BENTON, J.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

EN BANC.

BENTON, J.

Convicted on three counts of attempted second-degree murder, for discharging a firearm from a vehicle, and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Henry Coldridge Mills was sentenced to twenty years in prison for each attempted second-degree murder, and fifteen years for each of the remaining counts, all sentences to run concurrently. We affirm the convictions and sentences, and uphold the public defender's lien, imposed to secure payment of a mandatory application fee as well as mandatory, minimum fees and costs for representing an indigent accused of a felony, but reverse another cost and fine (with surcharge), and remand for possible reimposition of the fine (and surcharge).

When, at sentencing, the trial court orally pronounced court costs of “$721, the $150 Public Defender Attorney's fee lien,” no objection was raised. Only because the appellant later filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), contending that the trial court erred in imposing a $100 fine together with a $5 surcharge (pursuant to sections 775.083 and 938.04, Florida Statutes (2010)), a $100 “Sheriff's Office Investigative Cost,” and “a discretionary $150 public defender lien,” are these issues preserved. The criminal rules treated the 3.800 motion as denied because the trial court did not act on it within 60 days. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); 3.800(b)(1)(B).

Our precedent distinguishes between set costs and fees the Legislature requires judges to impose, on the one hand, and fees or costs judges may or must impose in varying amounts depending on the facts of a particular case: “Statutorily-mandated costs may be imposed without notice and, thus, need not be specifically pronounced at the sentencing hearing. By contrast, discretionary costs must be orally pronounced at sentencing because such costs may not be imposed without affording the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Nix v. State, 84 So.3d 424, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citation omitted).

I.

The $150 public defender's lien secures two separate statutory impositions. First, under section 27.52(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), indigent convicts represented by public defenders are liable for a uniform, mandatory application fee: “An applicant shall pay a $50 application fee to the clerk for each application for court-appointed counsel filed.” Id. Second, under section 938.29, Florida Statutes (2010), attorney's fees and costs must be assessed against indigent convicts in amounts that may vary depending on the case, but cannot be less than $100 in a felony case or $50 in a misdemeanor case. Ever since the Legislature amended section 938.29 by “providing that certain defendants are liable for the application fee to determine indigent status for purposes of appointing counsel,” “prescribing minimum attorney's fees and costs related to representation in criminal cases,” and “authorizing the court to establish higher fees and costs” for representation, if appropriate, Ch.2008–111, at 1164, Laws of Fla., trial courts have been required to impose a minimum lien of $150 on any defendant who, like appellant, is convicted of a felony after receiving the assistance of the public defender's office (assuming the $50 application fee had not already been paid).

Notwithstanding the amendments effected by Chapter 2008–111, § 45, decisions of this and at least one other court have persisted in reversing imposition even of the minimum, statutorily required public defender's lien when the defendant was not given an opportunity to contest the amount of the lien. See, e.g., Chestnut v. State, 145 So.3d 193, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (remanding with directions either to strike the $100 indigent legal assistance lien imposed pursuant to section 938.29, Florida Statutes (2009), or to give the defendant an opportunity to contest the lien); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (striking a $100 indigent legal assistance lien imposed under section 938.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008) without informing the defendant of his right to contest the amount of the lien, as required by section 938.29(5), Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1)); G.D. v. State, 42 So.3d 327, 327–28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reversing the public defender's fee imposed pursuant to section 938.29, Florida Statutes (2008), because “[a]lthough imposition of the fee is mandatory, the statute requires the trial court to give the defendant notice and an opportunity to object to the amount” (citation omitted)). But see Maestas v. State, 76 So.3d 991, 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (ruling the trial court erroneously imposed a $400 public defender's fee “because the trial court failed to make factual findings warranting the imposition of the additional $300” and remanding “to the trial court to reduce the public defender fee to the statutorily required $100 or to hold a hearing with proper notice to Maestas, allowing him the opportunity to object to the additional $300 imposed”).

Out of respect for the trial bench and bar, we believe the time has come to address this matter en banc, in order to eliminate essentially meaningless procedures and in order to prevent further waste of time and resources. As Judge Ray pointed out in Harrison v. State, 146 So.3d 76, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 153 So.3d 909 (Fla.2014), the commonsense argument that no notice of the accused's right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien is called for when the trial court imposes the statutory minimum “has appeal based on logic and sound legal reasoning.” The Harrison panel decided it was “not at liberty to recede from our case law directly on point, which requires that a defendant be given the ‘opportunity to object’ to the cost of defense, even where the mandatory, minimum amount is imposed” and concluded it was “constrained to reverse this $100.00 cost and remand for the trial court to advise Appellant of his right to a hearing to contest the amount of the indigent legal assistance lien.” Id. We now sit en banc to escape that constraint, and “recede from our case law directly on point.” Id.

