Opinion
August 1, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Carey, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order entered January 24, 1991, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order entered December 24, 1991, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeals from the orders entered May 7, 1991, December 24, 1991, and March 24, 1992, and the cross appeal from the order entered December 24, 1991, are dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.
The appeals and cross appeal from the intermediate orders must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeals and cross appeal from those orders are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The Purchase Environmental Protective Association, Inc. (hereinafter PEPA) contends that the court erroneously dismissed its first, second, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action in Matter No. 1 as being time-barred. These causes of action all pertain to the respondents' alleged failures to fully comply with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA) (see, ECL art 8) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
The record establishes that the Planning Board, which had been designated "lead agency" for SEQRA purposes, made its final SEQRA determination no later than April 24, 1990, at a public hearing. The minutes of the April 24th meeting were undisputedly filed with the Town Clerk on May 22, 1990. Since the instant proceeding was commenced on June 24, 1990, more than 30 days after the filing of the minutes, PEPA's fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action in Matter No. 1, were properly dismissed on the ground that they are time-barred (see, Town Law § 274-a; Matter of Casement v. Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 162 A.D.2d 685, 687).
Further, we conclude that PEPA lacks standing to raise the remaining causes of action asserted in its petition in Matter No. 1 and its petition/complaint in Matter No. 2 (see, Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 69 N.Y.2d 406, 413-414; see also, Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 773-774).
In light of the above, we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions. Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.