Opinion
No. 33370
Decided November 25, 1953.
Judgments — Controlling points or questions actually determined — Not bar to second action but operates as estoppel, when — Second action between same parties on different claim — Final adjudication binding irrespective of different forms or causes of action.
1. In a second action between the same parties on a claim, demand or cause of action different from that involved in the first action, a final judgment in the first action does not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the second, but does operate as an estoppel with regard to the relitigation of controlling points or questions actually determined in the first action. (Paragraph four of the syllabus of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, explained.)
2. The final adjudication of a material issue by a court of competent jurisdiction binds the parties in any subsequent proceeding between or among them, irrespective of a difference in forms or causes of action.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland county.
The present action was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County by Rusby C. Mansker against Dealers Transport Company, hereinafter called Dealers, and Crafton C. Dow. Subsequently, by stipulation of the parties, Dow was dismissed from the action.
Mansker seeks damages based on negligence for personal injuries he sustained in a collision of two motor vehicles and recovered a verdict and judgment in the trial court over the claim that he was estopped from prosecuting his action for the reason that the controlling issue of negligence therein had been fully litigated in a prior action between the same parties and had been determined by verdict and judgment adverse to him.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment below, and the allowance of a motion to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record places the controversy before this court for decision.
The material facts are as follows:
On the early morning of September 14, 1949, at the intersection of U.S. routes 224 and 250 in Ashland county, Ohio, a collision occurred between a tractor-trailer and a fire truck. The tractor-trailer was being operated at the time by Mansker for and in the business of the Summit Fast Freight, Inc., hereinafter called Summit. Mansker owned the tractor and the trailer was the property of Summit. The fire truck was being driven by Dow, referred to above, for and in the business of his employer, Dealers, a corporation engaged in the transportation of new motor vehicles over the highways.
Prior to the institution of the instant action, Dealers had begun an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County against Summit and Mansker, numbered 24979 on the docket of such court, to recover damages for the destruction of the fire truck, and at the same time Dow commenced an action, numbered 24980 in the same court, against Summit and Mansker to recover damages for personal injuries received in the collision. In case No. 24979, Summit filed a cross-petition against Dealers, asking damages for the injury to its trailer and the contents thereof, and contemporaneously therewith Mansker filed a cross-petition seeking damages for injury to his tractor due to the collision.
Thereafter cases Nos. 24979 and 24980 were by agreement tried together and resulted in verdicts in favor of Dealers and Dow, respectively. Such verdicts, after the ordering and accepting of remittiturs, were reduced to judgment, and the judgments were subsequently paid.
In case No. 24979, the judgment entry, after ordering the recovery of a stipulated sum by Dealers from Summit, further ordered a dismissal of the cross-petitions of Summit and Mansker.
During the trial of cases Nos. 24979 and 24980, at the request of counsel for Summit and Mansker, the following written interrogatory was submitted to the jury apparently without objection and answered in the negative by all twelve of the jurors: "Was Crafton Dow negligent in the operation of the fire truck at the time he entered the intersection?"
In the instant action, separate amended answers were filed by Dealers and Dow, describing the final judgments rendered in cases Nos. 24979 and 24980 and alleging that such judgments barred Mansker from prosecuting his action to recover damages for the personal injuries he received in the collision.
After the filing of a reply, Dealers and Dow filed a written motion for judgment on the pleadings and in support thereof offered the pleadings, the interrogatory and the answer thereto, and the judgment entry in case No. 24979. Such motion was overruled and later the action came on for trial.
At the close of the opening statements, counsel for Dealers moved for judgment on the pleadings "for the reason of the previous judgment in favor of the defendant," which motion was overruled. After Mansker had adduced his evidence, counsel for Dealers moved for an instructed verdict in its favor, and such motion was overruled. Thereupon Dealers presented its evidence and tendered the pleadings, the interrogatory and the answer thereto, and the judgment entry in case No. 24979, which the court declined to admit. The cause was submitted to the jury, which returned its verdict for Mansker. Thereafter, and prior to the entry of judgment, counsel for Dealers moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and this motion was overruled.
Mr. J.H. Gongwer, for appellee.
Mr. Robert L. Ross, for appellant.
Both lower courts, in support of their respective judgments, relied principally on the case of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707, 166 A.L.R., 855, and particularly on the fourth paragraph of the syllabus thereof which reads:
"Injuries to both person and property suffered by the same person as a result of the same wrongful act are infringements of different rights and give rise to distinct causes of action, with the result that the recovery or denial of recovery of compensation for damages to the property is no bar to an action subsequently prosecuted for the personal injury, unless by an adverse judgment in the first action issues are determined against the plaintiff which operate as an estoppel against him in the second action."
