Opinion
February 18, 1999
The information supplied by an informant that she had observed petitioner using drugs on numerous occasions, which information was reasonably detailed and included a declaration against penal interest, constituted substantial evidence of the reasonable suspicion required for an order directing a drug test for cause (see, Matter of Giammarino v. Ward, 161 A.D.2d 440, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 704). It can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that the officer who ordered the drug test acted upon information conveyed by a fellow officer who possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion (see, Matter of Partland v. Bratton, 247 A.D.2d 261), and, accepting the credibility determinations of the Hearing Officer, there was substantial evidence that petitioner refused to comply with such order (see, supra). In the circumstances, the penalty of dismissal does not shock our sense of fairness (see, Matter of Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840). Since petitioner was suspended without pay on May 2, 1996 and dismissed, following the hearing and determination of the charge supporting the suspension, on July 26, 1996, and since there is no evidence that petitioner was responsible for the delay in the determination of the charge beyond the 30 days permitted under Civil Service Law § 75 Civ. Serv. (3), he is entitled to back pay for the period from June 2, 1996 to July 26, 1996, less any earnings he may have received from other sources during that period (see, Gerber v. New York City Hous. Auth., 42 N.Y.2d 162, 164-165).
Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Nardelli, Tom and Andrias, JJ.