When minimum fees and costs required by statute are imposed, there has been no judicial determination adverse to the defendant of the value of services the public defender has provided. See § 938.29(5), Fla. Stat. Where the Legislature, not the trial judge, has decided the amount, inviting the defendant's views on the question is pointless and, indeed, misleading. Ratione cessante, lex cessat. Because the minimum amount is mandated by statute, binding on the court and the defendant alike, no hearing is necessary or appropriate.

With or without a hearing, the Legislature requires that a minimum fee of $100 be imposed when a person convicted of a felony “has received the assistance of the public defender's office, a special assistant public defender, the office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, or a private conflict attorney, or ... has received due process services after being found indigent for costs under s. 27.52.” § 938.29(1)(a), Fla. Stat. In addition, and also without regard to any hearing, such a defendant shall “be liable for payment of the assessed application fee under s. 27.52.” The Legislature requires that this $50 application fee be assessed as part of the sentence pursuant to section 938.29, if not paid prior to disposition of the case. §§ 938.29(1)(a); 27.52(1)(b), Fla. Stat.

In sum, reconsidering the question en banc, we recede from any and all decisions holding that sections 938.29(1) and 27.52, Florida Statutes, as amended effective July 1, 2008, require notice and hearing before imposition of a minimum public defender's lien, i.e., $150 in felony cases or $100 in misdemeanor cases.

II.

Appellant also challenges the $100 sheriff's investigative cost, imposed separately after the sentencing hearing pursuant to section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2010). Assessing this cost is discretionary, and it was error to impose it without notice or hearing and without specifically identifying it at sentencing. See Kirkland v. State, 106 So.3d 4, 4–5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Baker v. State, 86 So.3d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). See also Lippwe v. State, 152 So.3d 782, 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (ruling that investigative fees pursuant to section 938.27(1), Florida Statutes “must be requested on the record by the appropriate agency”). We reverse the sheriff's investigative cost. On remand, the trial court may not reimpose this investigative cost because there is no record evidence the state requested the cost. See DeSalvo v. State, 107 So.3d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Vaughn v. State, 65 So.3d 138, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

The fine authorized by section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes, is also discretionary, and the state concedes it was error for the trial court to impose the $100 fine under this statute without notice or hearing and without specifically pronouncing the fine at the sentencing hearing. Because the fine was erroneously imposed, the $5 surcharge imposed pursuant to section 938.04, Florida Statutes, must likewise be reversed. See Nix, 84 So.3d at 426. On remand, the trial court may reimpose the fine and surcharge, if it so decides after providing notice to Mr. Mills and following the proper procedure. Id. If the trial court decides not to reimpose the fine and surcharge, it can enter a corrected judgment and sentence striking these amounts. Id. at 426 n. 2.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

ROBERTS, C.J., and WOLF, LEWIS, THOMAS, WETHERELL, ROWE, MARSTILLER, RAY, SWANSON, OSTERHAUS, BILBREY, KELSEY, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

MAKAR, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

MAKAR, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

This case, which the Court has unanimously taken en banc on the motion of the three-judge panel, alters our precedents by dispensing with notice and a hearing before imposition of a minimum public defender's lien against indigent defendants. The elimination of wasteful hearings is laudable, but judicially eliminating a long-standing statutory requirement of notice is less so.

The ostensible problem arises from cases where trial judges fail to give notice to indigent defendants of the imposition of statutory liens for public defender attorney's fees/costs under section 938.29, Florida Statutes. Because the statute requires notice, the typical result has been a remand for an evidentiary hearing that changes nothing; the defendant now has notice of the lien but has no legitimate basis for contesting its amount because it is set at statutory minimums, which were first established seven years ago. The annual number of appellate reversals of this type is unclear, but is sufficient to reassess the matter given the obvious waste they generate on remand.

The question is, how to do away with these wasteful hearings? Two approaches come to mind: one that eliminates only the hearing, and one that eliminates notice and the hearing. In following the latter course, the Court reinterprets section 938.29, Florida Statutes, by receding from cases that “require notice and hearing before imposition of a minimum public defender's lien.” Majority op. at 8. Under this approach, if a trial judge determines that minimums are to be imposed, the defendant need not be notified and, of course, no hearing occurs. Prospectively, trial judges would be freed from providing notice in cases other than those where the trial court's determination of fees and costs exceeds statutory thresholds.

