Opinion
B302813
06-20-2022
RAFAEL MADRIGAL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION AND GOVERNMENT CLAIMS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.
California Innocence Project, Justin Brooks, Alexander Simpson and Raquel Cohen for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell and Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorneys General, Barton Bowers, Kenneth N. Sokoler, Mark R. Beckington, Dina Petrushenko and Todd Grabarsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS172571, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
California Innocence Project, Justin Brooks, Alexander Simpson and Raquel Cohen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell and Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorneys General, Barton Bowers, Kenneth N. Sokoler, Mark R. Beckington,
Dina Petrushenko and Todd Grabarsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Deputy Attorney General Kenneth N. Sokoler appeared as counsel for respondent California Victim Compensation Board in this matter from April 2017 through the 2021 briefing in this appeal. On January 3, 2022, Mr. Sokoler sent a letter to the court stating he "is not the attorney of record for the California Victim Compensation Board," and that he represents "the State of California, the Real Party in Interest." On January 4, 2022, Deputy Attorney General Todd Grabarsky sent the court a letter stating he "ha[d] been assigned to represent the Respondent, California Victim Compensation Board, in this matter." Mr. Sokoler nevertheless presented oral argument in this appeal on behalf of the Board.
EGERTON, J.
Rafael Madrigal appeals from a judgment upholding the decision of the California Victim Compensation Board (the Board) to deny his request for compensation for wrongful imprisonment under Penal Code section 4900 et seq. Madrigal contends the Board did not proceed in the manner the law requires and its findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We find no prejudicial abuse of discretion and affirm.
The caption in this case and some of the pleadings refer to the Board as the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. The name of the entity as of June 2016 is the California Victim Compensation Board. (See Gov. Code, § 13900; Penal Code, § 4900.)
References to statutes are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The crime and the eyewitness testimony
On the afternoon of July 5, 2000, Ricardo Aguilera was visiting Michael and Carlos M. Their home was in the territory of the Marianna Maravilla gang. Michael had been a member of the gang. (Madrigal I.)
We take our discussion of the facts from our opinion in Madrigal's direct appeal, People v. Madrigal (Oct. 17, 2005, B170431) [nonpub. opn.] (Madrigal I), the opinion by our colleagues in Division 8 in an earlier appeal in this case, Madrigal v. California Victim Comp. & Government Claims Bd. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1108 (Madrigal II), the transcripts from Madrigal's trial, testimony given at a federal court hearing on Madrigal's petition for a writ of habeas corpus (discussed below), and other sources within the administrative record.
Sometime between 3:15 and 3:20 p.m., Aguilera and Michael were outside when a black truck with two men in it drove past and slowed. Michael recognized one of the men as Francisco Olivares, known as "Go-Go," from the rival Ford Maravilla gang. Aguilera and Michael ran inside to tell Michael's mother, then went back outside to bring in the mother's other children. The truck stopped and the passenger asked Aguilera where he was from. Aguilera replied he was from nowhere. The passenger pulled out a gun. Aguilera ran toward the residence. He was shot in the back of the head but survived. (Madrigal I.)
Ricardo Aguilera
At trial, Aguilera testified he had gone outside to move a car. A black truck and a white car passed by. Aguilera got a "quick look" at the driver of the truck. The truck came back around and stopped; from inside the truck, someone yelled, "[W]here are you from?" Aguilera couldn't tell if it was the driver or the passenger who yelled.
The truck got very close to Aguilera. Aguilera saw the passenger "real quick." The passenger was "like . . . sticking his head out." Aguilera didn't see the passenger with any kind of weapon. Aguilera testified he didn't remember telling detectives that the passenger had pulled out a gun and shot at him but "maybe" he had. Aguilera didn't see anyone that day wearing a white baseball cap with an orange brim.
When asked at trial if he saw the driver or the passenger in the courtroom, Aguilera responded, "No. I don't." Aguilera said a detective showed him some photographs a couple of weeks after the shooting and "asked [him] to pick out someone who most look[ed] like the person who shot [him]." Aguilera chose Madrigal's photo (position number four) but wrote "lighter skin" because he "thought it looked like the person who shot [him] only with lighter skin." Aguilera then testified, however, that the photo he'd chosen was of the driver, and he didn't recall telling the detective it was the shooter. Aguilera said he didn't see the person in court whose photo he'd circled. Aguilera testified he didn't remember telling the prosecutor he didn't want to be labeled a rat.
At trial, Detective Ignacio Lugo testified he'd interviewed Aguilera at the hospital. Aguilera told Lugo he'd seen the passenger pull out a gun. He recognized the driver as Go-Go from Ford. Aguilera said he'd seen the shooter a couple of times before at Baby's Liquor store.
A few weeks later, Lugo showed Aguilera some photographs. Aguilera picked out Madrigal's photo. Aguilera told Lugo the person in the photo had the same facial features. Lugo first testified Aguilera said the shooter had lighter skin; later he testified Aguilera had said the shooter had darker skin.
Detectives never created a six-pack photographic lineup containing Madrigal's photograph. They did create one containing Olivares's photo, which apparently was People's Exhibit 6 at trial. (Given that the trial took place 20 years ago, the record on appeal does not include the trial exhibits.) Detectives showed some witnesses-including Aguilera and Carlos M.-a page containing 10 photographs. This seems to have been Exhibit 7. Exhibit 7 looks like a page from a so-called "gang book." The 10 photos include one of a woman, who is holding a placard in front of her with a name, presumably hers. In another of the photos, a man is holding a placard with a name. Neither of those names, of course, is Madrigal. The photo in position number four of Madrigal was taken when he was 19 or 20 years old. He was 25 at the time of the shooting. (Madrigal I.)
Lugo testified that, about a week before trial, Aguilera had told the prosecutor he wanted to get on with his life and not be known as a "rata," or rat.
Carlos M.
Before the shots were fired, while his mother was on the telephone with the police, Carlos had gone outside to warn the children, including 13-year-old Salvador H. (Madrigal I.) Carlos saw the black truck and "some bald kid." At trial, Carlos testified, "A little gangbanger. You know how they all look the same." The passenger's window was down. Carlos was 18 to 20 feet from the truck and the passenger, "at an angle." He testified "the sunlight off the reflection kind of covered the passenger's face"; the view he had of the passenger was strictly a side view because he couldn't see through the windshield. The passenger never leaned out of the vehicle.
