In an injured claimant's proceeding brought before the Industrial Accident Board, naming an alleged employer and an alleged employer's surety, the Board has jurisdiction to determine on the facts and on the law whether or not the surety is liable to the employer and employee, notwithstanding that the surety may not have issued its written policy nor filed the required bond with the Board. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Heller (1931) 256 N.Y. 322, 176 N.E. 410; Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson Co. (1925) 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381; State Compensation Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission Cal. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 264, 125 P.2d 42, 43; Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 177 Cal. 771, 171 P. 935; General Acc. F. L. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 196 Cal. 179, 237 P. 33; Tri-State Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 1941, 189 Okl. 97, 113 P.2d 981 (over-ruling prior decision of Okla. set forth in 127 A.L.R. Annotation); 58 Am.Jur. 930 § 572; 127 A.L.R. Anno. Compensation Insurance Proper Tribunal.

Where an employer has been held liable to an injured worker in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law, the employer, whose contractual status with the alleged surety has not been determined, should properly institute his action against the surety in the District Court.

The I.A.B. is a limited tribunal having the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the insurance issue on a claimant's petition, but not to entertain any suit between the employer and the employer's surety. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission, 20 Cal.2d 264, 125 P.2d 42; Tri-State Casualty Ins. Co. v. LaFon, 205 Okl. 293, 237 P.2d 124; United States F. G. Co. v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. 468, 6 P.2d 243.

The Industrial Accident Board order of dismissal of respondent should be affirmed inasmuch as the Industrial Accident Board does not have jurisdiction to determine the issue presented therein, to wit: contractual dealings between agent, employer and surety governing coverage questions. Thompson v. Liberty National Ins. Co., 78 Idaho 381, 304 P.2d 910 (1956).

The district court was correct and should be affirmed in ordering dismissal of the action against the surety on the ground that there was, at said time, another action pending within the meaning of Rule 12(b) (8), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) (8); Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 214 P.2d 844, 19 A.L.R.2d 288 (1950); Idaho Code Section 12-606.

"An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied." C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 73, page 116; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abatement, Survival and Revival; Section 6, page 44; Cederholm v. Loofbarrow, 2 Idaho 191, 9 P. 641 (1886).

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

This is a companion case to Martin v. Woods and Argonaut Insurance Co., 90 Idaho 107, 408 P.2d 475 (1965), wherein a full statement of the facts is set out.

Richard Martin filed a claim for workmen's compensation with the Industrial Accident Board in May 1962. At an investigational hearing held by the Board, Woods, Martin's employer, alleged that Argonaut was his surety and liable for any award granted to Martin. Argonaut denied liability, claiming that the insurance policy had expired before Martin's accident occurred. Woods' claim was based on the allegation that he was assured by Argonaut's agent that the policy would be renewed automatically as it had been once before and that Argonaut was estopped from denying liability because it had failed to notify Woods that the policy would not be renewed and that the authority of the local agent had been terminated.

The Industrial Accident Board refused to decide the issue and held that it had "no jurisdiction over the negotiations and contractual relations between employers and their insurance carriers, or of disputes between them." Argonaut was dismissed as a party defendant and Woods was held liable, as an uninsured employer, to Martin. On appeal, this court affirmed the decision of the Board.

Prior to the Board's decision, which was filed on September 17, 1962, Martin and Woods instituted this declaratory judgment action in the district court against Argonaut to determine Woods' rights on the insurance contract as against Argonaut. The trial was held on January 2, 1964, and both sides presented their evidence. On March 16, 1964, at which time an appeal from the Board's decision was pending before this court, the trial judge ordered the action dismissed. The decree stated in part:

"* * * now, it appearing to the court that the matter was formerly decided by the Industrial Accident Board, which is now pending in the Supreme Court on appeal, this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the cause * * *."

Appellants assert error to this judgment and contend the district court had jurisdiction to decide the issue. They also argue that the Board never decided the question of Argonaut's liability because it declined to assume jurisdiction on that question.

Respondent Argonaut argues that the district court was correct in dismissing the action because another action was pending between the same parties, namely, the proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board and the appeal taken from the decision therein.

The Industrial Accident Board, however, was not a tribunal of competent jurisdiction to determine the sole issue between the parties — whether Argonaut was Woods' surety — and this court so held on appeal, stating that the district court was the only court with jurisdiction to determine the issue. Martin v. Woods Argonaut Insurance Co., supra. In such circumstances there was not "another action" pending and the district court should have decided the case on its merits.

The judgment of the district court dismissing the action is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Costs to appellants.

McFADDEN, TAYLOR, SMITH and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.