Summary
In Matter of Lynelle W. (177 A.D.2d 1008, 1009, supra), based upon a father's sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that the son was a neglected child because the father's abuse of his stepdaughter "demonstrated a fundamental defect in his understanding of the duties and obligations of parenthood and created an atmosphere detrimental to the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of the son as well".
Summary of this case from Dutchess County Department of Social Services ex rel. Douglas E. v. Douglas E.Opinion
November 15, 1991
Appeal from the Oneida County Family Court, Flemma, J.
Present — Doerr, J.P., Denman, Boomer, Green and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: The record supports the court's findings that both parents abused their daughter and that the father neglected his son. Issues of credibility were for the court to resolve and the court's findings must be accorded the greatest respect (see, Matter of Irene O., 38 N.Y.2d 776, 777). Although the mother did not directly participate in the stepfather's sexual abuse of her daughter, the evidence established that she knew or should have known about it and did nothing to prevent it (see, Family Ct Act § 1012 [e] [iii]; Matter of Trina Marie H., 48 N.Y.2d 742). The evidence also established that the father neglected his son because his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter demonstrated a fundamental defect in his understanding of the duties and obligations of parenthood and created an atmosphere detrimental to the physical, mental and emotional well-being of the son as well (see, Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i]; Matter of Christina Maria C., 89 A.D.2d 855; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Manual S., 148 Misc.2d 988, 993-995; Matter of Katherine C., 122 Misc.2d 276, 282). The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the daughter to testify out of the presence of her mother and stepfather. The court properly balanced the respective interests of the parties and, based upon the hearing testimony, reasonably concluded that the daughter would suffer substantial emotional trauma if she were compelled to testify in open court (see, Matter of Donna K., 132 A.D.2d 1004). We have considered each of the remaining contentions raised and find them lacking in merit.