Carlos heard the passenger ask Aguilera where he was from. (Madrigal I.) Within "seconds" of seeing the black truck, shots were fired and Carlos ducked. Carlos told the police the passenger was wearing a white baseball cap with an orange brim and a button-type short-sleeved brown and black checkered shirt. Carlos also said the shirt was a "Pendleton-type" shirt. The passenger's hat was "down low." When asked how he knew the passenger was bald if he was wearing a baseball cap, Carlos replied the passenger's hairstyle was shaved on the sides.
Carlos told the police the passenger was Hispanic, 19 or 20 years old, with a light mustache and goatee and a "fairly dark," bad complexion, with acne and little scars. At trial, Carlos testified he'd told police the passenger was probably in his early to mid-20s. Carlos stated twice in his testimony that he hadn't seen any gun, but then said he'd told police he thought it was a revolver. He did not see the gun being fired.
About six days after the shooting, detectives showed Carlos photographs-apparently the same 10-pack (Exhibit 7). Carlos chose Madrigal's photograph. Carlos wrote, "The person identified is the person I believe shot Carlos [sic] on July 5, 2000." Carlos circled Madrigal's photo and wrote, "The passenger in the black Dodge Ram shot Ricardo."
Authorities-joined by Madrigal's counsel-made several attempts to get Carlos to attend a live lineup. Carlos testified he was "forced to" "against [his] own will." Carlos said his family had received "paperwork off the streets"-apparently a police report-with his name as a witness. Carlos's mother had been followed to work and her car egged; "a car full of fat chicks" followed Carlos; and his brother Michael was shot at and "barely grazed."
Carlos finally attended a live lineup in July 2001. Carlos wrote, "I can't recognize any of them." But at trial about six months later, when the prosecutor asked Carlos if he saw the person in the courtroom who'd been the passenger in the truck, Carlos answered, "Yeah," and identified Madrigal. (Madrigal I.) When asked if Madrigal was the same person whose photograph he'd circled, Carlos responded, "Yeah, but he looks different so-." The prosecutor asked, "What looks different?" Carlos answered, "Hair and gained weight, I guess."
As Madrigal had been in the live lineup, the prosecutor asked Carlos at trial why he hadn't identified him. Carlos mentioned the passage of time. The prosecutor asked if he was concerned about "the things that happened to [his] family." Carlos replied, "Well, I can't say that it wasn't in my mind at the time but at the time I really didn't recognize him."
When asked on cross-examination if he'd expected the shooter to be in the courtroom when he came to trial to testify, Carlos said yes, although no one told him that.
Salvador H.
On July 5, 2000, Salvador was skateboarding outside his father's house when he heard what sounded like fireworks. He looked toward the sound and saw a black truck. Salvador was 20 or 25 feet away from the truck. He saw "[a] guy coming out with a gun," leaning out the window of the truck and holding the gun in both hands. Salvador yelled, "[D]uck!"
Salvador testified he was able to see the shooter's face, and he identified Madrigal at trial as that person. Salvador saw the shooter from the neck up; he couldn't see what the man was wearing. He was not able to see the driver's face.
Salvador told a deputy on the day of the shooting that the passenger in the truck had a shaved head and a goatee but no mustache. Salvador described a "goatee" as being hair on the sides of the chin but not in the middle. Salvador didn't see anyone in a white baseball cap with an orange brim or a brown checkered shirt.
About a month after the shooting, Salvador was shown photographs, including Olivares's photo but not Madrigal's.On two occasions, Salvador was supposed to attend a live lineup but he didn't go. On the day he testified at trial, Salvador and his sister Jessica met with prosecutors who showed them photographs, but not a photograph of Madrigal. Salvador anticipated that, when he walked into the courtroom, the shooter would be there.
Salvador testified he was shown a photo of Madrigal by police and identified him. But Salvador did not recognize the document (apparently Exhibit 7) that included Madrigal's photo. (He did recognize Exhibit 6, the photo array with Olivares.) Although Salvador insisted he'd identified Madrigal from some sort of photograph, a prosecution exhibit with Salvador's signature-but not his handwriting-stated, "I cannot identify the person involved in the crime from any of the photographs in this folder." A detective testified at trial he couldn't remember "whether Salvador H. was ever given an opportunity to select [Madrigal's] photograph from a group of photographs"; that would've been documented in the file but there was no such entry. (Madrigal I.) At sidebar, both defense counsel and the prosecutor told the court they hadn't seen any photographic identification of Madrigal by Salvador.
Salvador's sister Jessica was 17 in July 2000. She told police she'd seen a black truck. At a live lineup about a year later, Jessica picked out both Madrigal and Olivares. She told a detective at the time that Madrigal was the driver. But when asked at trial if she'd seen Madrigal in the truck, Jessica answered, "No." Jessica remembered the driver had a goatee and Madrigal had one at the lineup. At trial, Jessica testified she believed Olivares was the driver. She said Madrigal was not the driver and she'd picked him because he was the only one at the lineup with a goatee. On cross-examination, Jessica admitted she'd picked another man out as the driver at the lineup who was neither Olivares nor Madrigal. In her trial testimony, Jessica stated four times that she was not able to see the passenger, did not see the passenger, and "never saw the passenger at all."
When police arrested Madrigal about two weeks after the shooting, he didn't have a goatee. (Madrigal I.)
2. The trial and Madrigal's alibi defense
Olivares and Madrigal were tried together in 2002. Madrigal's defense was alibi: he was at work in Rancho Cucamonga. Madrigal's workplace was about a 50-minute drive from the scene of the shooting. (Madrigal I.)
Madrigal's supervisor at work, Steven Finley, testified he didn't have an independent recollection of July 5, 2000 but he would've noticed had Madrigal left before 3:00 p.m. because production would have stopped. Madrigal operated a particular laminating machine; he was the only one who could run it "efficient[ly]." However, production records showed the laminating machine stopped running at 1:50 p.m.; after that, employees were loading labels and then cleaning up. (Madrigal I.)
