Summary
In Cole v. Norwalk Wilbert Vault Co., 4 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 155, 330 CRD-2-84 (1988), we concluded that a claimant's "injury during his vocational rehabilitation program is an event occurring in a chain of happenings following directly from a compensable injury without any intervening causative activity by the claimant.
Summary of this case from Zullo v. Caron Roofing Company, Inc.Opinion
CASE NO. 330 CRD-2-84
FEBRUARY 26, 1988
The claimant was represented by Thomas B. Wilson, Esq., Susman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray Faulkner, P.C.
The respondents were represented by Howard B. Field III, Esq., Law Office of Brian E. Prindle.
This Petition for Review from the June 13, 1984 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner at Large acting for the Second District was heard February 21, 1986 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Michael S. Sherman.
FINDING AND AWARD
1. Paragraph 1 of the trial Commissioner's June 13, 1984 Finding is adopted as paragraph 1 of this Division's Finding and Award.
2. The February 4, 1983 injury to Claimant's left wrist and elbow occurred at the welding school during the training and educational program established by the Division of Worker Rehabilitation of the Workers' Compensation Commission.
3. Claimant's February 4, 1983 welding school injury therefore arose out of and during the course of his employment with the respondent and is a compensable injury.
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND AWARDED that Respondent pay all indemnity and medical benefits resulting from the February 4, 1983 injury.
OPINION
A Voluntary Agreement between the parties approved by the Second District June 11, 1982 recites the occurrence of a compensable injury to Claimant's right master hand February 11, 1980. That Agreement also approved a 30% permanent partial disability of Claimant's right hand. Due to that permanent disability and resulting limited employability, the Division of Worker Rehabilitation (D.W.R.) placed Claimant in a welding school to be retrained pursuant to Sec. 31-283a, C.G.S. While at welding school, Claimant injured his left wrist and elbow February 4, 1983.
He sought benefits for that 1983 event. The Commissioner at Large, who heard the case for the Second District, ruled the left wrist and elbow injury did not arise out of the employment with Respondent and denied benefits.
As the facts were not in dispute, resolution of this matter rested on a conclusion of law, one on which we differ from the Commissioner below. Concededly, Claimant's left arm injury did not occur at the workplace or during work time, but it did occur because of the original right hand injury which had arisen out of and in the course of employment.
Chief Justice Wheeler defined the necessary causal connection between injury and employment in Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709 (1926). "The causal connection required to be established is that the employment was the proximate cause of the injury. . .", Id. at 713. The same jurist defines proximate cause in another classic opinion, Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184 (1929). In that case, Wheeler embraced the rule proposed by Professor Jeremiah Smith in a Harvard Law Review article." [The] tort must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage complained of.'", Id. at 195. In Connecticut, both for tort and worker compensation law, the Mahoney v. Beatman substantial factor rule of proximate cause remains the prevailing formula of causation analysis six decades later, McDonough v. Connecticut Bank Trust, 204 Conn. 104, 120 (1987), aff'g this tribunal's opinion in 3 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 184 CRD-2-82 (1986).
25 Harvard Law Review 305, 310.
Because the trial Commissioner concluded without any supporting explanation that the 1983 injury "did not arise out of and in the course of the employment', we can only surmise as to the reasoning leading to his dismissal of the claim. He must either have decided that there was some other intervening cause or that the 1983 happening was too remote, therefore "proximate" to the original 1980 work injury. But whatever the basis of his analysis, we think his conclusion was incorrect.
Professor Larson's Treatise examines situations involving consequential injuries and employs a "quasi-course of employment" concept. He states:
"By this expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee following upon his injury which, although they take place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for the compensable injury."
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 3-379, Sec. 13-11(d) (1985).
The Oregon Court of Appeals has followed Larson's rationale in two cases relating specifically to injuries occurring during a vocational rehabilitation program, Wood v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 30 Or. App. 1103, 569 P.2d 648 (1977) and Firkus v. Alder Creek Lumber, 48 Or. App. 251, 617 P.2d 620 (1980).
Whether we apply Connecticut's substantial factor theory or Professor Larson's "quasi-course of employment" concept with its reliance on a "but for" theory of proximate causation to the instant matter, the result is the same. Claimant's 1983 left wrist injury during his vocational rehabilitation-program is an event occurring in a chain of happenings following directly from a compensable injury without any intervening causative activity by the claimant. As such, it is an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.
We, therefore, sustain the claimant's appeal and remand the matter to the district for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Michael S. Sherman concur.