Opinion
24A-CR-61
07-17-2024
William Lawrence Martin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana, Kurt A. Young Nashville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable James K. Snyder, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D28-2103-F3-8710
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana, Kurt A. Young Nashville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Following a jury trial, William Martin was convicted of aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony. Martin then waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he is an habitual offender, and the trial court found that Martin is an habitual offender. Martin appeals and argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Martin is an habitual offender. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
Issues
[¶2] Martin raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Martin is an habitual offender.
Facts
[¶3] On March 15, 2021, Martin got into an argument with Steve Mason because Mason parked his truck in a manner that blocked Martin from moving his motorcycle. Martin attempted to punch Mason, and a physical fight ensued. During the fight, Martin stabbed Mason several times with a knife. Mason suffered stab wounds to his abdomen, causing serious internal injuries. After the stabbing, Martin fled the scene, while Mason called 911. The police soon located and arrested Martin.
[¶4] On March 22, 2021, the State charged Martin with aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, and battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. On May 24, 2023, the State added a count alleging that Martin was an habitual offender. This count alleged:
On or about March 26, 2010, in Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room 15, State of Indiana, [Martin] was convicted of Theft; Receiving Stolen Property, a Class D Felony under Cause Number 49F15-0912-FD-101495;
And;
On or about February 17, 2006, in Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room 4, State of Indiana, [Martin] was convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Class B Felony under Cause Number 49G04-0412-FB-219769.Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 172.
[¶5] A jury trial was held on October 25, 2023, and the jury found Martin guilty as charged. Immediately after the jury returned its verdict, the trial court asked Martin if he was ready to proceed to the habitual offender phase of the trial. Martin's counsel responded, "Judge, we will stipulate to the convictions. We will ask the Court to accept the waiver. We'd like to send it out for a sentencing day all in one, if we may." Tr. Vol. IV p. 141. The trial court then stated, "So the bench trial . . . with the stipulations and then the sentencing on the same day." Id. at 141-42. Martin's counsel replied, "Yes, Judge." Id. at 142. The trial court then explained to Martin his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender issue, and Martin personally waived this right. Id. at 142-43.
[¶6] The trial court held a bench trial on the habitual offender allegation on December 14, 2023. The State presented evidence that Martin was convicted in 2010 of theft, a Class D felony, in Cause Number 49F15-0912-FD-101495 ("Cause No. FD-101495"), and convicted in 2006 of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony, in Cause Number 49G04-0412-FB-219769 ("Cause No. FB-219769"). The trial court found Martin to be an habitual offender. Proceeding to sentencing, the trial court vacated Martin's conviction for battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. The trial court then sentenced Martin to eleven years on the Level 3 felony aggravated battery conviction, to which it added an additional twelve years for the habitual offender enhancement. Martin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Martin argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Martin is an habitual offender. We disagree.
We note that, at trial, Martin stipulated to his two prior convictions. See Tr. Vol. IV pp. 141-43. We take this to mean that Martin stipulated to the existence of the two prior convictions as alleged by the State but that he still wished to have a bench trial on the issue of whether he should be adjudicated an habitual offender. See Harris v. State, 211 N.E.3d 929, 937-38 (Ind. 2023) (noting that, under the habitual offender statute and Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution, the trier of fact determines both whether the defendant has the prior convictions alleged and whether those convictions make the defendant an habitual offender as a matter of law). In Garrett v. State, 737 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Ind. 2000), our Supreme Court held that the defendant's stipulation to the existence of prior charges did not mean that the defendant stipulated to all of the elements of the habitual offender allegation. Instead, "[t]he State still had the burden at trial of proving that the offenses were unrelated." Id. Accordingly, here, Martin's counsel did not stipulate to Martin's status as an habitual offender. He merely stipulated to the existence of the two prior convictions, and the State still bore the burden of proving that the other statutory requirements of the habitual offender statute were met.
