordingly enjoys the Tribe's immunity from suit."); see also Larimer, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 955 ("In light of the undisputed status of Konocti Vista as a casino wholly owned and operated by a tribe entitled to sovereign immunity, the Court finds that the casino is immune from suit in federal court as an arm of the tribe."); Morrison v. Viejas Enterprises, No. 11-197, 2011 WL 3203107, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (holding that "the Indian tribe's casino is entitled to sovereign immunity" as an arm of the tribe). Moreover, courts have recognized MCRS as an arm of Morongo. See Chavez v. Morongo Casino Resort & Spa, No. E056191, 2014 WL 4053805, at *1, *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2014) (extending tribal sovereign immunity to MCRS).
See California Gambling Control Commission, List of Casinos, www.cgcc.ca.gov/?pageID=tribalinfo&pageName=TribalInfo.com. Although no party requests judicial notice of this website, the Court may, on its own, "take notice of undisputed information available on a government website." Michael v. New Century Fin. Services, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2014 WL 4099010, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff does not dispute MCRS's status as an arm of the tribe. She has, therefore, conceded this point. See, e.g. Tait v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 12-9532, 2013 WL 3811767, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (holding plaintiff's failure to oppose argument amounted to concession of that argument).
Accordingly, the Court considers Morongo a federally-recognized Indian tribe, and MCRS as an arm of Morongo. If tribal sovereign immunity shields Morongo from this lawsuit, it also shields MCRS.
B. The FMLA Does Not Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court has established that "a congressional decision" to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity "must be clear." Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2031. "The baseline position," it has held, "is tribal immunity; and to abrogate such immunity, Congress must unequivocally express that purpose." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Multiple courts have analyzed the FMLA and determined that it does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, 5 99 Fed. Appx. 659, 660 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2015) ("The district court correctly held that the FMLA does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity."); Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The FMLA makes no reference to the amenity of Indian tribes to suit."); Morrison, 2011 WL 3203107, at *3 ("The Family Medical Leave Act is a law of general application that is silent with respect to Indian tribes."); Pearson v. Chugach Gov. Services Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 467, 477 (D. Del. 2009) ("The only courts to examine whether tribal organizations are subject to the FMLA's employer obligations held, based on the doctrine of tribal immunity, th[at] there is not [a] private cause of action under the FMLA against tribal organizations."); Myers v. Seneca Niagara Casino, 488 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Thus, Congress has not expressly abrogated the sovereignty of Indian Nations in the FMLA, and Congress must expressly do so for there to be an effective abrogation.").
Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. This Court finds no reason to deviate from the consensus. It, too, holds that Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity under the FMLA.
C. Morongo Has Not Waived Its Immunity
Even if Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity, an Indian tribe may waive its immunity. "[T]o relinquish its immunity, a tribe's waiver must be 'clear.'" C&L Enterprises, Inc., 532 U.S. at 418 (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 509).
Plaintiff makes two general arguments that Morongo has waived its immunity to employment-related lawsuits. First, she points to an agreement Morongo entered into with the State of California. Second, she argues Morongo waived its immunity by extending Plaintiff and other employees leave under the FMLA. Neither argument is convincing.
1. Morongo Did Not Waive Its Immunity to Employment-Related Lawsuits in Its Compact With the State of California
Plaintiff argues Morongo's Amended Class III Gaming Compact, which it entered into with the State of California ("the Compact") (see Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 2-4; Doc. No. 21-8), contains a clear waiver of immunity to employment-related lawsuits (see Opposition at 9-10). Not so.
The Court GRANTS Defendants' request for judicial notice of the Compact and its various amendments (see Doc. No. 14-3, Attachments 2-4). See Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Community v. California, 547 F.3d 962, 968 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking judicial notice of similar compacts and their amendments).
Morongo agreed in the Compact to "[a]dopt and comply with standards no less stringent than the standards of the Fair Labor Standards Act." (Doc. No. 21-8 ¶ 10.2(l)(1).) The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the FMLA are two different federal statutes. Compare FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., with FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Plaintiff does not assert a claim under the FLSA. Moreover, agreeing to adopt and comply with the FLSA is not a clear waiver of immunity to suit under that statute. The right to enforce Morongo's failure to adopt and comply with the FLSA lies with the State of California - not a third party like Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 2 § 9.4(a)(3).) The Compact explicitly states that it does not "create any right on the part of a third party to bring an action to enforce any of its terms." (Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 2 § 15.1.)
Morongo also agreed in the Compact to "waive its right to assert sovereign immunity . . . in connection with any claim for bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury arising out of, connected with, or relating to the operation of the Gaming Facility." (Doc. No. 21-8 ¶ 10.2(d)(i).) "[T]he Tribe," the Compact continues, "has waived its right to assert sovereign immunity for the purpose of arbitration of those claims." (Id.) Therefore, Morongo has waived its sovereign immunity to claims arising out of bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury at MCRS, but that waiver does not extend to immunity from suit for employment-related claims. In fact, the Compact excludes from its definition of "Compensable Injury" - and therefore excludes from its dispute resolution process - "any injury allegedly sustained . . . in connection with . . . employment." (See Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 4 § 2.4.)