Madrigal (or someone) punched in on Madrigal's timecard at 7:25 a.m. on July 5, then out for lunch at 11:30 a.m., then back in at 11:58 a.m. But there was no stamp on Madrigal's timecard for punching out at 3:30 p.m., the usual end of his shift. Finley testified he hand-wrote "3:32" on the card. Finley said he'd told the police that both Madrigal and his brother Victor, who also worked there, were at work all day. Finley testified Madrigal and Victor carpooled to and from work every day.
On cross-examination, Finley testified he couldn't recall if he'd had a conversation with Madrigal on July 6 about not punching out on July 5, but he had spoken with Victor about it both the next day and several weeks later. Nor could Finley remember if Madrigal and Victor had left together on July 5.
Finley said it was possible for an employee to leave early without getting permission, but he didn't recall that ever happening. An employee "[p]robably" could have left 30 to 60 minutes early without Finley noticing. Finley was sure Madrigal had worked that day but not sure if he'd worked his entire shift. (Madrigal I.)
On redirect, however, Finley testified he was "positive" Madrigal had worked the entire shift. But on re-cross, he admitted he'd told Lugo that he wasn't absolutely positive if Madrigal had worked the entire shift. Finley remembered Madrigal being there before and after lunch but he didn't punch out at the end of his shift.
Madrigal's cousin, Ricardo Pimenta, testified Madrigal attended Pimenta's wedding on July 1, 2000, and Madrigal didn't have a goatee at that time.
3. The verdict, motion for a new trial, sentence, and direct appeal
The jury convicted Madrigal of the attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder of Aguilera. The jury found true allegations that Madrigal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to Aguilera, and that he committed the crime for the benefit of a gang. (Madrigal I.)
The jury convicted Olivares as well. In September 2003, another panel of this court affirmed Olivares's conviction. (People v. Olivares (Sept. 23, 2003, B160522, B167012) [nonpub. opn.].) In September 2011 a federal district court denied Olivares's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Madrigal moved for a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence." In June 2001, a Ford Maravilla gang member named Manuel Mendoza was arrested with a gun. It matched a bullet found at the scene of the Aguilera shooting. A firearms examiner's report stated it could not be determined whether a second bullet-removed from Aguilera's head-also had been fired from that gun. (Madrigal I.) At a hearing on the new trial motion, Madrigal called Mendoza as a witness. Mendoza stated his name and date of birth, but then asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent on every question Madrigal's counsel asked him.
Madrigal testified on his own behalf at the hearing. Madrigal said he was at work at the time of the shooting. He described being present at his sister's house in June 2000 when members of Ford Maravilla discussed who had killed their fellow gang member "Fat Boy" on June 1 and what to do about it. Madrigal also described interactions among himself, Olivares, and Mendoza when they were all in the county jail at the same time. Madrigal said Olivares berated Mendoza for being caught with the gun and Mendoza replied, "[I]f I known [sic] you would have acted like a little bitch by doing this I would never have done" "nothing with you." In Madrigal's view, Mendoza was referring to the shooting of Aguilera, although Mendoza never actually said he was the shooter. (Madrigal I.)
Madrigal also testified about a document marked as Defense Exhibit A, which was apparently a letter or "declaration" Madrigal dated, signed, and gave to Mendoza. The record on appeal does not include the declaration but reportedly Madrigal stated in the letter he had "lie[d] to implicate these other people." Mendoza's family gave the declaration to the prosecutor just before Mendoza was called as a witness. Madrigal testified Olivares threatened him and he "had to" sign the declaration or he was "going to get dealt with."
The trial court denied the new trial motion. The court sentenced Madrigal to life plus 28 years to life in the state prison. (Madrigal I.)
Madrigal erroneously states the trial court sentenced him to "25 years to life without parole plus 28 years on the gang enhancement." In fact, the court sentenced Madrigal to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement plus the midterm of three years on the gang enhancement.
On appeal, Madrigal contended his trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective. He also filed a companion petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On October 17, 2005, this court affirmed Madrigal's conviction and denied his writ petition. (Madrigal I.) On January 4, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied review. (S139064.)
In October 2006 Madrigal filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Madrigal asserted ineffective assistance of counsel as well as a Brady violation in the prosecution's failure to produce potentially exculpatory evidence that Mendoza was the shooter. One of the 23 exhibits submitted with the petition was a transcript of an August 2001 recorded jail telephone call between Olivares and his girlfriend in which Olivares said Madrigal had been asking "who really did it" and Olivares told him, "[I]t[']s none of your fucking business." The California Supreme Court denied Madrigal's writ petition.
See Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
4. Madrigal's federal habeas petition
In November 2007, Madrigal filed a petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court appointed counsel for Madrigal. Counsel from the California Innocence Project also represented Madrigal.
Madrigal also again raised a Brady claim. (See Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83.) The federal court ultimately rejected that claim.
On November 3, 2008, Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman conducted an evidentiary hearing. Madrigal testified on his own behalf. Madrigal said that, from 1:50 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. on July 5, 2000, he worked on setting up an order, and he didn't leave early that day. He "didn't clock out" until 3:30 and left with Victor.
In the spring of 2001 Madrigal asked Victor to ask around about who had been involved in the Aguilera shooting. Madrigal suspected Mendoza had been involved because-when he, Mendoza, and Olivares all were in county jail-he overheard Mendoza tell Olivares that he'd been arrested with the gun "they had used." Madrigal's moniker was Mugsy and Mendoza's was Dreamer. Olivares came into Madrigal's cell and told him to stop Victor from asking around about "who did this." It was, Olivares said, "[N]one of your business."
Robert Howards, Madrigal's "ultimate supervisor" at work, also testified at the evidentiary hearing. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112.) Howards testified about a work "lineup"-a "production sheet"-for July 5, 2000. The "operator" would fill out the production sheet; in this case, that operator was Madrigal. The sheet showed Madrigal completed two "partial" orders, ending at 1:20 p.m. According to the sheet, from 1:50 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Madrigal worked on "prefolding" for a different order.