A. Standard of Review
[¶8] When determining whether sufficient evidence supports a defendant's habitual offender adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor re-evaluate the witnesses' credibility. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). Instead, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and we will affirm that judgment unless we cannot find substantial evidence of probative value to support it. Id.
B. The Habitual Offender Statute
[¶9] The habitual offender statute provides, in part, that:
A person convicted of murder or of a Level 1 through Level 4 felony is a habitual offender if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the person has been convicted of two
(2) prior unrelated felonies; and (2) at least one (1) of the prior unrelated felonies is not a Level 6 felony or a Class D felony.Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(b).
[¶10] The habitual offender statute also provides that:
A person has accumulated two (2) or three (3) prior unrelated felony convictions for purposes of this section only if:
(1) the second prior unrelated felony conviction was committed after commission of and sentencing for the first prior unrelated felony conviction; [and]
(2) the offense for which the state seeks to have the person sentenced as a habitual offender was committed after commission of and sentencing for the second prior unrelated felony conviction ....Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(f).
[¶11] "Thus, for two convictions to qualify as unrelated felonies under the general habitual offender enhancement statute, '[t]he commission of the second felony must be subsequent to the sentencing of the first and the sentencing for the second felony must precede the commission of the principal felony for which the enhanced sentence is being sought.'" Afanador v. State, 181 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (quoting Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999)), trans. denied. "Proof that 'commission/conviction/sentence for each of the offenses occurred seriatim' is required." Evans v. State, 209 N.E.3d 472, 481 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Weatherford, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993)), reh'g denied.
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence
[¶12] Martin claims that the State failed to prove the date on which the theft in Cause No. FD-101495 was committed. Without proof of when the theft in Cause No. FD-101495 occurred, Martin claims that the State could not prove the commission/conviction/sentence sequence for the predicate offenses supporting his habitual offender adjudication.
[¶13] As noted by the State, however, it introduced into evidence a certified copy of the Officer Arrest Report from the prior theft conviction at the habitual offender phase of the trial. This report lists an offense date of December 18, 2009-the same date that Martin was arrested for the theft offense. The trial court explicitly relied on this evidence when it found that the offense occurred on December 18, 2009. Tr. Vol. IV p. 165. Thus, the State introduced evidence that, in Cause No. FD-101495, Martin committed the offense on December 18, 2009. The State also submitted evidence that Martin was convicted for this offense on March 26, 2010, when he pleaded guilty. Ex. Vol. I, State's Ex. 30, p. 120. On that same date, the trial court sentenced Martin. See id.
In his reply brief, Martin argues for the first time that there was insufficient evidence to connect the Officer Arrest Report with his conviction in Cause No. FD-101495. It is axiomatic that arguments may not be presented for the first time in a reply brief. Dunn v. State, 202 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied. Regardless, the Arrest Report lists a "JUSTIS Case No." of 09101495. Ex. Vol. I, State's Ex. 29, p. 115. The cause number in that case also ended in 101495. This is sufficient to prove that the Arrest Report was from the incident that led to Martin's conviction in Cause No. FD-101495. Martin's arguments to the contrary are merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1265.
[¶14] Although Martin does not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his conviction in Cause No. FB-218769, we also note that the State presented evidence that Martin committed the offense in that case on December 4, 2004; Martin was convicted of the offense on January 11, 2006, when he pleaded guilty; and Martin was sentenced on this offense on February 17, 2006. See id., State's Ex. 31, p. 125; State's Ex. 32, pp. 133-34.
[¶15] Martin committed the instant offense on March 15, 2021; he was convicted of the offense on October 25, 2023, following the jury trial; and he was sentenced on the offense on December 14, 2023. Accordingly, the State presented evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission/ conviction/sentence sequence for Martin's predicate offenses and the instant offense. This is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Martin is an habitual offender. See Evans, 209 N.E.3d at 481.
Conclusion
[¶16] The State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Martin is an habitual offender. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶17] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.