Summary
In Mello, the plaintiff established that, as a back-seat passenger in a taxicab that rear-ended a second vehicle, she was free of negligence as a matter of law.
Summary of this case from Oluwatayo v. DulinayanOpinion
2013-04-25
Pazer, Epstein & Jaffe, P.C., New York (Matthew J. Fein of counsel), for appellant. Kathleen C. Waterman, New York, for respondents.
Pazer, Epstein & Jaffe, P.C., New York (Matthew J. Fein of counsel), for appellant. Kathleen C. Waterman, New York, for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (George J. Silver, J.), entered April 11, 2012, which, in this action for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident, denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as against all defendants, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted to the extent of finding no culpable conduct by plaintiff on the issue of liability, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
Plaintiff established that, as a back-seat passenger in a taxi cab that rear-ended a second vehicle, she was free of negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff testified that just before the accidentoccurred, her friend, who was with her in the back seat, was in the process of instructing the driver to slow down. The driver testified he did not hear plaintiff's friend, and there is no basis for finding that plaintiff or her friend did anything to cause the accident or could have prevented it ( cf. Bruni v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 319, 328, 778 N.Y.S.2d 757, 811 N.E.2d 19 [2004]. Since plaintiff was an innocent rear-seat passenger who cannot be found at fault under any version of how the accident occurred, the motion should have been granted to the extent indicated ( see Garcia v. Tri–County Ambulette Serv., 282 A.D.2d 206, 723 N.Y.S.2d 163 [1st Dept. 2001];see also Medina v. Rodriguez, 92 A.D.3d 850, 939 N.Y.S.2d 514 [2d Dept. 2012] ).