Howards testified Finley would have told him if Madrigal had been absent from any part of his shift. Other employees "[p]robably" would've told him as well; no one did. An employee who abandoned his shift without permission would be fired. Howards said he was "real certain" Madrigal was there until at least 3:00 p.m. that day. On cross-examination, Howards reiterated that the company was pretty small, and if someone were missing, he'd know it.
Madrigal's brother Victor also testified. Victor said he and Madrigal went to work together that day and left together at 3:30 p.m. Victor testified Madrigal, while in county jail, asked him to try to find out who shot Aguilera.
Madrigal's counsel presented the recording of Olivares's August 2001 jail call with his girlfriend Gloria. In the call, Olivares told Gloria he'd had a fight with Madrigal. Olivares said he'd heard Madrigal "told his brother to go find out who really did it." Olivares told Madrigal, "[W]hat the fuck you wanna know for, it's none of your fucking business." According to Olivares, Madrigal asked, "[W]hat you think I'm going throw rat [sic]," and Olivares responded, "[W]ell it's better . . . this way that you don't know nothing that way I can't say if you rat you know what I mean?" Oliveras referred to the way Madrigal looked at him and Dreamer (Mendoza), adding, "So he either already knows but . . . he don't know shit you know, he don't know what happened cause he's, he's I know he's been asking cause when I tell him I didn't have shit to do with it you know?"
After post-hearing briefing, on July 15, 2009, Judge Goldman issued a 59-page report and recommendation concluding Madrigal's trial counsel Andrew Stein committed a number of errors that "deprived [Madrigal] of a fundamentally fair trial and severely undermine[d] the Court's confidence in the jury's verdict." First, Stein failed to interview Howards or to call him as a witness at trial. "Howards would have provided [Madrigal] with a complete alibi for the crime and undermined the eyewitness identification placing [Madrigal] at the scene of the Aguilera shooting, which was the only evidence against [him]." Judge Goldman found Howards's testimony "certain and unequivocal." As a "disinterested third party," "Howards would have made a very strong witness on [Madrigal's] behalf at trial because his testimony was clear, straightforward, and credible."
Second, while Victor-as Madrigal's brother-was "not a disinterested witness, he nevertheless strongly corroborated [Madrigal's] alibi defense." Had Stein presented Victor's testimony at trial-even though Victor "was a gang member and on parole"-"it would have clearly undermined the prosecution's relatively weak case against [Madrigal]."
Third, Stein testified he could not remember if he'd even listened to Olivares's jail call, much less tried to present the recording at trial in support of a third-party culpability defense. In Judge Goldman's view, Olivares's conversation with Madrigal about" 'who really did it, '" which Olivares then related to Gloria in the call, was about the Aguilera shooting. This failure "to present highly reliable and exculpatory evidence in support of a defense that someone else, namely Olivares and Manuel Mendoza, committed the shooting" was "egregious," "deficient performance."
Judge Goldman also found "egregious" Stein's failure to call Madrigal to testify in his own defense at trial "after promising the jury in opening statement that he would do so." The day before the defense rested, Stein told the trial judge he had planned to put Madrigal on the stand but then he learned Madrigal was a suspect in another shooting. The attorney general apparently failed to bring this fact to Judge Goldman's attention in the habeas proceeding.
On September 3, 2009, United States District Judge Gary A. Feess issued an order accepting and adopting Judge Goldman's findings and recommendations, and granting Madrigal a conditional writ of habeas corpus. On October 1, 2009, Judge Goldman ordered Madrigal released on bail pending the government's appeal. In his order, Judge Goldman stated, "I also must note that there is compelling evidence in this case that [Madrigal] is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted." The judge referred to the alibi testimony and the Olivares jail call, adding "[t]he eyewitness identifications were conflicting and unreliable."
5. The prosecution's post-habeas investigation and the dismissal of the charge
In December 2009, authorities met with Howards. They showed him Madrigal's time card for July 5, 2000, which Howards had never seen. The sheriff's department's supplemental report of the interview states the timecard showed Madrigal clocked out at 3:00 p.m. on July 5. Howards said he had no independent recollection that Madrigal was at work until 3:00 p.m. but Finley would know.
While the supplemental report refers to 3:00 p.m., Finley's handwriting on the card seems to say "3:32."
In early January 2011, authorities interviewed Victor, who was represented by counsel. Victor said he had nothing to do with Madrigal's timecard for July 5, and he hadn't talked to Finley about it. When asked why Madrigal didn't punch out that day, Victor replied Madrigal had told him "Steve would take care of it." Victor said Madrigal was there with him when Victor punched out at 3:30 p.m. and they then drove to Madrigal's house.
On February 11, 2011, authorities met with Olivares at the prison in Lancaster. Olivares said he'd heard the recording of his jail call with Gloria and "it ha[d] nothing to do with" the Aguilera shooting. Olivares told the authorities Madrigal was trying to find out who'd shot at another gang member known as Porky. When asked if Madrigal had been involved in the Aguilera shooting, Olivares responded, "He was involved." In answer to the question, "[W]as he the shooter?" Olivares replied, "Yeah."
Porky was Michael M., Carlos M.'s brother.
Olivares said the notion that Mendoza had been involved in the Aguilera shooting was "bullshit." According to Olivares, the shooting wasn't planned; Madrigal had gone "out there to see" a girl "and it just happened." Madrigal was in the passenger seat. As for the timecard, Madrigal told Olivares "he had all that shit . . . covered," "[b]y his boss I guess it was."
The prosecutor emphasized to Olivares that he wanted only the truth. When asked if he'd be willing to testify, Olivares first said he would. Olivares then asked if his testimony would be "in exchange for a date," presumably referring to parole. Eventually, Olivares said he "would just plea[d] the 5th," because he had an appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In July 2011, back in the superior court, the People announced "unable to proceed" on a retrial and the court dismissed the case against Madrigal. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1112-1113.)
In 2016, Madrigal filed a motion in the federal district court "for a finding of innocence" under section 1485.55, subdivision (f). Judge Stephen V. Wilson denied the motion on February 18, 2016 noting, "[T]he court is aware of no federal basis for [the motion]." Judge Wilson stated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) grants federal courts jurisdiction only over cases involving" 'a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court.'" Madrigal was "not such a person."
