Opinion
Civ. 21-20794 (KM) 21-20795 (KM)
06-23-2022
STEVEN MELEIKA, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Defendant.
OPINION
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
Steven Meleika, a frequent and repetitive litigant in this District, has filed these two nearly identical actions in which he challenges this Court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Jersey City in a prior action for malicious prosecution, Civ. No. 17-1959 (the “Prior Action”). Mr. Meleika asserts that, because he was not convicted of certain underlying misdemeanor charges, he was entitled to prevail in the Prior Action. He was not entitled to prevail, however, because he stipulated to probable cause as a condition of voluntary dismissal, and I so ruled in a detailed opinion. For ease of reference, a copy of my summary judgment decision in the Prior Action, reported at 2018 WL 4522046 (Sept. 21, 2018), is attached as Exhibit A (“Prior Opinion”).
I will therefore grant Mr. Meleika's motion to be granted in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status and dismiss his complaint upon initial screening pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
I. The Applicable Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all IFP complaints, not only those filed by prisoners. See, e.g., Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 n. 19 (3d Cir. 2002) (non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs are “clearly within the scope of § 1915(e)(2)”). The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege ‘sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “While a litigant's pro se status requires a court to construe the allegations in the complaint liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372 Fed.Appx. 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
II. Background
Mr. Meleika was arrested on May 1, 2014, and charged with violations that were downgraded to disorderly persons offenses, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:35-10(c) (CDS) and 2C:29-2(a)(1) (resisting arrest), and referred to Jersey City Municipal Court. On October 7, 2015, the charges were voluntarily dismissed on the record before Municipal Court Judge Margaret Marley. In that proceeding, Mr. Meleika was represented by counsel. (ECF no. 24-3 at 17.)
That voluntary dismissal of charges was expressly conditioned on Mr. Meleika's stipulation to the existence of probable cause, as discussed more fully in my Prior Opinion. The court transcript from that hearing reads, in relevant part:
MR. LOPEZ: Judge, the State is going to move to dismiss this complaint against this individual.
There are pending Superior Court matters that he still needs to confront. Given the age of this Summons, Judge, I believe that's an appropriate disposition.
MR. SERTERIDES: Judge, apart from that, the charges pending in the Superior Court are very, very serious. They are assault with a deadly weapon, and a possible attempted murder charge.
Mr. Meleika has been in jail since his extradition from
Florida. And there is little, if any, hope that he will make bail. So that, for all intents and purposes, Mr. Meleika will be spending the indefinite future in the Hudson County Jail.
THE COURT: Okay. And -
MR. SERTERIDES: Mr. Meleika, do you understand why you were arrested by a member or members of the Jersey City Police Department on May 1, 2014?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. SERTERIDES: Your Honor, assuming the Court grants the Prosecution's request, we will stipulate to probable cause.
THE COURT: Okay. And the officer who is present here, your appearance for the record.
OFFICER SCALZIONE: Officer Matthew Scalzione (phonetic), Jersey City police Department, Street Crimes Unit, Shield No. 2911.
THE COURT: And, Officer Scalzione, are you okay with this resolution?
OFFICER SCALZIONE: Yes. I've discussed this at length with the Prosecutor, and I'm comfortable with the disposition that's being discussed.
THE COURT: Okay. So for all the reasons placed upon the record, this matter will be dismissed on motion of the State. There is a stipulation of probable cause, which Mr. Serterides has reviewed with Mr. Meleika, and has been placed on the record, as well.
Okay. Matter is dismissed.(Oct. 7, 2015 Court Transcript at 2-4, 17-cv-1959 DE 24-3 at 18-19.)
Mr. Meleika pled guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in connection with those separate and unrelated charges. That conviction is the subject of opinions in other cases, including two habeas cases, Civ. Nos. 21-11592 and 2120776, and an appeal from denial of PCR, State v. Meleika, No. A-4103-19, 2022 WL 554204 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. Feb. 24, 2022).
For the reasons stated in the Prior Opinion, that transcript was properly considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.
Two key elements of a malicious prosecution claim are lack of probable cause and favorable termination of the criminal proceeding. I held that both had been negated, and granted summary judgment to Jersey City on the claim of malicious prosecution. (See Prior Opinion, attached as Ex. A.)
