OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.

A dependent surviving widow's claim is at the crux of this appeal. Her motion to preclude defenses as well as her entire claim was denied below. The basis for the denial was the limitations period in Sec. 31-294. The decedent was employed by the respondent employer from July 6, 1960 until March 1, 1981. On October 16, 1988 he died form respiratory failure as consequence of pulmonary edema and cancer. The widow's claim is that her husband's fatal lung disease arose out of and in the course of his employment. During his lifetime the decedent never filed a claim for compensation. The parties stipulated that May 15, 1986 was the first date on which decedent became aware of a possible causal relationship between his employment and the lung disease.

The issues on appeal are (1) whether the widow's claim was timely filed, and (2) if timely filed did the claim trigger the preclusion of defenses under Sec. 31-297b. Sec. 31-294 provides:

No proceedings for compensation shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim is given within one year from the date of the accident within three years from the first manifestation of the symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, . . . may make a claim for compensation within such two year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later. (emphasis ours)

The trial commissioner held that as no claim was filed within two years of May 15, 1986, the date when decedent became aware of the possible work connection, then the claim was untimely. We disagree.

In 1980 the legislature enacted P.A. 80-124 changing the previous one year limitation period for filing an occupational disease claim to "three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupautional [occupational] disease." Bremner v. Eidlitz Son, Inc., 118 Conn. 666 (1934) has held that there is no manifestation of a symptom until it is a known manifestation. The 1980 legislation did not change the other statutory language relating to two years from the date of injury or one year from date of death whichever was later.

Assuming arguendo that May 15, 1986 was the first date of known manifestation, the decedent, if he had been alive, would have had until May 15, 1989 to file a claim. The surviving widow filed her claim by certified mail with the employer on December 16, 1988 well before the three year period. As the date of death was October 16, 1988, the claim was also filed within one year of the death. It is hardly conceivable that the legislature meant live victims to have three years and their surviving dependents to have less time to file occupational disease claims. Even if that were the legislative intent, it does not apply here as death did not occur within two years of the possible known manifestation of symptom. As death did not occur within the period, then the limitation period is that set forth at the beginning of the statute, three years from manifestation.

But there remains another problem with the commissioner's ruling. Bremner v. Eidlitz Son, Inc., supra, 669-670, states, "No doubt the legislature used the word manifestation with something of this significance, intending that the duty of giving notice, and the risk that an employee might forfeit compensation for an occupational disease, should arise only when a symptom of that disease should plainly appear, not when it was merely suspected or doubtful." In Paragraph #6 of the Finding and Award the commissioner adopts the language of the parties' stipulation and finds "the first time the decedent was made aware of the possible causal relationship between the symptoms of the illness/disease which eventually caused his death and his employment was May 15, 1986." The "possible causal relationship" found does not fit the Bremner language "only when a symptom of that disease should plainly appear." Rather it fits the other Bremner phrase "when it was merely suspected." A possibility or a mere suspicion does not satisfy the Bremner holding. See also, DeAngelo v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 9 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 970 CRD-8-90-1 (1991); Orcutt v. Ohmweave Co., 8 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 822 CRD-2-89-2 (1990); Piscitelli v. Connecticut Coke/Eastern Gas and Fuel Assoc., 6 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 575 CRD-3-87 (1989); Cortes v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 173, 61 CRD-3-81 (1982).

Besides ruling that the widow's claim was not timely filed, the commissioner also denied the motion to preclude on the ground that the notice of claim received December 16, 1988 did not sufficiently comply with the requirement of Sec. 31-294 to invoke the default provisions of Sec. 31-297(b). He held the notice was insufficient as (1) the widow did not give her actual name but only identified herself as Mrs. Bruno Mingrone, (2) the notice does not state whether she is claiming benefits as a surviving dependent or on behalf of her husband's estate, (3) the notice failed to list the place of injury and (4) it failed to state the last address of the decedent.

In fact, the notice of claim, Exhibit C, gave her address, 141 Cricket Lane, Orange, Connecticut. It identified the claim as "her claim for worker's compensation." It stated that her husband was subjected to inhalant exposure during his employment at Burndy and the inhalant exposure caused the pulmonary fibrosis from which he died. Regarding the first two reasons for the insufficiency of the notice, the statute does not require that a dependent widow identify herself by her own given name rather than by placing the title "Mrs." before the husband's name. Certainly by giving her name and address, she clearly stated who she was so that there could be no mistake as to identity. By stating it was her claim, she indicated "the person in whose interest compensation is claimed.

As to the last two reasons of claimed insufficiency, there is no one spatial location for occupational disease. It differs from accident in this regard, and the statute in referring to occupational disease notice requirements after the disjunctive pronoun "or" separating disease from accident states "or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of such disease." It does not repeat the "place of accident" formula used in the accidental injury part of the statute. Finally, we decided in Dorsett v. General Dynamics Corp., 8 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 805 CRD-2-88-12 that it was meaningless to attempt to include the address of a deceased person in the notice. What is required is the address of the person in whose interest the claim is being made. That was done here.

The matter is remanded to the Seventh District for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Andrew Denuzze concur.