The Court will not infer a waiver of immunity as to certain types of claims based on a separate, unrelated waiver of different categories of claims. Courts have rejected similar arguments with little trouble. See, e.g., Harris v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, No. 14-2365, Doc. No. 22, at 3 (C.D. Cal. April 29, 2015) ("Section 10.2(d) relates only to the tribe's procurement of insurance to cover claims for 'bodily injury, property damage, and personal injury,' not claims for wrongful termination or other state employment law claims."); Myers, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 171 ("[I]t would be too broad of a reading to find that simply because immunity was waived as to gaming activities in a Compact between the Nation and State of New York under the IGRA, that immunity was also waived for unrelated employment claims under the FMLA."); Chavez, 2014 WL 4053805, at *7 ("Since the complaint did not fall within the Tribe's express waiver related to arbitration lawsuits/petitions, we conclude the trial court correctly found there was not jurisdiction because Morongo is protected by its sovereign immunity.").
The Court GRANTS Defendants' request for judicial notice of this Order (see Doc. No. 15). See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ("Courts may take judicial notice of another court's opinion for the existence of the opinion, but not for the truth of the facts recited therein."). Because judicial notice of this Order is proper, it DENIES Plaintiff's objection. (See Doc. No. 26.)
For comparison, Defendants request judicial notice of the Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake. (See Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 5.) The Court GRANTS that request. See Cachil Dehe Band, 547 F.3d at 968 n.4
In that compact, "the Tribe expressly waive[d], and also waive[d] its right to assert, sovereign immunity with respect to the binding arbitration of claims for harassment, retaliation, or employment discrimination . . . ." (See Doc. No. 14-3, Attachment 5 ¶ f(2)(C).) No such provision appears in the Compact between the State of California and Morongo.
The Compact lacks a clear waiver of immunity from suit for employment-related claims.
2. Adopting a Policy Does Not Constitute a Clear Waiver of Immunity
Plaintiff next argues that because Morongo provided her leave under a policy similar to the FMLA, it has waived immunity to suit under the FMLA. (See FAC ¶¶ 6, 14.) That Morongo has instituted a policy to provide its employees protections similar to those available under the FMLA does not mean, however, it has also waived any immunity. This Court does not break new ground by requiring a clear waiver of immunity instead of inferring such a waiver from the adoption of a policy. See Myers, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 169-70 (noting that merely referencing "an employee's eligibility and rights under the FMLA, but . . . not mention[ing] dispute resolution or jurisdiction in any fashion" could not amount to a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity because "[c]learer and more unequivocal evidence is required"); see also Allen, 464 F.3d at 1047 (holding general statements in employment application, including that employee could be terminated "for any reason consistent with applicable state or federal law," did not waive immunity because "[t]hese statements [we]re not a 'clear' waiver of immunity"); cf. C&L Enterprises, 532 U.S. at 414 (holding tribe waived its immunity when it expressly agreed to arbitrate disputes arising out of a specific contract).
Based on the evidence presented, this Court does not find that Morongo or MCRS has waived immunity to suit under the FMLA.
D. The Individual Defendants Also Have Immunity From Plaintiff's Lawsuit
Plaintiff also sues two individual Defendants: Kandi Kelley and Briton Cook (collectively "Individual Defendants"). Plaintiff mentions the Individual Defendants just once in her FAC. (See FAC ¶ 2(b) ("Defendant Kandi Kelley is a non-Indian/non-tribal official of Morongo and Defendant Briton Cook is a non-Indian/non-tribal official of Morongo. Both are agency officers in their official capacities."). Plaintiff's FAC provides no other information about, inter alia, who the Individual Defendants are or what wrongdoing they allegedly committed. Accordingly, she has failed to allege sufficient facts, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires, to state any employment-related claims against the Individual Defendants. In any event, they are also entitled to immunity.
Plaintiff sues the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. (FAC ¶ 2(b) ("Both are agency officers in their official capacities."). A tribe's sovereign immunity "protects tribal officials acting within the scope of their valid authority." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Chayoon, 355 F.3d at 143 ("Furthermore, Chayoon cannot circumvent tribal immunity by merely naming officers or employees of the Tribe when the complaint concerns actions taken in defendants' official or representative capacities and the complaint does not allege they acted outside the scope of their authority."). As Plaintiff only sues the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, the tribe's sovereign immunity shields them from Plaintiff's lawsuit.
In her Opposition, Plaintiff asserts for the first time that the Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of their authority. (See Opposition at 1.) An official is not immune from suit when "acting wholly outside the scope of . . . discretionary authority." Harbert Intern., Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff's FAC, however, contains no facts that would support that conclusion. In her Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that she learned "from another employee that [the Individual Defendants] had been trying to get other non-Indian employees to join in and assist them in firing [her] by providing false statements against her." (Opposition at 4-5.) This statement appears only in her Opposition - not the FAC - and is unsupported.