6. Madrigal's claim for compensation, the Board's decision, the administrative mandamus action, and Madrigal II
In September 2011 Madrigal filed a "Claim for Wrongful Felony Conviction" with the Board under section 4900 et seq. seeking $281,700 in compensation for the time he was incarcerated. Madrigal stated he was "innocent of the crime for which he was charged and convicted and [he] served over 7 years in prison for a crime he did not commit." The Attorney General opposed Madrigal's claim.
On June 3, 2013, a hearing officer conducted a hearing at which Madrigal testified. On November 18, 2013, the hearing officer issued a proposed decision, recommending the Board deny Madrigal's claim. The hearing officer stated he'd "determined that Madrigal ha[d] not proven by a preponderance of the evidence" that he had not committed the crime. Before the Board could act on the proposed decision, however, new legislation took effect in January 2014 that made binding on the Board certain factual findings from habeas corpus proceedings that went to the issue of a claimant's actual innocence. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.)
The administrative record does not include a transcript of Madrigal's testimony at that hearing.
The new legislation also made binding factual findings made by a court in considering a motion to vacate a judgment under section 1473.6 or an application for a certificate of factual innocence. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1114-1116.)
The parties submitted letters addressing the application of the new legislation. On February 14, 2014, the hearing officer issued another proposed decision. The officer stated that, because the Attorney General had contested the factual allegations at the hearing on Madrigal's habeas petition, the Board was not bound by the district court's findings on the witnesses' credibility. The hearing officer again concluded Madrigal hadn't proved he had not committed the crime, and he again recommended the Board deny the claim. On March 20, 2014, by a 2-to-1 vote, the Board denied Madrigal's claim.
On April 21, 2014, Madrigal filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court. The court (Judge James C. Chalfant) concluded the habeas corpus petition findings were not binding on the Attorney General, the hearing officer, or the Board under the provisions amended or added to the Penal Code by the new legislation. Madrigal appealed and Division 8 of this court reversed in a 2-to-1 decision. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1108, 1113, 1116.)
The Madrigal II majority acknowledged "the apparent conflict" between one of the then-new statutes-section 1485.55, subdivision (a), which in contested proceedings calls for the binding effect only of findings of actual innocence based on new evidence-and an amendment to section 4903, subdivision (b), which "seems to call for the binding effect of findings made in all habeas corpus proceedings." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1115, 1117.) The court turned to the legislative history, then observed:
"[T]he Legislature provided for three scenarios: (1) at uncontested habeas corpus and other such proceedings, the factual findings underlying the court's findings are binding (§ 1485.5, subd. (a)); (2) the findings from contested proceedings are binding and compensation is awarded without a hearing if the findings are based on new evidence that points unerringly to innocence (§ 1485.55, subd. (a)); and (3) in all other scenarios that result in a hearing before the Board, previous trial court findings and credibility determinations that do not point unerringly to actual innocence are binding, with the Board bound by those findings when evaluating the evidence as part of its determination whether to award compensation. (§ 4903, subd. (b).)" (Id. at pp. 1118-1119.)
The Madrigal II court seemed to conclude Madrigal's case fell under the third scenario. The majority said the federal court's finding that the testimony of supervisor Howards at the habeas corpus hearing was credible was binding on the Board. The court noted the Legislature's intent was "to streamline the compensation process and ensure consistency between the Board's compensation determinations and earlier court proceedings related to the validity of a prisoner's conviction," "including those not based on actual innocence." Accordingly, "[a]ll material factual findings from the habeas proceeding would be binding on the board, not just those favorable to the claimant." And the Board "would have access to all of the prosecution's trial evidence." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1118-1119.)
The presiding justice of Division 8 dissented. She stated the statutory provisions did not conflict with one another. Rather, they "set out a consistent statutory framework which directs that the Board is bound by credibility determinations and findings forming the basis for orders made by a state or federal court in habeas corpus proceedings only where the district attorney or the Attorney General does not contest the predicate factual allegations." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120.)
The Madrigal II court rejected Madrigal's contention that "the district court's findings were tantamount to finding him actually innocent, mandating an award of compensation by the Board." The court agreed with the Board that "the nature of those findings fell short of that standard." Noting the court had granted Madrigal's writ petition "on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel," the court stated, "Although the district court made findings concerning the weakness of the prosecution's case and the strength of Madrigal's alibi evidence, it did so in the context of determining whether Madrigal had been prejudiced by his trial lawyer's omissions." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1119.) The court also rejected "Madrigal's assertion that the findings made when he was granted bail are also binding." (Id. at p. 1120.)
The Madrigal II court reversed the Board's order denying Madrigal's compensation claim and directed the Board to hold a new hearing that gave binding effect to the district court's habeas corpus findings in a manner consistent with the Madrigal II court's decision. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120.)
7. The Board's second denial of Madrigal's claim
On July 10, 2017, a different hearing officer, Laura Simpton, conducted another hearing. Madrigal appeared through counsel. Neither Madrigal nor the Attorney General presented any new evidence, and neither side filed a post-hearing supplemental brief.
On November 17, 2017, Simpton issued a 38-page proposed decision, again finding Madrigal had failed to prove his innocence and recommending the Board deny his claim. Simpton listed five factual findings by the federal court by which the Board was bound: (1) Olivares's jail call was evidence of Madrigal's noninvolvement in the Aguilera shooting; (2) Madrigal's testimony at the habeas hearing that he was willing to testify was more credible than Stein's testimony that he wasn't; (3) Howards was a credible alibi witness whose testimony was certain and unequivocal; (4) Victor's testimony was highly corroborative of Madrigal's alibi defense; and (5) the prosecution's case was relatively weak and depended on conflicting and inconsistent eyewitness accounts. However, citing Madrigal II, Simpton stated, "[N]one of these findings by the federal court amount[s] to a determination of actual innocence."
Simpton summarized the facts "based upon the entire record before [the Board]," which included the trial transcripts, transcripts of the hearing on Madrigal's new trial motion (including exhibits), transcripts of the habeas hearing before Judge Goldman (including exhibits), and transcripts of post-habeas law enforcement interviews with multiple witnesses.
