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rejecting a laches argument because an adverse possessor was reasonable in assuming "that her rights in the Disputed Half-Acre were secure, and there was no reason for her to bring a suit to quiet title or take any other action to assert her rights. In other words, she took all the necessary action to assert her rights merely by continuing to use and maintain the Disputed Half-Acre as if it was her own"
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C.A. No. 2221-S.
Submitted: January 9, 2004.
Decided: January 16, 2004.
Joined for Purposes of Notice and Not Judgment.
Alan G. Davis, Esquire, HENRY CLAY DAVIS III, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware, Attorneys for Petitioners.
Donald L. Gouge, Jr., Esquire, HEIMAN GOUGE KAUFMAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action to quiet title in a half-acre of land that the petitioner, Clara E. Mitchell, mistakenly conveyed to another party in 1971, but continued to use and maintain until the present day. Mitchell seeks to quiet title in her name based on theories of adverse possession and equitable reformation. The respondents, Gail and Charles Dorman, are currently the record owners of the property at issue. The Dormans argue that Mitchell has not established that she is entitled to relief under either of these theories and that relief is barred in any event by the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
In this opinion, I conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding any of the legal issues necessary to dispose of the parties' contentions. Mitchell has established the necessary elements of an adverse possession claim, and therefore I need not decide whether she is entitled to equitable reformation. Moreover, the Dormans' defenses of laches and equitable estoppel are without merit. I therefore grant Mitchell's motion for summary judgment and deny the Dormans' cross-motion, and will enter an order placing title to the disputed property in Mitchell's name.
I. Factual Background
In 1940, Mitchell and her now-deceased husband entered into a transaction that resulted in their ownership of a two-and-a-half-acre lot outside of Dagsboro, Delaware (the "Original Lot"). In 1971, Mitchell entered into a transaction with Joseph and Janice Swayne, intending to sell the Swaynes the southernmost acre of the Original Lot. Due to an apparent mutual mistake of the parties, the deed given to the Swaynes in that transaction recited the boundaries of two tracts of land covering the southernmost oneand-a-half acres of the Original Lot (the "Parcel"). Thus, although Mitchell intended to retain the central one-half acre of the Original Lot for herself, the deed given to the Swaynes included that half-acre as the northernmost one-half acre of the Parcel (the "Disputed Half-Acre"). Mitchell and her family continued to use and maintain the Disputed Half-Acre after the sale to the Swaynes as if it was their own. Their use of the Disputed Half-Acre continues.
The Parcel changed hands several times and ultimately ended up in the name of respondents in this action, Gail and Charles Dorman, who, along with Dawn Dorman, purchased the Parcel from Miriam Mundorf in 1993. The Dormans knew at the time they purchased the Parcel that issues had been raised in the past regarding the ownership and location of one half-acre of the Parcel. They were aware that one of their soon-to-be neighbors had been using a half-acre of "land that didn't belong to them," and that the Dormans "were going to have to prove which half-acre it was." Nonetheless, the Dormans — like all the purchasers of the Parcel before them — did not procure a survey. Nor did they discuss the matter with Mitchell before purchasing the Parcel. They apparently first questioned Mitchell regarding the Disputed Half-Acre sometime in 1993, after closing had already occurred, at which time Mitchell said that she was "getting tired of hearing about that . . . half-acre" and "more or less walked away." The Dormans never again discussed the matter with Mitchell.
The Parcel has an interesting title history. Apparently, Gerald Hitchens (who, along with Linda Hitchens, purchased the Parcel from the Swaynes in 1973) realized that he held title to a one-and-a-half-acre parcel but had only been occupying one acre. Hitchens apparently questioned his northern and southern neighbors — including Clara Mitchell — in an attempt to "find" the missing half-acre. He apparently gave up the inquiry eventually, and conveyed only one acre to J. Grier and Miriam Mundorf in 1984. The land surveyor who inquired into the title history of the Original Lot believed that Hitchens did so in an attempt to correct the error in the deed given to Hitchens (that had been carried over from the original deed given to the Swaynes). Adams Dep. at 21-23. Unfortunately, the one-acre deed given to the Mundorfs in 1984 appears to include the Disputed Half-Acre (although the land surveyor seems to read the deeds otherwise, see id. at 22, 24). In any event, in connection with the conveyance from Miriam Mundorf to Gail, Charles and Dawn Dorman in 1993, Hitchens issued a corrective deed to Mundorf for the entire one-and-a-half acre Parcel, apparently so that the Dormans (who claim to have understood themselves to be purchasing a full one-and-a-half acres, see D. Dorman Dep. at 9-11) could take title to the entire Parcel. The Dormans themselves only received a one-acre deed initially in 1993; they did not obtain title to the remaining half-acre of the Parcel (wherever its exact location) until 1995, after pressuring the attorney who had handled their purchase of the property, Steve Parsons, to issue them a corrective deed. In 1999, the entire Parcel was conveyed to Gail and Charles Dorman by way of straw transfer.
