Opinion
January 26, 1998
Cross motion by the respondents John M. Leventhal and Edward R. Hallman to dismiss the petition.
Ordered that the cross motion is granted; and it is further,
Adjudged that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner is a sex offender within the meaning of Correction Law § 168-a (1) who was not definitively released from parole supervision at the time that the Sex Offender Registration Act ( see, Correction Law § 168 et seq. [L 1995 ch. 192]) took effect. His classification as a risk level three sex offender by the respondent John M. Leventhal, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was not an act which can in any sense be considered as beyond the court's jurisdiction ( see generally, People v. Nieves, 172 Misc.2d 346). Therefore, the writ of prohibition does not lie. The absence of any right to appeal the determination ( see, People v. Stevens, 235 A.D.2d 440, lv granted 90 N.Y.2d 864; People v. Rodriguez, 240 A.D.2d 351) does not compel the conclusion that relief is available by way of application for a writ of prohibition ( e.g., Matter of Brown v. Browne, 187 A.D.2d 580). To hold otherwise would result in this "extraordinary" writ becoming instead routine in sex-crime cases. We disagree with the result in People v. Cash ( 242 A.D.2d 976) to the extent that it holds that prohibition is available under these or similar circumstances.
Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Santucci and Luciano, JJ., concur.