Summary
In Mintz v. Dallek & Zaret Associates, the Court approved of summary judgment when Plaintiff had "...made out a prima facie case by submitting the promissory note and the notices of default" (Id. at 654).
Summary of this case from FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. RodeckerOpinion
May 19, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Pantano, J.).
Order affirmed, with costs.
In support of his motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, the plaintiff in action No. 2, Gerald H. Dallek, submitted the promissory note at issue, the bill of sale concerning the goods (two horses) transferred, and two notices of default sent to the defendant in action No. 2, Ira B. Lampert. Lampert, in response, asserted that his default on the promissory note was excusable because Dallek breached a separate but related covenant not to compete with the plaintiffs in action No. 1. To support this contention, Lampert submitted a "buy-out" agreement, whereby the plaintiff in action No. 1 received Dallek's shares of stock in the plaintiff Gerald H. Dallek, P.C., in exchange for certain monetary consideration.
Special Term granted Dallek's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, finding that Lampert had not asserted a valid defense or an excuse for his default. We agree. Dallek made out a prima facie case by submitting the promissory note and the notices of default (see, Interman Indus. Prods. v R.S.M. Electron Power, 37 N.Y.2d 151, 155; Seaman-Andwall Corp. v Wright Mach. Corp., 31 A.D.2d 136, affd 29 N.Y.2d 617; North Fork Bank Trust Co. v Cardiff Rose Enters., 104 A.D.2d 932, 933). Lampert attempts to rebut the prima facie case by asserting that Dallek's breach of the covenant not to compete constituted a failure of consideration with respect to the agreement for the sale of the horses. However, there is no language in either the promissory note or the bill of sale to indicate that the agreements were conditional upon each other. Therefore, since Lampert has not denied receiving the goods (the two horses) underlying the promissory note, summary judgment was properly granted to Dallek (see, Fopeco, Inc. v General Coatings Technologies, 107 A.D.2d 609, 610; Ssangyong [U.S.A.], Inc. v Sung Ae Yoo, 88 A.D.2d 572, 573; Logan v Williamson Co., 64 A.D.2d 466, appeal dismissed 46 N.Y.2d 996).
In view of the foregoing disposition, Special Term correctly denied as moot Lampert's cross motion for consolidation of the two actions. Bracken, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Niehoff, JJ., concur.