D. Dorman Dep. at 10-11.
Id. at 29.
Dawn Dorman's deposition is not entirely clear on when exactly the discussion with Clara Mitchell took place. Dawn Dorman stated that the conversation with Mitchell occurred shortly after Walter Todd, a friend of Dawn's father, attempted to help the Dormans locate the "missing" half-acre. See id. at 27. Dawn Dorman thought that the conversation with Walter Todd took place after closing had already occurred. See id. at 15.
Id. at 26.
Around 2001, Mitchell began searching for a buyer for the one-and-a-half acres that she understood to be her own — i.e., the northernmost one-and-a-half acres of the Original Lot, including the Disputed Half-Acre. Because the Dormans currently hold title to the Disputed Half-Acre, Mitchell has brought this action to quiet title in the Disputed Half-Acre in her name, based on two theories. First, she argues that she has acquired title to the Disputed Half-Acre by adverse possession. Second, she argues that she is entitled to equitable reformation of the Dormans' deed (and, apparently, of every preceding deed in the Dormans' chain of title since the mistake first occurred) to exclude the Disputed Half-Acre. The Dormans dispute these claims and further argue that relief is barred by the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel. Discovery in this case is complete, and both parties have moved for summary judgment in their favor.
II. Legal Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, at which point "the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there are material issues of fact in dispute." Although I must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it is insufficient for a nonmoving party to merely assert the existence of a disputed fact; the disputed fact must be material to the final disposition of the case.
Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
Scureman v. Judge, 626 A.2d 5, 10 (Del.Ch. 1992), aff'd, Wilmington Trust Co. v. Judge, 628 A.2d 85 (Del. 1993) (ORDER).
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
Scureman, 626 A.2d at 10-11.
Brzoska, 668 A.2d at 1364.
The record in this case is sparse in many respects. Neither Mitchell nor the Dormans have obtained testimony from any of the previous owners of the Parcel, and have not indicated that they would do so at trial. Nonetheless, the record that the parties have developed yields no genuine issue of material fact precluding resolution of this case through entry of summary judgment for one of the parties. The material facts are undisputed.
A. Mitchell Has Obtained Title To The Disputed Half-Acre By Adverse Possession
In order to claim property by adverse possession, Mitchell must show that she has possessed the Disputed Half-Acre "in an open, notorious, hostile and exclusive manner for the twenty-year period." "`Open and notorious' mean that the possession must be public so that the owner and others have notice of the possession. . . . `Hostile' means against the claim of ownership of all others, including the record owner."
Steller v. David, 257 A.2d 391, 394-95 (Del.Ch. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 269 A.2d 203 (Del. 1970). See also 10 Del. C. § 7901.
Steller, 257 A.2d at 395.
Based on the record before me, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mitchell has established her claim of adverse possession. Mitchell and her family constructed a barn that extends onto the Disputed Half-Acre before mistakenly transferring that property to the Swaynes in 1971, and have continuously used that barn exclusively since that time. The Mitchells caused the creation of a driveway on the southern side of the Disputed Half-Acre to permit access to a landlocked parcel east of the Original Lot. Clara Mitchell purported to transfer a right of way to that access road to the owner of the landlocked parcel in 1972, and attempted to sell the Disputed Half-Acre in 2001. She and her family have cut the grass on the Disputed Half-Acre, allowed their children to play there, held church bake sales there, and maintained two potted plants at the entrance to the above-mentioned access road, all at various points in time since 1971. She has paid taxes on a total of one-and-a-half acres of land for many years, which constitutes an act of ownership. A land surveyor who inquired into the history of the Original Lot believed that "the maintenance and use of the [Disputed Half-Acre] has been with the Mitchell family for many years." Thus, based on the undisputed facts in the record, Mitchell's adverse possession of the Disputed Half-Acre ripened into legal title in 1991, twenty years after mistakenly conveying that property to the Swaynes.