Simpton discussed the trial testimony of eyewitnesses Aguilera, Carlos M., and Salvador H. Simpton noted that Mendoza's photograph was included in the 10-picture document (Exhibit 7 at trial) shown to Aguilera and Carlos M., yet neither of them chose Mendoza's photo as the shooter. Simpton summarized Madrigal's testimony at the hearing on his motion for a new trial that he was present when fellow gang members discussed retribution for Fat Boy's murder, as well as his admission of lying in the declaration he gave Mendoza. Simpton detailed Olivares's statements to authorities in the 2011 interview, in which he "explicitly and unequivocally confirmed that Madrigal shot Aguilera." Simpton noted, "Olivares made these incriminating statements without any promise of leniency."
As for Madrigal's July 5 timecard, Simpton observed that the date and time stamped on the card for arrival and lunch "were accurate and only appeared on the wrong row"-Monday (a company holiday) when July 5 was actually a Wednesday. Simpton stated Madrigal's failure to clock out at the end of the work day was "inexplicabl[e]," adding, "This omission is particularly suspicious considering that Madrigal's brother did 'clock-out' at 3:30 p.m., supposedly while Madrigal was standing next to him." Simpton also noted the inconsistency between Victor's testimony about Madrigal's timecard and Finley's: Finley testified Victor had spoken with him about Madrigal's timecard for July 5; however, in his January 2011 interview with prosecutors, Victor said he never talked to Finley about it. Simpton noted Judge Goldman had not "render[ed] any factual findings as to Victor's credibility."
As for Howards's testimony, Simpton "reject[ed] Madrigal's assertion that a court's finding of credibility automatically constitutes a finding of accuracy." Simpton stated, "Credible means believable, whereas accurate means correct. A witness may be convincing yet mistaken." (Footnote omitted.) Simpton acknowledged Howards testified he was" 'real certain'" Madrigal was at work until at least 3:00 p.m., based on Madrigal's timecard "and production log, Finley's oversight, and workplace dynamics." However, Simpton said, while Finley "believed that Madrigal was at work the entire day," he "acknowledged it was possible for Madrigal to have left up to an hour early (i.e., 2:30 p.m.) without his knowledge."
Finley testified that, while he was sure Madrigal had worked that day, he was not sure he'd worked his entire shift. In Howards's 2009 interview with prosecutors, Howards saw Madrigal's timecard for the first time; he said he had no independent recollection that Madrigal was at work until 3:00 p.m. but Finley would know. Simpton noted the Madrigal II court had "confirmed" that a finding of prejudice resulting from a constitutionally ineffective lawyer was "not tantamount to a determination of innocence."
Ultimately, Simpton concluded Madrigal had not carried his burden of proof. Simpton stated her conclusion was "entirely consistent with the federal court's decision that Madrigal's criminal conviction was constitutionally infirm due to counsel's ineffective representation at trial." Simpton reiterated, "[T]hree separate eyewitnesses identifi[ed] Madrigal as the shooter, two of [whom] have never . . . recanted." "Howards did not personally observe Madrigal at work [when Aguilera was shot]. Madrigal did not clock out at the end of the day. Madrigal did not operate the specialized labeling machine after 1:20 p.m." Olivares "confess[ed]" to Madrigal's and his "guilt." Madrigal made "contradictory statements" and "admissions linking him[self] to the crime." For all of these reasons, Simpton recommended the Board deny Madrigal's claim for compensation.
On January 18, 2018, the Board-again by a 2-to-1 vote- denied Madrigal's claim.
8. Madrigal's second action for administrative mandamus
On February 20, 2018, Madrigal filed another petition for a writ of mandate. The parties briefed the matter and submitted the administrative record and a joint appendix to the superior court. The court held a hearing on October 3, 2019. On that same date, the court issued a 20-page written decision denying Madrigal's petition.
The court took the "factual background" from the federal district court decision, then summarized the evidence at trial. The court recited the evidence at the hearing on Madrigal's motion for a new trial, the evidence at his habeas proceeding before the magistrate judge, and the court's findings of fact in its decision granting Madrigal's writ petition. The court noted the district attorney's post-habeas investigation.
The court then set forth the standard of review under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b). The court cited the then-governing law contained in sections 4900-4904, 1485.5, and 1485.55, and discussed Madrigal II in detail. The court summarized the district court's findings about the testimony of Howards and Victor, as well as Olivares's jailhouse conversation with his girlfriend. The court stated the Board "was entitled to weigh Howards' alibi testimony against other evidence in the record, including eyewitness identification"; the Board also was "free to make its own credibility determination" about Victor's testimony; and it was permissible for the Board to find Olivares's recorded conversation did not prove Madrigal's innocence. The court noted, "The District Court did not find that [Madrigal] was actually innocent, and it did not find that the statements made by Olivares . . . were necessarily true."
As discussed below, the Legislature significantly amended the governing statutes, effective January 1, 2022.
The court concluded Madrigal had "fail[ed] to show that the Board did not proceed in the manner required by law when it considered and gave binding effect to the District Court's factual findings and credibility determinations," and substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. Citing Tennison v. California Victim Comp. & Government Claims Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1173 (Tennison), the court stated Madrigal was required to "establish his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence." The court said he had not done so. The court noted "the Board considered that four witnesses identified [Madrigal] as the shooter": Carlos M., Salvador H., Aguilera, and Olivares.
DISCUSSION
1. The compensation system for wrongful imprisonment
" 'California has long had a system for compensating exonerated inmates for the time they spent unlawfully imprisoned.'" (Larsen v. California Victim Comp. Bd. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 112, 123 (Larsen), review granted Aug. 25, 2021, S269406. See also People v. Etheridge (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 800, 806.) "[I]f a person has been imprisoned or incarcerated for a crime, and that crime 'was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her,' he or she may present a claim for compensation against the state to the California Victim Compensation Board . . . for the injury he or she sustained by reason of the erroneous imprisonment or incarceration." (Souliotes v. California Victim Comp. Bd. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 73, 75, review granted June 9, 2021, S267930.)
Former section 4904 provided, "If the evidence shows . . . the claimant has sustained injury through [his or her] erroneous conviction and imprisonment, the [Board] shall report the facts of the case and its conclusions to the next Legislature, with a recommendation that the Legislature make an appropriation for the purpose of indemnifying the claimant for the injury. The amount of the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to one hundred forty dollars . . . per day of incarceration served . . . ." (Former § 4904. See Larsen, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123-124.)