In any event, Plaintiff seeks to compel arbitration. Such relief would function against the tribe, not the Individual Defendants. See Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding courts must be sensitive to whether the judgment sought in an individual capacity suit would "interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the sovereign from acting, or to compel it to act."). The remedy sought here - arbitration - is not like a claim for money damages, where the remedy applies against the Individual Defendants' pockets; it necessarily functions against the sovereign.
Accordingly, the Individual Defendants have immunity from Plaintiff's lawsuit.
As Plaintiff has not asserted a proper claim against an Individual Defendant, the Court does not determine whether the FMLA applies to the tribe notwithstanding tribal sovereign immunity. See Carsten, 2015 WL 1345535, at *1 n.2 ("[W]hether a statute abrogates tribal sovereign immunity and whether a statute applies to tribes are two distinct inquiries.").
E. Plaintiff's Exhaustion Argument Is Misplaced
Plaintiff focuses most of her Opposition on arguing that until she has "exhausted the available remedies in the Tribal Court, it would be premature for the District Court to consider any relief." (Opposition at 9.)
Here, Defendants correctly point out that no tribal remedies are available. (See Reply at 2-3). Plaintiff even alleges she received a letter from Morongo stating that arbitration was not available for employment-related claims. (FAC ¶ 16.) Exhaustion is not required, in a case such as this, where it would be futile. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19 n.12.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. The cases she cites support the proposition that a defendant - not a plaintiff - can seek a stay or dismissal to exhaust tribal remedies. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (court should have required exhaustion where defendant moved to dismiss on that basis); Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) (same); Sharber v. Spirit Mountain Gaming Inc., 343 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding district court did not err "in concluding that tribal courts should have first opportunity to determine whether they have jurisdiction to hear actions based on the [FMLA]"); Stock West Corp v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing case on exhaustion grounds because defendant moved for abstention based on "principles of comity"); see also Paddy v. Mulkey, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1247-48 (D. Nev. 2009) (staying case pending exhaustion when the court raised the issue sua sponte and then defendant requested stay). Unlike those cases, Defendants here do not request a stay pending exhaustion of tribal remedies.
What Plaintiff seeks is an injunction requiring the Morongo tribal courts to hear her case, or for Morongo to have to arbitrate this dispute. As discussed, this Court cannot provide such relief because Defendants have immunity.
F. Plaintiff Did Not Serve Defendants Properly
In any event, Plaintiff did not properly serve Defendants. Assuming Plaintiff has served MCRS properly (See Motion at 15 ("Even if delivery of a single copy of the Summons and FAC to a receptionist in the MCRS Executive Offices could constitute sufficient service on MCRS . . . .")), she did not properly serve the remaining Defendants. Plaintiff served the FAC on Faith Cartagena through process server Rod Collins, who swears under penalty of perjury that Ms. Cartagena was authorized to accept service of process on behalf of the Defendants. (Doc. No. 14-2 ("Cartagena Decl.") ¶ 7; Doc. Nos. 10-13.)
Ms. Cartagena is employed as the Executive Receptionist at the MCRS Executive Offices in Cabazon, California. (Cartagena Decl. ¶ 2.) On March 19, 2015, Mr. Collins left Ms. Cartagena an unmarked envelope and instructed her to give the envelope to her supervisor. (Id. ¶ 6.) Mr. Collins did not tell Ms. Cartagena what was in the envelope or that she was being served with legal process, nor did he ask Ms. Cartagena whether she was authorized to accept service of process on behalf of any entity or individual. (Id.)
In fact, Ms. Cartagena declares that she is not designated as an agent for service of process by any of the four Defendants. (Id. ¶ 5.) Further, there is nothing in the record to establish that Ms. Cartagena, in her role as Executive Receptionist, was authorized to accept service of process on behalf of any Defendant. "Rule 4 has generally been construed to mean that service at a defendant's place of employment is insufficient." Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Smith v. Western Offshore, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 670, 684 (E.D. La. 1984); Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 518 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D.N.J. 1981)). Therefore, service of process was not proper.
Further, Plaintiff does not address the issue of proper service in her Opposition. She has, therefore, conceded this point.
As discussed earlier, Plaintiff attempted numerous times to file exhibits with her Opposition. On May 21, 2015, she filed a declaration in connection with these attempts, in which she requested additional time to effect proper service of process. (Doc. No. 21.) Six days later, however, she filed a "Notice Errata; Declaration of Gloria Dredd Haney," in which she explained the declaration she filed as Doc. No. 21 "was an inadvertent error and mistake" and thus, she withdrew that declaration. (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 3.) The Court, therefore, does not consider Ms. Haney's statements regarding a request for additional time to effect service of process in Doc. No. 21.
Accordingly, the Court holds Plaintiff did not properly serve Morongo or the Individual Defendants with the FAC.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, therefore, GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE. Dated: June 17, 2015
With this conclusion, the Court does not reach Defendants' alternative arguments for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See Notice at 2.)
/s/_________
VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS
United States District Judge