See D. Mitchell Dep. at 13.
D. Mitchell Dep. at 7-8; C. Mitchell Dep. at 12-14.
See David v. Steller, 269 A.2d 203, 204 (Del. 1970). Admittedly, the Dormans, as well as previous owners of the Parcel, have also paid taxes on one-and-a-half acres for many years. But, even if the record owner of the Disputed Half-Acre was paying taxes on that property during the running of statutory period, that would be insufficient to defeat a claim of adverse possession. There is no indication in the record that Mitchell was ever aware that other parties might also have been paying taxes on the Disputed Half-Acre. See 3 Am. Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 107 (2003) ("The conduct claimed by an owner to work an interruption of adverse possession must be such as would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that he or she actually has been ousted.").
Adams Dep. at 24-25.
The Dormans do not dispute these facts or suggest that they will produce evidence tending to counter them at trial, but argue that they themselves have used the Disputed Half-Acre in such a way as to defeat Mitchell's adverse possession claim. But, the Dormans had no involvement with the Parcel until 1993, two years after the statutory period had already run and legal title had vested in Mitchell by operation of law. Thus, the Dormans' acts on the Disputed Half-Acre — which, in any event, were so limited and sporadic that they would likely have been insufficient to defeat a claim of adverse possession even if they had been committed during the statutory period — are irrelevant to Mitchell's adverse possession claim.
For example, the Dormans argue that their use of the access road on the southern end of the Disputed Half-Acre should defeat Mitchell's adverse possession claim. Not only did their use of the driveway begin after the legal right to the property had already vested in Mitchell, but Mitchell had no reason to prevent the Dormans from using that driveway, for the simple reason that she believed that she had conveyed it in 1972. Indeed, counsel for Mitchell represented at oral argument that, if Mitchell succeeds in this action, she would immediately quitclaim the driveway to the current owner of the landlocked parcel, Grace Hosker, who has been joined as a party in interest in this action.
Nor is the adverse possession claim defeated by the fact that Gerald Hitchens, a previous record owner of the Disputed Half-Acre, might have recognized that he held title to that property and spoke to Mitchell about the matter at some point between 1973 and 1984. The record suggests that Mitchell informed Hitchens at that time that she had purchased the Disputed Half-Acre in the 1940s, and Hitchens apparently made no further inquiry regarding the matter. "Acts of the record owner to ascertain the true condition of title are not sufficient to interrupt the running of the adverse possession," and, although Dawn Dorman stated that "Hitchens had made a big fuss over the half-acre, trying to locate where it was" there is no suggestion that Hitchens took any other action to interrupt the Mitchells' continued use of the Disputed Half-Acre or asserted his rights in the property in any way.
D. Mitchell Dep. at 9-10.
3 Am. Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 107 (2003).
D. Dorman Dep. at 27.
Because Mitchell has established all of the elements of her claim of adverse possession, I need not reach her alternative claim based upon equitable reformation. Mitchell is entitled to quiet title in her name unless there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the merit of the Dormans' defenses, which I will now discuss.
B. The Dormans' Laches And Equitable Estoppel Defenses Are Meritless
The Dormans advance two defenses against Mitchell's adverse possession claim — laches and equitable estoppel. I address these defenses in turn.
"To establish the equitable defense of laches, the defendants must demonstrate that the [plaintiff], once having learned of [her] claim, (1) unreasonably delayed in asserting [her] rights and (2) that the defendants were prejudiced by the plaintiff['s] failure to assert [her] claim in a timely manner." The Dormans claim that the defense is applicable here because (1) Mitchell became aware of the problem regarding ownership of the Disputed Half-Acre possibly as early as sometime between 1973 and 1984 (when Hitchens apparently questioned her regarding the matter) and certainly since 1993 (when the Dormans did the same) but never took any action to correct it; and (2) the Dormans have suffered prejudice because (a) so much time has elapsed that they are now unable to obtain testimony from witnesses or the previous owners of the Parcel and (b) they used the entire Parcel as collateral on two mortgages.