Mr. Meleika, however, continued to seek discovery. He filed a notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. (17-cv-1959 DE 43.) He moved to reopen the case and extend the time to appeal, and he filed escalating demands for damages. These were denied, as the case was closed and the 180-day deadline to reopen the time to appeal had passed. (DE 50, 52.)
These above-captioned nearly identical actions against “The Federal Government” followed. The causes of action are variously listed as 4th Search and Seizure, 5th Double Jeopardy, legal malpractice, and Negligence. (DE 1 at 3-4) Attached is a “Brief” in which Mr. Meleika explains further:
The plaintiff sues the defendant for negligence, and for the violation of his 5th amendment right the double jeopardy clause where it says that a person shall not to be tried twice for the same crime. The plaintiff had his charges dismissed. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that he was falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted. The plaintiff had a settlement pending in the case when the federal judge dismissed the case saying that the police had probable cause. The judge cannot make these decisions as the criminal has already been won. The judge violated the plaintiff double jeopardy rights when he made that decision. A criminal case dismissed is an automatic win in a civil case for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The poor handling of the plaintiff case is negligence. The plaintiff sues the defendant for negligence, and for the violation of his 5th amendment right the double jeopardy clause where it says that a person shall not to be tried twice for the same crime. The plaintiff had his charges dismissed. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that he was falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted. The judge cannot make these decisions as the criminal has already been terminated in the plaintiff favor. The judge violated the plaintiff double jeopardy rights when he made that decision. A criminal case dismissed is an automatic win in a civil case for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The poor handling of the plaintiff case is negligence. The plaintiff has provided sufficient merit in his civil cases. For good shown the plaintiff requests the court honor the settlement and award monetary damages for negligence and for violating the plaintiffs double jeopardy rights.(DE 1 at 7-8) The complaint seeks monetary compensation.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Bars
The complaint is procedurally defective. To begin with, it is difficult to discern the reasoning behind naming “The Federal Government” as defendant. To the extent Mr. Meleika means to sue this Court or the Court of Appeals, there would be judicial immunity to deal with. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985).
There are some indications that this is his intent, though it is not clear. See DE 1 at 4 (naming this Court and the Third Circuit, and listing the case numbers of the Prior Action and appeal).
Setting that aside, the claim is at bottom one of judicial error-i.e., that Mr. Meleika should have prevailed in the Prior Action. Correction of error, however, must be pursued by the proper means, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. These have already been attempted and denied, whether on the merits or on timeliness grounds.
B. Merits
At any rate, Mr. Meleika's arguments fail on the merits. He now claims that “[a] criminal case dismissed is an automatic win in a civil case for false arrest and malicious prosecution,” and that this Court violated his double jeopardy rights when it denied his malicious prosecution claim on summary judgment.
Mr. Meleika is incorrect about the dismissal of criminal charges entitling him to an “automatic win” on his malicious prosecution claim. For the reasons stated in my Prior Opinion, the opposite is the case. His stipulation to the existence of probable cause in exchange for the voluntary dismissal of charges precludes a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.
Malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the plaintiff's] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007)). As set forth in my Prior Opinion, both the probable-case and the favorable-termination elements of malicious prosecution are negated by a stipulation to the existence of probable cause. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, No. 3:17-CV-151-DJH, 2018 WL 345119, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2018) (stipulation negates probable cause element); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (favorable termination element); Jones v. Somerset Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, No. CV 15-2629 (FLW), 2017 WL 1337432, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2017)
Mr. Meleika is also incorrect in his invocation of double jeopardy. “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
‘No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' The Clause by its terms does not prohibit twice placing a person in jeopardy ‘for the same conduct or actions.' .... Instead, it focuses on whether successive prosecutions are for the same ‘offence.'.... Because the sovereign source of a law is an inherent and distinctive feature of the law itself, an offense defined by one sovereign is necessarily a different offense from that of another sovereign.Denezpi v. United States, No. 20-7622, 2022 WL 2111348, at *4 (U.S. June 13, 2022) (cleaned up).
In short, the double jeopardy clause is concerned with successive criminal prosecutions by the same sovereign for the same crime. The denial of a subsequent civil claim for damages is not a criminal prosecution at all, let alone a prosecution for the same offense; moreover, the State and the federal government are separate sovereigns.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the complaint is DISMISSED. Because this action is in effect an amendment to the complaint dismissed in Civ. No. 17-1959, and in light of the history of this litigation, the Court determines that further amendment would be futile, and the dismissal is with prejudice.
(Exhibit Omitted)