Opinion
2022CV30414
12-28-2022
Div. 202
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ELIZABETH BEEBE VOLZ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on motion of Defendant The Travelers Indemnity Company (“Travelers”) seeking summary dismissal of Plaintiff's breach of contract and bad faith claims against Travelers related to underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. The Court, having considered the pleadings, file and applicable law finds that the motion is GRANTED.
INTRODUCTION
1. Nature of Litigation. Plaintiff David Martin (“Mr. Martin”), claims UIM coverage under his employer's insurance policy with Travelers. It is undisputed that Mr. Martin was injured by a third-party tortfeasor while working as a deputy sheriff for Montezuma County. It is also not contested that “Mr. Martin received workers' compensation benefits. He also presented a claim to Travelers for UIM benefits under the County's policy.” Rsp to MSJ, 2. Mr. Martin brought claims of relief against Travelers for breach of contract, common law bad faith breach of insurance contract and violation §10-3-1115(1)(a), improper denial of claim. (Am. Cmpl First - Third Claims for Relief). Additionally, Mr. Martin set forth a claim for Intentional Interference with Contractual Obligations related to a separate insurance policy with Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange (“California”). Travelers concedes that its motion for summary judgment does not address the Intentional Interference claim. Rply, 4.
2. Travelers Motion for Summary Judgment. Travelers asserts that “because Plaintiff treated under Colorado's Workers' Compensation Act (the “WCA”), it became Plaintiff's exclusive remedy ... [and therefore] Plaintiff has no cause of action, claim or remedy at law or in equity against Travelers.” MSJ, 2-3. Travelers argues that “the exclusivity provisions of the WCA . eliminates all causes of action except for those provided within the WCA . [and the] employer-employee immunity principals created by the WCA . extends to insurers as well.” MSJ, 5. Defendant Travelers relies on recent holdings by the Colorado Supreme Court in Ryser v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 480 P.3d 1286 (Colo. 2021) and the federal district court for Colorado interpreting Colorado law in Ward v. Acuity, 591 F.Supp3d 1003 (D.Colo. 2022) in support of its argument.
3. Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff rejects the analysis of the federal district court in Ward, asserting that “Ward was wrongly decided.” Rsp MSJ, 3. Mr. Martin further argues that “Travelers waived its argument based on workers compensation immunity . [stating that] . Travelers did not plead immunity as an affirmative defense . [and therefore such] . affirmative defenses . are waived unless timely raised.” Rsp MSJ, 8. Travelers disputes that it has waived any defenses, specifically referring to “affirmative defense 4 [which] refers to any limitations or policy conditions or exclusions.” Rply, 5. Further, Travelers specially reserved the right to amend its affirmative defenses.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
. “Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and it should only be granted when it is clear that the applicable legal standards have been met.” People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 465 P.3d 554, 559 (Colo. 2020). Summary judgment “is only appropriate where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 442 P.3d 938, 943 (Colo.App. 2017). “For purposes of summary judgment, a ‘material fact' is one that will affect the outcome of the case.” Morley v. United Services Automobile Association, 465 P.3d 71, 74 (Colo.App. 2019). “In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court grants the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts and resolves all doubts against the moving party.” Meagher, Id. at 559. “When, as here, neither party raises a factual dispute, issues of statutory interpretation are particularly appropriate for resolution on summary judgment.” Cook v. City and County of Denver, 68 P.3d 586, 588 (Colo.App. 2003)
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
“The Workers' Compensation Act provides exclusive remedies for employees suffering work-related injuries... The exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act bar civil actions in tort against an employer for injuries that are compensable under the Act.” Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 474 (Colo. 2001). The statutory provisions of the WCA, state, in part:
An employer who has complied with the provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title, including the provisions relating to insurance, shall not be subject to the provisions of section 841-101; nor shall such employer or the insurance carrier, if
any, insuring the employer's liability under said articles be subject o any other liability for the death or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in said articles; and all causes of action, actions at law, suits in equity, proceedings, and statutory and common law rights and remedies for and on account of such death of or personal injury to and such employee and accruing to any person are abolished except as provided in said articles.§8-41-102, C.R.S. (1990).
Relying on Colorado decisions addressing the interplay between the WCA and an employer's UIM/UM coverage, the federal district court granted summary judgment to an employer's insurance carrier concluding that “an employee injured during the course of employment cannot claim benefits under his or her employer's UM/UIM policy in addition to workers' compensation.” Markel Insurance Company, v. Hollandsworth, 400 F.Supp.3d 1155, 1160 (D.Colo. 2019). The Hollandsworth court further stated that since plaintiff “is not entitled to coverage as a matter of law ... [the] breach of contract and statutory bad faith insurance contract [claims] also fail as a matter of law.” Hollandsworth, Id. at 1160.
The federal district court for Colorado came to a similar conclusion in Ward v. Acuity, 591 F.Supp3d 1003 (D.Colo. 2022) finding that “the exclusion provisions and immunity principles of the WCA bar Plaintiff from recovering UM/UIM benefits from his employer's insurance carrier after he has received workers' compensation, even where his injury was caused by a third-party tortfeasor.” Ward, Id. at 1007-09.
The Colorado supreme court provides further support for the analysis and holdings of Hollandsworth and Ward. “[T]he Act provides the exclusive remedy to a covered employee for injuries sustained while the employee is performing services arising in the course of his or her employment . Employers who comply with the requirements of the WCA are therefore immune from common law liability related to on-the-job injuries.” Ryser v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, 480 P.3d 1286, 1290 (Colo. 2021). The court in Ryser explained:
In our view, the expansive wording of the WCA controls in this case. Section 8-41-102 provides that ‘all causes of action, ... and statutory and common law rights and remedies for and on account of such personal injury to an employee . are abolished. . That section further provides that the immunity afforded the employer extends to the employer's insurance carrier.Ryser, Id. at 1291
More recently, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that an insurance policy excluding medical payments for injuries eligible for workers compensation benefits does not violate public policy. Del Valle v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange, 2022 WL 17347880, 2022 COA 138 (Colo.App. 12/1/22). The court in Del Valle concluded that:
The workers' compensation exclusion is also consistent with the general recognition that, when an employee is injured in the course and scope of employment, workers' compensation insurance is primary. Indeed the fundamental purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado (the Act) is to provide a remedy for job-related injuries, without regard to fault. To accomplish that, the legislature enacted comprehensive and exclusive remedies for work-related injuries . accepting that workers' compensation benefits result in a surrender of an employee's rights to any other method or form of relief. .[internal citations omitted] Del Valle, Id. at ¶20, 4.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth more fully above, the Court finds that Travelers motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's First - Third claims of relief for breach of contract as well as common law and statutory bad faith breach of insurance contract, is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.