Steele v. Ratledge, 2002 WL 31260990, at *2 (Del.Ch. Sept. 20, 2002).
But, Mitchell has not in fact failed to assert her rights. From 1971 until 2001, Mitchell believed that she owned the Disputed Half-Acre, and her continuous use and maintenance of that property throughout that time is consistent with that belief. At most, the inquiries by Hitchens and the Dormans put her on notice that this belief might be mistaken, but the record does not suggest that either the Dormans or any of their predecessors-in-interest attempted to assert rights in the Disputed Half-Acre in any meaningful way. Indeed, after questioning Mitchell about the Disputed Half-Acre in 1993, the Dormans never tried to stop her from using it; rather, they decided to "leave her alone and let her just think that [the Disputed Half-Acre] is hers." Thus, it was reasonable for Mitchell to assume that her rights in the Disputed Half-Acre were secure, and there was no reason for her to bring a suit to quiet title or take any other action to assert her rights. In other words, she took all the necessary action to assert her rights merely by continuing to use and maintain the Disputed Half-Acre as if it was her own.
D. Dorman Dep. at 32 (emphasis added).
Nor have the Dormans suffered any cognizable prejudice as a result of any conduct on Mitchell's part. If the Dormans cannot now mount an effective case against Mitchell's adverse possession claim because too much time has elapsed to obtain testimony from witnesses or previous owners of the Parcel, or if the collateral on the Dormans' mortgages is insufficient, that is the result of the Dormans' own lack of diligence in this matter. They purchased the Parcel knowing that issues had been raised in the past regarding the ownership and location of one-half acre of that Parcel. They did not obtain a land survey either at the time of purchase or before they took out the mortgages. They permitted Mitchell to continue to use the Disputed Half-Acre for years even after they determined that they were the record owners of that property, and never brought an action for ejectment against Mitchell. Put bluntly, they took no action to protect their rights in the Disputed Half-Acre, choosing instead to rely solely on their record ownership as their only protection, while knowing that Mitchell believed the property to be hers. In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that any prejudice suffered by the Dormans is in any way the product of Mitchell's actions (or inaction), and the laches defense is without merit.
The Dormans also argue that Mitchell's claim is barred by equitable estoppel because she has long been aware of the problem regarding the title to the Disputed Half-Acre, possibly for up to twenty to thirty years (i.e., since Hitchens apparently spoke to her regarding the matter), but has taken no action to notify purchasers of the Parcel. An equitable estoppel arises "when a party by [her] conduct intentionally or unintentionally leads another, in reliance upon that conduct, to change position to his detriment." To prevail on an estoppel defense, "the party claiming the estoppel must be shown to have: (i) lacked knowledge or imputed knowledge of the truth of the facts in question, (ii) relied on the conduct of the party against whom estoppel is claimed, and (iii) suffered a prejudicial change of position as a result of such reliance."
Wilson v. Am. Ins. Co., 209 A.2d 902, 903-04 (Del. 1965).
Ratledge, 2002 WL 31260990, at *4 (citing Wilson, 209 A.2d at 903-04).
The Dormans cannot establish any of the three elements of an estoppel defense. First, they did not lack knowledge of the fact that ownership of the Disputed Half-Acre was uncertain. Indeed, they knew when they purchased the Parcel that there had been issues regarding the ownership of the Disputed Half-Acre.
Second, the Dormans did not rely on any action (or inaction) of Mitchell when purchasing the Parcel. They did not obtain any survey to assure themselves of the precise boundaries of the land they were purchasing, and did not speak to Mitchell before purchasing the Parcel to ensure themselves that she laid no claim to the Disputed Half-Acre. They simply believed that they might be purchasing the Disputed Half-Acre, and hoped that their record ownership would be sufficient to protect their rights in the event that this belief turned out to be accurate.
Third, the Dormans have not suffered any prejudicial change in position in reliance on Mitchell's actions or inaction. As noted above, any harm the Dormans may have suffered in this case is the result of their own failure to be more diligent when purchasing the Parcel.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Mitchell's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Dormans' motion for summary judgment is denied. Mitchell's attorney shall submit an implementing order, upon notice and approval as to form, within ten days. Each side shall bear its own costs.