Opinion
CASE NO. 184-CRD-2-82
APRIL 1, 1986
The Claimant was represented by Matthew Shafner, Esq.
The Respondents were represented by Robert E. Beach, Jr., Esq.
This Petition for Review from the December 7, 1982 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District, was argued February 24, 1984, before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and Frank Verrilli.
FINDING AND AWARD
The Finding and Award of the Commissioner as corrected is affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of this Division.
OPINION
Cardiac disability resulting from workplace stress is the claim made by the veteran bank employee in this matter. She had been employed by the Respondent bank for twenty-one years, as Supervisor of the Discount Department at the Groton branch for the last three years, prior to June 18, 1980. Problems developed in her department at that time. Several conferences were held between June 16 and June 18 causing the claimant to become emotionally upset. On June 18, she suffered intense chest pain and was hospitalized until June 23, 1980.
Since chest pains persisted, she saw a New London Cardiologist, Dr. Richard Pembrook. He ultimately diagnosed the condition from which she had been suffering since June 18, 1980 as myocardial ischemia, intermittent spasm and angina pectoris. On April 10, 1981, claimant underwent double bypass surgery at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford. The Commissioner below found that the claimant was totally disabled from work during the period June 18, 1980 until July 15, 1981 and that the disability arose out of and in the course of the employment.
The respondent employer has appealed this determination. Its contention is that the disability was caused by other factors which were pre-existent prior to June 1980 events and that the workplace stress was only a minor factor. It contends also that no injury or occupational disease had been proven as defined by the Statute. The claimant's cross appeal contends that further periods of disability benefits after July 15, 1981 should have been granted to the claimant.
Sec. 31-275. . .(8) "Personal injury," or "injury," as the same is used in this chapter, shall be construed to include, in addition to accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease as herein defined. . .(11) "Occupational disease" includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment.
Part of the respondent's appeal attacks the Commissioner's factual conclusions. Such an attack seems unwarranted. Dr. Pembrook's deposition of July 15, 1981, and his various written reports in evidence, certainly gave the Commissioner a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that the plaintiff was disabled from work for the period found and that such disability was caused by the stressful job incidents of June, 1980. Therefore, we cannot substitute our factual conclusions for the Commissioner's, Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143 (1915), Battey v. Osborne, 96 Conn. 633 (1921), Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (1979).
The remaining part of the respondent employer's evidentiary argument would have us adopt a type of major factor analysis as a basis for causation. That seemed to be the concept employed by the employer's counsel in the cross-examination of Dr. Pembrook:
"Q. And you can't put any sort of percentage on the amount of job related stress that contributed to it, the problems, can you?" Pembrook Deposition, p. 78 (7/15/81)
But Connecticut has never adopted any major contributing fact or theory. Instead we have relied on the substantial factor basis of proximate causation enunciated in Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184 (1929). Therefore, the fact that the claimant had pre-existent coronary atherosclerosis, as testified by both Dr. Pembrook and Dr. H. Robert Silverstein, the Hartford Cardiologist testifying for respondent, does not in and of itself controvert the Commissioner's conclusion that the proximate cause of claimants' disability was work related. Neither does claimant's weight, her smoking or her family history of heart disease.
Finally, Appellant argues, there was no one identifiable incident or unusual stress nor was there occupational disease found. We have discussed these issues recently in Zipoli v. Watertown, 215-CRD-5-83, (1/17/86) and before in Gecewicz v. Sealtest Foods Division, 77-CRD-1-81, 1 Conn. Workers Comp. Rev. Op. 195 (10/25/82). Our analysis in those cases demonstrates that neither a single identifiable incident nor unusual stress or exertion is required to conform to the statutory definition of injury.
Claimant's cross appeal objects because the Commissioner failed to grant any benefits after July 15, 1981. That day was the date of Dr. Pembrook's deposition. Obviously, the Commissioner concluded he had insufficient medical basis for any findings concerning subsequent future benefits. If those benefits are now claimed, they must wait on further medical evidence.
Both the employer's appeal and the employee's cross appeal are dismissed, and the Finding and Award of the Commissioner is affirmed as corrected.
Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and Frank Verrilli concur.