The courts below reached the conclusion that such case is authority for the proposition that where the same person sustains injury to both his property and his person as the result of the same incident and due to the claimed negligence of another, an infringment of different rights occurs, so that he has two causes of action — one for damage to his property and the other for injury to his person; that, hence, where he prosecutes those causes of action separately, a verdict and judgment against him in one case do not preclude him from litigating the other, and his success in the other case is not prevented by an adverse result in the first; and that in such a situation res judicata or estoppel may not be invoked by his opponent.
It must be conceded there is some basis for such conclusion due to the wording of the fourth paragraph of the syllabus and certain language employed in the opinion of the Vasu case. However, we think the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Appeals relied too heavily on the first part of the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in that case and failed to apprehend the significance of the last three lines thereof read in conjunction with the fifth paragraph which recites:
"A right, question or fact in issue which was necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a judgment which has become final, cannot be disputed or litigated in a subsequent suit between the same parties, although the subsequent suit is based upon a different cause of action.
Actually, the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in the Vasu case means and was intended to mean that where a second action is instituted upon a claim, demand or cause of action different from that involved in the first action, the judgment in the first action is not a bar to the prosecution of the second, but operates only as an estoppel with regard to points or questions actually litigated and determined in the first action. See Vaughn's Admr. v. Louisville N.R. Co., 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441, 152 A.L.R., 1060; McKee, Exrx., v. Producers Refiners Corp., 170 Okla. 559, 41 P.2d 466.
Both the plaintiff and defendant herein were adverse parties in case No. 24979, referred to above in the statement of the case. In that action the decisive issue of negligence was squarely raised between them and fully litigated, and the jury, by its answer to the interrogatory and by its verdict, found the issue of negligence against the plaintiff herein, and judgment in favor of the defendant herein was rendered accordingly. The fact that in the former case damage to property was involved whereas in the present case injury to the person is the subject of the action makes no difference; the standards by which negligence is determined are the same in both instances.
All the authorities agree that the doctrine of res judicata rests on the principles that the same person should not be twice vexed over the same dispute, and that it is for the benefit of society that there be an end to litigation.
Although " res judicata" and "estoppel by judgment" have been distinguished (see for example Gordon v. Gordon [Fla.], 59 So. [2d], 40), they are certainly akin. Briefly stated, "estoppel by judgment" simply means that the final adjudication of a material issue by a court of competent jurisdiction binds the parties in any subsequent proceeding between or among them, irrespective of a difference in forms or causes of action.
Thus in the case of Hixson v. Ogg, 53 Ohio St. 361, 42 N.E. 32, the law is laid down in the syllabus as follows:
"Where issue has been joined on a material fact in an action, and the issue judicially determined and carried into judgment by a court having jurisdiction of the action, the parties to such action are concluded by such finding until the judgment is reversed or set aside. And the fact thus established cannot be retried by the same parties in any subsequent action, whether the second action is upon the same or a different subject matter from the first.
And in the much later case of Ross, an Infant, v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18, the first paragraph of the syllabus is:
"A point or a fact which was actually and directly in issue in an action or in a branch of the same action and was there passed upon and finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction may not be drawn in question in any future action or litigation between the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions or branches of the same action be identical or different.
See, also, Quinn, Aud., v. State, ex rel. Leroy, 118 Ohio St. 48, 160 N.E. 453; Wright, Admr., v. Schick, 134 Ohio St. 193, 16 N.E.2d 321, 121 A.L.R., 882; Gibson v. Solomon, 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E.2d 996, 125 A.L.R., 903; Conold v. Stern, 138 Ohio St. 352, 35 N.E.2d 133, 137 A.L.R., 1003; Norwood v. McDonald et al., Admrs., 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67.
Such holdings correspond with the generally accepted law on the subject. See 50 Corpus Juris Secundum, 141, Judgments, Section 686; 30 American Jurisprudence, 920, Section 178.
It is our view that by reason of the verdict and final judgment in case No. 24979, mentioned above, wherein the plaintiff and defendant in the present action were opposing parties and wherein the decisive issue of negligence was litigated and definitely adjudicated adversely to such plaintiff, he is concluded thereby to relitigate such question. Such issue being a material and decisive one, entry of judgment for the defendant herein is required.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and final judgment is rendered for the defendant, Dealers Transport Company.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MIDDLETON, TAFT, HART and STEWART, JJ., concur.
LAMNECK, J., not participating.