Summary
reviewing District and Superior Court decisions and considering whether “the chief acted within the authority granted by G.L. c. 140, § 131, to determine individual suitability to carry a firearm”
Summary of this case from McGunigle v. City of QuincyOpinion
14-P-369
12-12-2014
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Stanley Mazurczyk appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming an order by a judge of the District Court. At issue is the police chief's (chief) exercise of authority pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 131(f), to revoke Mazurczyk's class A license to carry a firearm.
The chief determined that Mazurczyk was "no longer a suitable person to possess [a] license" under G. L. c. 140, § 131(f), inserted by St. 1998, c. 180, § 41, on the basis of the latest incident stemming from an ongoing dispute between Mazurczyk and his neighbors. An officer was called to the scene to investigate an altercation in what the parties agree is a history of animosity between Mazurczyk and his neighbors. The officer reported that he "attempted to speak with Mazurczyk, but he would rant and rave and was not rational." The chief's notice of suspension stated as its reason, "[t]he irrational behavior displayed towards neighbors and officers as described by [the investigating officer]."
While Mazurczyk disputes this characterization of his behavior, he concedes that he was "upset" and "refused to cooperate" with the police who came to investigate the report that he had been harassing his neighbors.
Mazurczyk appealed his license suspension by filing a complaint in the District Court; after a hearing a judge affirmed the suspension, and Mazurczyk filed a petition for certiorari in the Superior Court. Godfrey v. Chief of Police of Wellesley, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 46 (1993).
A judge of the Superior Court determined that there were no material facts in dispute, and affirmed the decision of the District Court after the parties submitted cross motions for judgment on the pleadings. Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).
We agree with the decisions in the District and Superior Courts that the chief acted within the authority granted by G. L. c. 140, § 131, to determine individual suitability to carry a firearm. Ruggiero v. Police Commr. of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 258-259 (1984) (firearms legislation is based on "realization that prevention of harm is often preferable to meting out punishment after an unfortunate event"). The record contains undisputed evidence of ongoing enmity and continual confrontation between Mazurczyk and his neighbors; even if the chief accepted Mazurczyk's version of affairs and were to agree that the neighbors were initially at fault for the bad blood in this neighborhood, Mazurczyk's exhibited lack of control and refusal to cooperate with police officers supports the chief's determination that he is not a suitable person to be possessed of a firearms license. "In performing its task, the licensing authority is given considerable latitude. As was noted in Chief of Police of Shelburne v. Moyer, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 546 (1983), '[t]o warrant a finding that a chief of police had no reasonable ground for refusing to issue a license it must be shown that the refusal was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.'" Ruggiero v. Police Commr. of Boston, supra at 259.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Trainor, Grainger & Carhart, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: December 12, 2014