The root of the problem, however, isn't notice, which the statute requires, it is the wasteful hearings themselves. While eliminating both may be most expedient, it judicially erases the requirement of notice from the statute. The notice provision of section 938.29, set forth in subsection (5), requires that “adequate notice” be given, an unwavering legislative requirement that goes back almost two decades. See Ch. 97–271, § 22, Laws of Fla. And the only change in nearly twenty years was to make its provisions mandatory. See Ch.2003–402, § 128, Laws of Fla. (“may” changed to “shall” in first clause). It now states:

(5) The court having jurisdiction of the defendant-recipient shall, at such stage of the proceedings as the court may deem appropriate, determine the value of the services of the public defender, special assistant public defender, office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, or appointed private legal counsel and costs, at which time the defendant-recipient or parent, after adequate notice thereof, shall have opportunity to be heard and offer objection to the determination, and to be represented by counsel, with due opportunity to exercise and be accorded the procedures and rights provided in the laws and court rules pertaining to civil cases at law.

§ 938.29(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The notice requirement has remained unaltered since its inception in 1997, and the Legislature has not renounced the need for notice or deemed it discretionary under subsection (5).

For its change in course, the Court relies on a 2008 modification to subsection (1) of the statute, which required that an attorney's fees/costs lien be set at no less than $50 and $100, for misdemeanors and felonies, respectively. Ch.2008–111, § 45, Laws of Fla. (amending § 938.29(1), Fla. Stat.). Nothing in the language of that amendment purported to change the requirement of notice to indigent defendants, either as required by subsection (5) or by some inferential linkage to the newly-enacted minimum liens. Because the notice requirement in section 938.29(5) has not changed since its adoption, it's a poor candidate for judicial reinterpretation. In effect, judicially eliminating notice appends an amendment to subsection (5) saying, “Where the value of services and costs are set at the minimum amounts in subsection (1), notice is not required under this subsection.”

On the other hand, the problem of unnecessary hearings can be remedied without judicially eliminating statutory notice by applying the harmless error doctrine used in civil cases like this one. § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (“No judgment shall be set aside or reversed ... in any cause, civil or criminal ... unless in the opinion of the court to which application is made, after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”); see, e.g., Chrysler v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 627 So.2d 31, 34–35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“[T]he more appropriate test for an alleged violation of one's due process rights to a fair hearing would appear to be the harmless error test generally applied in civil cases. An error is harmful where there is a reasonable probability a different result would have been reached but for the error committed.”) (footnote omitted); see generally Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 19:11 (2015 ed.) (“Not all error is reversible error. To the contrary, it is an established principle that an appellate court will not reverse an order or judgment of a lower tribunal if the error complained of is harmless.”). Where notice is not given, an appellate court would note the trial court's error but have discretion to deem it harmless if, absent something more prejudicial, only statutory minimums are imposed. This approach would relieve appellate courts from reversing where notice wasn't given; affirmance would be in order, thereby saving the trial court from having to hold a useless hearing on remand.

Effects on judicial behavior are important. Telling trial judges they don't have to provide statutory notice in this class of cases creates the potential for unintended consequences, such as not giving notice in cases when they should or imposing liens erroneously without notice; maintaining the statutory status quo means fewer snafus. Moreover, even if minimum liens are imposed, indigent defendants are still entitled to notice of their imposition, as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1) specifically requires: “If the accused was represented by a public defender or other court appointed counsel, the court shall notify the accused of the imposition of a lien pursuant to section 938.29, Florida Statutes.” (emphasis added). The better approach is to continue requiring notice in all cases as the statute and Rule require, leaving it to the Legislature to amend the statute and our supreme court to deal with the Rule, if deemed appropriate to eliminate notice.

No approach is perfect. A risk of the harmless error approach is that some trial judges may decide to not give notice because doing so is likely to be deemed harmless error on appeal. What they risk is that an appellate court will point out their error, which they won't like; and repeated errors of this type risk judicial ignominy. Though imperfect, a moderate deterrent exists to ensure that notice is given. Notice is neither costless nor costly, and may have little tangible benefit; but it has the universally-recognized intrinsic value of ensuring that an affected party is made aware of a lien's imposition and the existence of an adverse money judgment so that its validity can be questioned.

In conclusion, a harmless error approach better addresses the problem at hand. It eliminates the costly/inefficient remedy of reversing and remanding for a meaningless hearing in minimum lien cases, preserves long-standing statutory language and caselaw, ensures that notice continues to be given in all cases, avoids creating conflict with other district courts, and requires no modification of Rule 3.720. Judicial custom dictates that my disagreement with eliminating notice be deemed a dissent, but in truth it is a clement way of saying there are other ways of solving the same problem. Multi modi quibus feles excoriatur.