Sections 4900-4904, 1485.5, and 1485.55 govern Board proceedings. At the time of Madrigal's proceedings before the Board on remand from Madrigal II, and in the superior court in 2019, section 4903, subdivision (b) provided, "In a hearing before the board, the factual findings and credibility determinations establishing the court's basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the board." (Former § 4903, subd. (b). See also former § 1485.5, subd. (c), and § 1485.5, subd. (d) ["the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus . . . shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board";" 'express factual findings' are findings established as the basis for the court's ruling or order"].)
Before 2022, section 4903, subdivision (a) placed the burden of proof on the claimant: "The claimant shall prove the facts set forth in the statement constituting the claim, including the fact that the crime . . ., if committed, was not committed by the claimant." (Former § 4903, subd. (a). See also former § 1485.55, subd. (b) ["if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus . . ., the person may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime . . . was not committed by the petitioner"].) As we noted, the superior court denied Madrigal's writ petition, stating, "A reasonable mind could conclude . . . that [Madrigal] did not prove his innocence by a preponderance of evidence."
2. Our standard of review
Administrative mandamus is available to obtain judicial review of a public agency's "decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a). See Holmes v. California Victim Compensation & Government Claims Bd. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1406 (Holmes) [Board's ruling on a claim for compensation is subject to writ review].) In a proceeding for administrative mandate, the judicial inquiry extends to whether the public agency "has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) An abuse of discretion is established if the public agency "has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." (Ibid.)
Because Madrigal does not have a fundamental vested right to compensation from the Board, the superior court reviews the Board's decision to determine whether substantial evidence supports it. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.) An "abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)
Where, as here, no vested fundamental right is involved, our function as an appellate court is identical to that of the superior court: we review the administrative record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board's findings. Our review is not limited to the trial court's findings. (San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1145; Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation-San Diego Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1077 (Ryan).) Instead, it is "no less than a fresh and complete reexamination of the administrative record." (City of Fontana v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 899, 923 (City of Fontana).)
"When considering all relevant evidence within the administrative record, the trial court cannot lose sight that it is for the administrative agency to weigh the preponderance of conflicting evidence, as the court may reverse an administrative decision only if, based on the evidence before the administrative entity, a reasonable person could not have reached the conclusion reached by that agency." (Ryan, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) "This deferential standard requires us to presume the correctness of the administrative ruling, as all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of it." (Id. at pp. 1077-1078. See also BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1244.) Reversal requires the appellant to demonstrate "that the evidence in the administrative record is so comprehensively one-sided that the Board's decision was not only against the weight of that evidence, it was a decision so lacking in support that it cannot command the assent of reasonable minds." (City of Fontana, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 924; see Greene v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1234 ["It is not necessary that every finding be supported by substantial evidence, as long as the findings that are supported by substantial evidence are sufficient to support the decision of the [Board]."].)
Pure issues of law, of course, are always subject to independent appellate court determination. (Moustafa v. Board of Registered Nursing (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1129 ["' "On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, we exercise independent judgment."' "].)
3. The Board proceeded in the manner required by law
Madrigal contends the Board did not proceed in the manner required by law because it "refused to bind itself to even the most basic factual findings and credibility determinations [of the federal court] in its subsequent recommendation." Madrigal asserts Judge Goldman found Howards "knew Madrigal was at work," and found his testimony "more compelling" than the testimony of the eyewitnesses. Judge Goldman, Madrigal says, "found that Howards was right." We do not agree.
First, as the Madrigal II court noted, "Madrigal's writ of habeas corpus was granted on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the district court made findings concerning the weakness of the prosecution's case and the strength of Madrigal's alibi evidence, it did so in the context of determining whether Madrigal had been prejudiced by his trial lawyer's omissions." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1119.)
If Madrigal were correct-that the federal court found Howards knew Madrigal was at work until 3:00 p.m. and Howards was "right" about that-that "finding" would require a conclusion that the eyewitnesses were mistaken or lying. But the Madrigal II court rejected Madrigal's contention "that the district court's findings were tantamount to finding him actually innocent." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1119.)
Moreover, the Board acknowledged it was bound by the federal court's factual finding that "Howards was a 'credible' alibi witness whose testimony was 'certain and unequivocal.'" That finding is not the same as a finding that Madrigal in fact was at work until 3:00 p.m. Rather, it's a finding that Howards testified to the best of his ability, was believable, and expressed certainty about the accuracy of his own recollection. Howards based his testimony on his company's records-one of which (the production sheet) was completed by Madrigal himself-and the way things usually worked. When interviewed in December 2009 after the federal court granted Madrigal's habeas petition, Howards said he had no independent recollection that Madrigal was at work until 3:00 p.m., adding Finley would know. Finley, however, had testified both that he was not sure Madrigal had worked his entire shift-he remembered seeing him before and after lunch but Madrigal didn't clock out at the end of his shift-and that he was "positive" that he had.
Madrigal also seems to argue that-as Howards's testimony constituted (in his view) an ironclad alibi-the Board erred in considering anything else in the administrative record. But as the Madrigal II court noted, while the Board was bound by" '[a]ll material factual findings from the habeas proceeding, '" it also "would have access to all of the prosecution's trial evidence." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118.) That evidence included the eyewitness identification testimony.
In his brief, Madrigal discusses at some length research showing eyewitness testimony "is often unreliable." There is no indication Madrigal ever presented any of this information to the Board.
Nor are we aware of any authority that would bar the Board from considering evidence or information that came to light after the federal habeas proceeding concluded. Here, about 17 months after the federal court granted Madrigal's petition, prosecutors met with Olivares. Olivares told them Mendoza was not involved in the shooting of Aguilera, and Madrigal was the shooter. Olivares provided some level of detail. Obviously, the federal court did not have these statements from Olivares when it issued its findings. We do not read the statutory mandate that the Board must accept as binding the federal court's findings and credibility determinations to prohibit it from considering later-discovered relevant information.
