MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENISE COTE, District Judge

On March 21, 2003, this Court issued an Opinion and Order ("March 21 Opinion") (1) finding subject matter jurisdiction over a removed action to the extent that that action concerned ten insurance policies (the "Affiliate Policies") issued to Corning Incorporated ("Corning"), on the ground that the declaratory judgment action concerning the Affiliate Policies was a core proceeding in the bankruptcy proceeding against Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (the "Debtor"), (2) staying further litigation before this Court over the Affiliate Policies, (3) remanding to state court the litigation concerning the remaining insurance policies issued to Corning, and (4) staying the remand for ninety days to give effect to the ninety-day stay order entered by a state court on March 5, in connection with one of the insurance companies implicated in the remanded litigation.

Familiarity with the March 21 Opinion is assumed. See Mt. McKinley Ins. Co. v. Corning Inc., 2003 WL 1482786, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003). London Market Insurers ("LMI") has moved for reconsideration of the March 21 Opinion and Corning has moved under Rule 60(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., for relief from certain parts of the orders entered in the March 21 Opinion. For the following reasons, both motions are denied.

London Market Insurers' Motion for Reconsideration

LMI filed a timely motion for reconsideration of what it describes as two "collateral" matters. First, it argues that the issues related to the Affiliate Policies are "related to" the Debtor's bankruptcy but not core proceedings. It asks that the bankruptcy court be allowed to decide whether the claims are core or non-core claims. LMI has not pointed to any argument, facts or law that was overlooked in the March 21 Opinion.

Specifically, it did not argue in the extended and extensive briefing on that motion for this precise relief. This prong of its motion is denied for failure to meet the threshold requirements for a motion for reconsideration.

Second, LMI requests that the ninety-day stay of the remand be lifted. That request is now moot. The ninety-day period has run, and through this Order, the Clerk of Court is directed to remand immediately the portion of the action related to the non-Affiliate Policies.

Corning's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion

Corning moved on April 10, 2003, under Rule 60(b)(6), to extend the finding of federal jurisdiction to certain policies issued by Lumbermens, the Home, Century Indemnity, Westchester Fire, and LMI because on March 27, 2003, Corning and the Asbestos Claimants Committee ("ACC") signed a term sheet resolving Corning's asbestos-related claims by, among other things, the assignment of insurance policy proceeds from policies issued to Corning by these companies to a Section 524(g) trust, a contribution that will be embodied in the Debtor's Plan of Reorganization. Although this agreement was the result of long term negotiations, Corning made no argument and presented no facts related to this agreement in connection with the protracted motion practice that resulted in the March 21 Opinion.

But for the ninety-day stay issued for reasons of comity, to accommodate a stay issued by a state court in unrelated litigation, Corning would have had no opportunity to make this Rule 60(b)(6) application. The parties agree that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars review of an order of remand, even by the district court issuing the remand order. They only disagree as to whether a copy of the remand order must be forwarded to the state court, as directed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), before the Section 1447(d) bar takes effect.

It is unnecessary to decide whether Section 1447(d) deprives the Court of jurisdiction to consider this motion, since the Rule 60(b)(6) motion is denied on the merits. "A motion for relief from judgment is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001).

Rule 60(b) "should be broadly construed to do substantial justice, yet final judgments should not be lightly reopened." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). A motion based on clause (6) must be brought "within a reasonable time"; relief is only appropriate under clause (6) "in cases presenting extraordinary circumstances." Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Corning has not shown the exceptional circumstances required to obtain relief from the March 21 Opinion. The policies at issue remain Corning's policies. The Debtor has not made a claim against those policies. While Corning seeks to assign those policies to resolve asbestos claims that have been or could be made against Corning, that voluntary decision does not suggest that the analysis in the March 21 Opinion was in error. Indeed, Corning does not argue that the March 21 Opinion erred in its description of the facts, the issues or the law. In these circumstances, Corning has not shown that it is entitled to relief from the terms of the March 21 Opinion.

Conclusion

The motion for reconsideration by the London Market Insurers and the Rule 60(b)(6) motion by Corning are denied. The Clerk of Court shall forthwith remand to state court the claims regarding any policies other that the ten Affiliate Policies identified in the March 21 Opinion.

SO ORDERED: