MEMORANDUM and ORDER

KEVIN FOX, Magistrate Judge

By order dated July 9, 2002, plaintiff Marathon Ashland Petroleum LLC was directed to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the defendants, Equili Company, L.P. and Equili Company II, L.P., in connection with the reexamination of five individuals who had been deposed previously. Defendants' reexamination of these individuals was occasioned by plaintiff's failure to produce timely certain documents relevant to the instant litigation; accordingly, defendants were directed to limit the scope of the resumed depositions to inquiries concerning information contained in or related to those documents.

On October 16, 2002, counsel for the defendants, Arkin Kaplan LLP ("Arkin Kaplan"), submitted an invoice to counsel for the plaintiff, Healy Baillie, LLP ("Healy Baillie"), in the amount of $50,411.86, for fees and expenses incurred in connection with the above-referenced resumed depositions. Plaintiff's counsel subsequently challenged Arkin Kaplan's fee request, asserting that it was unreasonable and excessive. Specifically, plaintiff's counsel questioned whether the hourly rates charged in the invoice were those Arkin Kaplan customarily charged its clients or had charged its clients in this case. Healy Baillie also asserted, inter alia, that: (1) time spent on document review in preparation for the examination of plaintiff s witnesses, and on in-house conferences among Arkin Kaplan's attorneys and paralegals, was excessive; (2) many of the timekeeping entries included in the invoice lacked sufficiently detailed descriptions of specific tasks performed and the amount of time spent on each task; and (3) certain categories of charges, such as those associated with the review of correspondence from Healy Baillie and the drafting of responses thereto, should not have been included in the invoice.

During a telephonic conference held with the parties on December 4, 2002, the Court directed Arkin Kaplan to supplement its attorney fee application in order to provide more detailed information concerning the nature of the legal services performed by its attorneys and paralegals, the time allocated thereto and the fees charged the defendants.

On December 18, 2002, Arkin Kaplan provided to the Court a revised invoice in the amount of $48,965.39: $48,366.25 for professional services and $599.14 for expenses. Arkin Kaplan also submitted a writing in camera to the Court to explain its compensation arrangements with the defendants.

Reasonable Hourly Rates

The parties' submissions indicate that defendants incurred attorney fees through work performed by the following Arkin Kaplan personnel: Howard Kaplan ("Kaplan"), Sherrie Brown ("Brown"), Paul Niehaus ("Niehaus"), Anthony Cappo ("Cappo") and two paralegals. Arkin Kaplan has provided to the Court adequate information concerning the experience and skill of Kaplan, Brown and Niehaus; however, no comparable information has been provided concerning Cappo. Thus, the Court has no basis for determining whether the hourly rate of $275, which was assigned to Cappo by Arkin Kaplan, is reasonable. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n. 11 (1984) (finding that, when fixing a reasonable rate for attorney fees, it is appropriate for a court to consider and to apply the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for similar legal work of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation). Accordingly, in the absence of adequate information concerning Cappo's skill and experience, Cappo's hourly rate is reduced to $150 per hour, a rate that is within the range of reasonable hourly rates given to junior associates in this district. See Lucian v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that it is permissible for a court to rely upon attorney's fees approved in comparable cases, as well as its own knowledge of current market rates, in deciding what reasonable attorney fees are in the community); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Pataki, No. 93 Civ. 7146, 2003 WL 2006608, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2003) (citing cases in which a billable rate of $120 to $150 per hour was awarded to junior associates in this district).

Further, based on a review of the record in this case, the Court has concluded that an adjustment to the hourly rates at which Arkin Kaplan's personnel seek to be compensated is warranted. As the Court emphasized during its December 4, 2002 conference with the parties, although the defendants are entitled to reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in connection with the reexamination of plaintiff s witnesses, the award of such expenses should not result in a windfall to the defendants or their counsel. Accordingly, the Court has determined that the following are reasonable hourly rates for Arkin Kaplan personnel (excepting Cappo) who provided legal service(s) to the defendants: Kaplan: $405 per hour; Brown: $360 per hour; Niehaus: $270 per hour; paralegals: $99 per hour.

Reasonable Number of Hours

A review of the revised time records submitted by Arkin Kaplan indicates that, as a general matter, defendants' counsel used their time efficiently. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) ("Counsel . . . should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary."). In addition, Arkin Kaplan acknowledged and corrected errors made in its original submissions and reduced the amount of its fees and costs accordingly. Furthermore, the Court finds that the number of hours devoted to document review and to conferences between and among defendants' attorneys was essential to the competent preparation for and conduct of the depositions described earlier in this writing. Hence, the time spent on these activities was reasonable.

However, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that time billed in connection with reviewing correspondence from Healy Baillie and drafting responses thereto is beyond the scope of the Court's July 9, 2002 order and, therefore, should not have been included in the invoice. Moreover, although the revised timekeeping entries for Kaplan, Brown, Niehaus and Cappo now provide detailed accounts of the specific tasks they performed and the amount of time spent on each task, the entries for the paralegals who performed service(s) in connection with this action lack the requisite specificity. For example, the relevant entry in the case of one paralegal states that nine (9) hours were spent on "[d]eposition prep . . . including reviewing and retrieving files and documents for use in preparation and as possible exhibits." No breakdown of the time spent on each item is provided. Consequently, since the paralegals' time entries are too vague to allow the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the time spent, the total number of hours claimed in this category should be reduced by fifty percent (50%). See, e.g., Moon v. Gab Kwon, No. 99 Civ. 1 1810, 2002 WL 31512816, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2002) (reducing by fifty percent the number of hours claimed by a law student intern where time entries were impermissibly vague).

With the appropriate adjustments in hours billed and hourly rates, the attorney fees and costs incurred by the defendants are as follows:

Accordingly, the Court awards defendants attorneys' fees and costs in the sum of $40,953.72.

SO ORDERED.