Opinion
18-CV-05276 (JMA)(ARL)
02-22-2019
SAMUEL MOORE, #18-A-2028, Plaintiff, v. ERROL TOULON, JR., SECURITY OFFICERS, Defendants.
ORDER AZRACK, United States District Judge :
On September 19, 2018, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Samuel Moore ("plaintiff") commenced this action against Suffolk County Sheriff Errol Toulon, Jr. ("Sheriff Toulon") and unidentified "Security Officers" who are described to be "investigators" at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility in Riverhead pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), alleging a deprivation of his constitutional rights and defamation of character. Accompanying the complaint is an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court grants plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismisses the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1) for the reasons that follow.
I. BACKGROUND
All material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Order, see, e.g., Rogers v. City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).
Plaintiff's brief, handwritten complaint is submitted on the Court's Section 1983 complaint form. In its entirety, plaintiff's statement of claim alleges:
Excerpts from the complaint are reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
2009 I was arrested for contraband in Riverhead Correctional Facility. I received a 1 ½-3 year term. In 2013 I received a violation and noticed that my photo is on the wall in the lobby. I complained about the photo but was denied about taking it down. Then in 2018 I asked several officers Sgt. and security officers to take
the photo down but still shown no concern. I submitted several grievances and none of the grievances was answered. Some grievances was denied to be submitted. Also while being in Riverhead Facility other inmates came to me that I didn't know tell me that I am on the wall. Officers knows me by other officers mentioning that I am on the wall. I wrote on the grievance that they had no authority to place me on the wall for officers and inmates to see. I feel it is a security hazard and inhumane.(Compl. ¶ II.) As a result, plaintiff claims to have suffered defamation of character, discrimination, and pain and suffering for which he seeks to recover punitive damages in the total sum of $3.6 million and to have his photo taken down. (Id. ¶¶ II.A.-III.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of plaintiff's declaration in support of the application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
B. Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Similarly, pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that it "(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition, the court is required to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts; rather the complainant "need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. While "'detailed factual allegations'" are not required, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
C. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). In order to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements. First, the conduct challenged must have been "committed by a person acting under color of state law." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) ("[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, "the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id.; see also Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999).
Moreover, in an action brought pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of the defendant in the purported constitutional deprivation. Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006)). "Personal involvement" may be established by evidence of a supervisor's direct participation in the challenged conduct or "by evidence of an official's (1) failure to take corrective action after learning of a subordinate's unlawful conduct, (2) creation of a policy or custom fostering the unlawful conduct, (3) gross negligence in supervising subordinates who commit unlawful acts, or (4) deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information regarding the unlawful conduct of subordinates." Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003). An "individual cannot be held liable for damages under Section 1983 'merely because he held a high position of authority.'" Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)). Where a Section 1983 claim fails to allege the personal involvement of the defendant, it fails as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App'x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).
1. Section 1983 Claims Against Sheriff Toulon
As discussed above, a Section 1983 claim that does not allege the personal involvement of a defendant fails as a matter of law. Johnson, 360 F. App'x at 201. Although plaintiff names Sheriff Toulon as a defendant, the complaint contains no allegations or references to him and, accordingly, plaintiff has not alleged a viable Section 1983 claim against this defendant. Given the absence of any allegations of conduct or inaction attributable to Sheriff Toulon, plaintiff's claims against him are implausible and are therefore dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
2. Section 1983 Claims Against the Unidentified Security Officers
As noted above (see supra at 3-4), a plausible Section 1983 claim requires that "the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id.; see also Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, plaintiff claims only that his picture was placed on the wall of the Suffolk Correctional Facility's Riverhead location following plaintiff's conviction for possession of contraband. As a result, plaintiff claims to have suffered "defamation of character." Defamation is a state law cause of action and does not implicate the Constitution or other laws of the United States. Accordingly, as is readily apparent, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Section 1983 claim against the unidentified security officers and such claims are thus dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
3. State Law Claims
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), "the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." However, courts "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim" if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Id. § 1367(c); (c)(3); see Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d. Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court explained: "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
Here, given the absence of a viably pled federal law claim, the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of not exercising supplemental jurisdiction at this time over any state law claims that may be reasonably construed from the complaint. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state-law claims contained in plaintiff's complaint and dismisses any such claims without prejudice.
4. Leave to Amend
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity "to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, a pro se plaintiff who brings a civil rights action, "should be 'fairly freely' afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint." Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, No. 08-CV-911, 2009 WL 1033786, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2009) (quoting Frazier v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet while "pro se plaintiffs are generally given leave to amend a deficient complaint, a district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile." Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the Court has carefully considered whether plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint. Because the defect in plaintiff's claims is substantive and could not be cured in an amended pleading, leave to amend the complaint is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, but plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are sua sponte dismissed for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims and dismisses any such claims without prejudice to plaintiff pursuing such claims, including defamation, in state court.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JMA
Joan M. Azrack
United States District Judge Dated: February 22, 2018
Central Islip, New York