In short, the Board explicitly acknowledged it was bound by five specific findings of the federal court, and it considered those findings as well as other evidence in the entire administrative record in reaching its decision.
4. Substantial evidence supports the Board's decision
Madrigal also contends substantial evidence does not support the Board's denial of his claim. Without any citation of authority, Madrigal asserts that, for a court reviewing a wrongfully-convicted person's claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (c), the question is not "whether there is 'substantial evidence' from the conviction to justify the denial of the claim," but rather "whether there is 'substantial evidence' that survived the reversal of the conviction to justify the denial of the claim." This assertion ignores the basis for the federal court's grant of Madrigal's writ petition: that Madrigal was prejudiced by his trial lawyer's constitutionally ineffective representation because it was reasonably likely that, had counsel been competent, "the outcome of the trial would have been different." It also flies in the face of the Madrigal II court's statement that, on remand, the Board "would have access to all of the prosecution's trial evidence." (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118.)
In determining whether substantial evidence supported the Board's findings, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all inferences in support of the findings. (Holmes, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.) Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.; Tennison, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1180.) Inferences may constitute substantial evidence as long as they are the product of logic and reason rather than speculation or conjecture. (Holmes, at p. 1406.) As a reviewing court, we do not reweigh the evidence. We must affirm the agency's findings if there is any substantial evidence- contradicted or uncontradicted-to support it. (World Business Academy v. State Lands Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 499.)
Substantial evidence supports the Board's findings here. Both Carlos M. and Salvador H. identified Madrigal as the passenger and shooter. As the Madrigal II court noted, while there were "conflicts, inconsistencies, and weaknesses in the witnesses' testimony," that is "usual" in cases like this one. (Madrigal II, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1111.) Aguilera chose Madrigal's photo, saying that person had the same facial features but the skin tone was different. Aguilera told the prosecutor he didn't want to be a "rat."
Madrigal's failure to clock out at work on July 5, 2000, was never explained. According to Victor, Madrigal was standing right there when Victor clocked out. Victor's testimony conflicted with Finley's about whether they discussed the matter. Madrigal admitted having lied in the declaration he gave Mendoza. Olivares told the authorities that Madrigal was the passenger and the shooter in the crime.
These facts constitute substantial evidence.
5. The amendments to the statutory compensation scheme do not apply to Madrigal's case
On October 4, 2021, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 446 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 446). The bill, which took effect on January 1, 2022, "revise[d] and recast [certain] provisions [of the existing law, including the requirement that the claimant 'prove[ ] to the board that they are factually innocent'] to instead require the board, upon application of a person whose writ of habeas corpus was granted in state or federal court . . . to recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made without a hearing, unless the Attorney General establishes that the claimant is not entitled to compensation." (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 446 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).)
New subdivision (b) of section 4900 provides, "If a state or federal court has granted a writ of habeas corpus . . ., and the charges were subsequently dismissed, . . . the California Victim Compensation Board shall, upon application by the person, and without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904, unless the Attorney General establishes pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 4902, that the claimant is not entitled to compensation."
New subdivision (d) of section 4902 provides, "If subdivision (b) of Section 4900 applies in any claim, the California Victim Compensation Board shall calculate the compensation for the claimant pursuant to Section 4904 and recommend to the Legislature payment of that sum, unless the Attorney General objects in writing, within 45 days from when the claimant files the claim, with clear and convincing evidence that the claimant is not entitled to compensation. . . . If the Attorney General declines to object within the allotted period of time, then the board shall issue its recommendation pursuant to Section 4904 within 60 days thereafter. Upon receipt of the objection, the board shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim . . . . At a hearing, the Attorney General shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the acts constituting the offense. If the Attorney General fails to meet this burden, the board shall recommend to the Legislature payment of the compensation sum calculated pursuant to Section 4904."
New subdivision (d) of section 4903 provides that a conviction that has been dismissed "is no longer valid," and the Attorney General may "not rely solely on the trial record to establish that the claimant is not entitled to compensation."
On November 15, 2021, Madrigal's counsel sent a letter to this court noting the passage of Senate Bill 446. We asked the parties under Government Code section 68081 to address in letter briefs the application-if any-of the new statutory provisions to this case. Madrigal submitted a letter asserting Senate Bill 446 applies to his claim and we should "reverse and remand this case to the superior court with instructions to enter a new judgment, directing the Board to conduct further proceedings."
The Attorney General submitted a letter contending the Board's decision was final when it denied Madrigal's claim in 2018 and, "unless the Board's decision was an abuse of discretion, the Court has no jurisdiction to vacate the decision." The Attorney General conceded "the amendments would apply in a reopened administrative proceeding" if "the Court were to vacate the Board's decision based on an abuse of discretion."
The Attorney General is correct. The Board's decision became final on January 18, 2018, when (by a 2-to-1 vote) it adopted Simpton's proposed decision. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 618.1, subd. (f)(1), 619.2. See also Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a) [administrative mandamus is limited to "final" administrative orders or decisions].) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), our jurisdiction is limited to a determination of whether a prejudicial abuse of discretion-as that statute defines it-has occurred. (California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1483. See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f) [superior court "shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside the order or decision, or denying the writ"].)
None of the cases Madrigal cites involved an administrative mandamus proceeding. Bradley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 404, 406-408 concerned a petition to compel arbitration in an insured/insurer dispute about an auto accident. While the appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the petition was pending, the Legislature enacted a statute abrogating an earlier-published case and expressly providing for its retroactive application to matters not yet final. In U.S. v. Lemaire (5th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 387, 390, a federal agency sued to enjoin the execution of a state court judgment against a bank during the pendency of a state court appeal. The court said a "final judgment" as used in the applicable federal statute meant a judgment on the merits no longer subject to appeal. Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond (1974) 416 U.S. 696 was a school desegregation case. The issue was the district court's authority to award attorney fees from a certain date given an intervening change in case law.
We recognize that, had the current version of the governing statutes been in effect when the Board considered Madrigal's claim for compensation, the result might well have been different. However, any relief Madrigal may seek based on the new legislation must lie with our Legislature, not with this court.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the decision of the California Victim Compensation Board denying Madrigal's claim for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: EDMON, P.J. WINDHAM, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.