Summary
affirming the Superior Court's denial of Miller's motion for correction of illegal sentence
Summary of this case from Miller v. StateOpinion
No. 400, 2003.
Submitted: October 6, 2003.
Decided: January 12, 2004.
Court Below — Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County in Cr. A. Nos. S92-12-0044 and 0045. Def. ID No. 92S05488DI.
BEFORE VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 12th day of January 2004, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) In 1994, the appellant, Thomas R. Miller, was found guilty of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and Burglary in the Second Degree. Miller was sentenced to life imprisonment on the sexual offense and eight years at Level V on the burglary offense. On direct appeal, his conviction and sentence were affirmed.
Miller v. State, 1995 WL 301379 (Del.Supr.).
(2) In 1995 and again in 2003, Miller applied for postconviction relief and was denied. In 2001, Miller's application for federal habeas relief was dismissed.
Miller v. State, 1996 WL 526164 (Del.Supr.) (dismissing appeal from denial of first motion for postconviction relief); Miller v. State, 2003 WL 1404365 (Del.Supr.) (affirming denial of second motion for postconviction relief).
Miller v. Snyder, 2001 WL 173796 (D. Del).
(3) On July 30, 2003, Miller moved pro se for correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35. The Superior Court denied the motion, ruling that Miller's sentence was legal and within the statutory guidelines. This appeal followed.
(4) On appeal, Miller contends, as he did in his motion, that his sentence for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree violates title 11, section 4214(b) of the Delaware Code that governs sentences imposed for habitual criminals. He also argues that the Superior Court failed to adhere to a sentencing procedure that requires the delivery of a letter to the sentencing judge whenever a recommendation of a sentence outside the Sentencing Accountability Commission (SENTAC) guidelines is requested.
Section 4214(b) requires a judge to impose life imprisonment on "[a]ny person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony . . . hereinafter specifically named . . . and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony hereinafter specifically named").
(5) The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when denying Miller's motion to correct an illegal sentence. First, Miller cannot base his claim of an illegal sentence on section 4214(b), as he was not sentenced pursuant to that statute section as a habitual offender. Second, Miller's life sentence (a) did not exceed the statutorily-authorized limits for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, (b) did not constitute double jeopardy, and (c) was not ambiguous or contradictory. Third, Miller's claim of an alleged procedural error in connection with the non-binding SENTAC guidelines is not subject to relief under Rule 35(a).
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 Del. C. § 775 (1987 Repl. Vol.) (providing that Unlawful Sexual Intercourse is a class A felony); see Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1) (1994 Cum. Supp.) (providing that a class A felony is subject to a sentence up to life imprisonment).
See Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (1998) (discussing the limited circumstances where relief is available under Rule 35(a)).
See Turner v. State, 2003 WL 1878202 (Del.Supr.) (providing that a claim that a sentence is illegal can not rest solely on the allegation that the sentence exceeds the SENTAC guidelines).
(6) Considering Miller's motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35(b), Miller's motion is untimely and thus procedurally barred. Miller's motion to correct an illegal sentence was filed more than nine years after his sentencing, and he has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances necessary to justify relief under Rule 35(b).
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) provides that the court may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided under Rule 35(b).
Under Rule 35(b), a motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner must be filed within 90 days after the sentence was imposed.
Rule 35(b) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he court will consider an application made more than 90 days after the imposition of sentence only in extraordinary circumstances."
(7) It is manifest on the face of Miller's opening brief that this appeal is without merit. The issues on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent the judicial discretion is implicated, there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.