MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.

In this appeal from a temporary injunction, Michael Massingill and Electric Utility Analysts, Inc. contend in a single issue that the temporary injunction should be dissolved because Keith Swanner, Tommy Swanner, Electrical Utility Analysis, Inc. and Electrical Utility Consulting, Inc. failed to meet the three-day notice requirement of rule 21 of the rules of civil procedure. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court's order granting the temporary injunction.

Rule 21 requires that "an application to the court for an order and notice of any hearing thereon, not presented during a hearing or trial, shall be served upon all other parties not less than three days before the time specified for the hearing unless otherwise provided by these rules or shortened by the court." Tex. R. Civ. P. 21. A trial court's action in conducting a hearing on a motion before the rule 21 notice period has expired will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Magnuson v. Mullen, 65 S.W.3d 815, 824 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, writ denied); Buruato v. Mercy Hosp. of Laredo, 2 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, writ denied). In exercising its discretion to shorten the rule 21 notice period, the trial court is free to examine and determine the circumstances present in each particular case. See Magnuson, 65 S.W.3d at 824.

Here, the record shows that appellees obtained a temporary restraining order against appellants on May 24, 2004. The TRO shows the hearing on the temporary injunction was originally set for June 3, 2004. Shortly thereafter, appellees sent a copy of the order by facsimile to, among others, James Koecher. Koecher was formerly an attorney for Massingill, who is the registered agent for Electric Utility Analysts, Inc. Koecher obtained a copy of the petition and forwarded it and a copy of the TRO to Massingill. Sometime before June 3, Koecher spoke with appellees' attorney on the telephone. Koecher told appellees' attorney that Koecher did not believe "the temporary injunction hearing could go forward so long as he was not `served.'" On June 2, appellees filed an application for extension of the TRO because they had been unable to serve appellants with notice of the hearing. The next day, the trial court extended the TRO and reset the hearing on the temporary injunction to June 16, 2004. Appellees made more unsuccessful attempts to serve Massingill with notice of the June 16, 2004 hearing. Finally, the process server made arrangements with Massingill to serve him at home on June 9, 2004 when he returned home from out of town. However, Massingill was not home to receive service on June 9, and appellees' attorney stated at the temporary injunction hearing that Massingill was not there because he "left for the Bahamas." Thereafter, appellees filed a motion seeking the trial court's authorization for substituted service. After considering the motion and accompanying affidavits, the trial court granted appellees' motion on June 14, 2004. The following day, appellants were served with notice of the June 16 hearing by posting it on the door of Massingill's home.

In light of the evidence in the record showing appellants' attempt to avoid service, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by shortening the rule 21 notice period. Nor can we conclude the trial court erred by ordering substitute service. See State Farm Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. 1993) (substituted service is authorized under rule 106(b) after a plaintiff has unsuccessfully tried to effect personal service). Appellants do not challenge the merits of the temporary injunction and thus, we do not discuss that issue. We overrule appellant's sole issue.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting the temporary injunction.