Summary
stating that Section 603 of the New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rules, which is identical in wording to NASD Code Section 15, is not a statute of limitations but an eligibility requirement
Summary of this case from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. JanaOpinion
June 24, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Diane Lebedeff, J.).
The interpretation that has been given section 15 of the National Association of Securities Dealers Code of Arbitration Procedure — that such is not a statute of limitations but a substantive eligibility requirement limiting the range of disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate (Matter of Prudential Bache Sec. v. Archard, 179 A.D.2d 652, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 754) — should be adopted for the identically worded rule 603 of the New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rules, and the timeliness of respondent's demand for arbitration left to the courts. Respondent's reliance on Application of Conticommodity Servs. (Philipp Lion) ( 613 F.2d 1222) does not avail in view of the more recent decision in Volt Information Sciences v. Stanford Univ. ( 489 U.S. 468), holding that the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt a choice of State law to govern the arbitration. Under New York law, which the parties' agreement specifically designates, courts are authorized to stay arbitration if the claim would have been time-barred had it been asserted in court (CPLR 7502 [b]). We also agree with the IAS Court because rule 603 is not a statute of limitations, it cannot be tolled by allegations of fraud (Jones Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512-513).
Concur — Wallach, J.P., Kupferman, Ross and Kassal, JJ.