Opinion
Submitted September 29, 1999
November 8, 1999
Vincent A. DeIorio, Purchase, N.Y. (Diane M. Lundin of counsel), for petitioner.
Eliot L. Spitzer, Attorney-General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavek and Adam L. Aronson of counsel), for respondent.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, HOWARD MILLER, JJ.
DECISION JUDGMENT
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review, inter alia, a determination of the Appeals Board of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the respondent New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, dated March 18, 19 98, affirming a decision of an Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Motor Vehicles, dated December 5, 1996, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 401(7)(F)(b) and New York City Traffic Rule 4-15(b)(9), and imposed a penalty.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
"It is well settled that judicial review of a determination rendered by an administrative body after a hearing is limited to whether that determination is supported by substantial evidence upon the entire record" (Matter of Dienna v. Appeals Board of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau, 262 A.D.2d 409 [2d Dept., June 7, 1999]; Matter of Liuzzo v. State of New York Dept. of Motor Vehicles Appeals Bd., 209 A.D.2d 618 ; see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176 ; Matter of Jones v. Hudacs, 221 A.D.2d 531, 531-532 ). "A reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by the Hearing Officer where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists" (Matter of McQueeney v. Dutchess County Sheriff, 223 A.D.2d 710, 711 ).
The determination that there was clear and convincing evidence (see, Vehicle Traffic Law § 227; Matter of Pernick v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 217 A.D.2d 630 ) that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 401(7)(F)(b) and New York City Traffic Rule 4-15(b)(9) is supported by substantial evidence, and there is no reason to disturb it.
We note that at an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge "need not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts" ( State Administrative Procedure Act § 306[1]; see, Matter of R D Equip. Leasing Co. v. Adduci, 220 A.D.2d 900, 901 ), and the petitioner's "reliance upon criminal cases is misplaced since such cases are inapplicable to administrative hearings in which different rules apply" (Matter of Cole v. New York State Dept. of Educ., 94 A.D.2d 904, 905 ).
BRACKEN, J.P., ALTMAN, FRIEDMANN, and H. MILLER, JJ., concur.