Opinion
Civil Action No. DKC 2005-2363.
July 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") is Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider (paper 13). The issues are briefed fully and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration but will remand the case for further administrative proceedings.
I. Background
Plaintiff Lenny Lunn was diagnosed with chromosomal deletion 22q13.2, a rare condition that impacts his verbal and expressive skills and causes attention and behavioral problems. Lenny was born in London, England in 1990, and moved with his mother, Plaintiff Lorie Peters Lauthier, to the United States in or around August 2004.
On August 27, 2004, Ms. Lauthier met with Montgomery County Public School ("MCPS") officials for an Individualized Educational Placement ("IEP") meeting. At the meeting, the team reviewed the assessments and evaluations that Ms. Lauthier had provided, and discussed doing additional assessments of Lenny in the future. Based on the information available at the time, the IEP team recommended placement for Lenny at the Cabin John Middle School Community Based Program for the 2004-2005 school year. Ms. Lauthier did not sign the IEP because she wanted to meet the director at the Cabin John program and to observe the program prior to sending her son there. At the time of the IEP meeting, Ms. Lauthier thought the Cabin John program sounded appropriate for Lenny.
Lenny began attending Ivymount, a private school, at the start of the 2004-2005 school year. Ms. Lauthier visited the Cabin John program on September 24, 2004, approximately three weeks after the school year began. Upon visiting the Cabin John program, Ms. Lauthier determined that the program was inappropriate for her son's needs. Following her visit, Ms. Lauthier called and informed an official at MCPS that she did not feel that the program was a proper placement for Lenny and that he was attending Ivymount.
Ms. Lauthier applied to Ivymount in June 2004, and, on August 12, 2004, signed an enrollment contract with Ivymount, which obligated her to pay $36,511.00, regardless of whether Lenny withdrew at any time during the school year.
On April 26, 2005, Ms. Lauthier requested a due process hearing to seek reimbursement for Lenny's placement at Ivymount for the 2004-2005 school year. A due process hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Susan Sinrod on May 26, 2005. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from each of the parties. On June 24, 2005, the ALJ issued an opinion, granting MCPS's motion for summary decision and denying Ms. Lauthier's request for reimbursement. The ALJ found that because Lenny had never attended any public school and had never received public special education and related services, pursuant to the plain language of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), Ms. Lauthier was not entitled to reimbursement for the 2004-2005 school year. Lenny and his mother appealed to this court.
On May 31, 2006, the court issued an Order and accompanying memorandum opinion, denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting Defendants Board of Education of Montgomery County's and Jerry D. Weast's cross-motion for summary judgment. (Papers 11, 12). The court agreed with the ALJ and found that, because Lenny never received public special education services, Plaintiffs are not eligible for reimbursement at Ivymount. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), requires the previous receipt of public special education services in order to receive reimbursement for the unilateral placement of a child in a private school. The court noted that the "previous receipt" requirement also is included in the accompanying federal and state regulations, and finds support in the legislative history. Moreover, the interpretation adopted by the court furthers the purpose of the IDEA's notice provision, which allows the reduction or complete denial of reimbursement where a parent places the child in private school without proper notice to public school officials, because the intent is that prior to placing a child in private school, parents must give the public school system a chance to provide a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") to the child.
The court noted that, because Lenny and his mother are not eligible for reimbursement, the subsidiary aspects of the complaint (the alleged procedural violations in the IEP, the adequacy of MCPS's proposed placement) appeared to be moot. However, the court ordered Plaintiffs to notify it within ten days if this conclusion was incorrect. On June 14, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), and a notice to the court regarding the mootness issue. (Paper 13). Plaintiffs first assert that the court's decision did not render moot Plaintiffs' request for prospective relief — namely, prospective placement and funding for Lenny at Ivymount. Plaintiffs also argue that the court should reconsider its earlier opinion because it improperly construed the statute as requiring previous receipt of special education services in order to receive reimbursement for private school.
II. Prospective Relief
Plaintiffs assert that the subsidiary aspects of the complaint were not mooted by the court's earlier decision. Plaintiffs maintain that the court must rule on Lenny's prospective placement, notwithstanding the court's earlier decision that Plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursement for the 2004-2005 school year. Plaintiffs concede that the ALJ "never reached the question of whether MCPS denied Lenny a FAPE by failing to place him in an appropriate program and placement." (Paper 13, at 2). Plaintiffs emphasize that if the court, or the ALJ upon remand, found that MCPS denied Lenny a FAPE, "nothing in the statute precludes the Court (or ALJ) from ordering MCPS to prospectively place and fund him at Ivymount." Id. at 4. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' assertion that the nature of relief sought is prospective is "without merit" and "contrary to the record and to logic." (Paper 14, at 1).
It is not entirely clear whether Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot seek prospective relief or that Plaintiffs did not seek prospective relief through the administrative process.
To the extent that Defendants assert that Plaintiffs did not seek a finding from the ALJ that MCPS failed to provide Lenny with a FAPE, they are incorrect. Pursuant to the IDEA, one prerequisite to the receipt of reimbursement for unilateral placement in a private school is that the school system failed to provide the child with a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i). Plaintiffs requested a due process hearing seeking reimbursement for expenses and placement for Lenny at the Ivymount school for the 2004-2005 school year. Thus, in their request for reimbursement, Plaintiffs implicitly sought a finding that MCPS failed to provide a FAPE to Lenny. Any argument that Plaintiffs cannot seek prospective relief also is flawed. To the extent that an IEP placing Lenny in a public school did not provide him with a FAPE, appropriate relief may include a "prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private school." Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).
The ALJ, concluding that Lenny was not entitled to reimbursement for the unilateral placement at Ivymount, did not reach the issue of whether the IEP that MCPS developed for Lenny provided him with a FAPE. This court's jurisdiction under the IDEA is limited to review of the final "findings and decision" of the administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002). Because the ALJ did not address whether the IEP provided Lenny with a FAPE, there are no "findings" or "decision" regarding the matter. As Plaintiffs recognize in their motion (paper 13, at 4), the proper disposition of this case is to remand for further administrative proceedings. See JH ex rel. JD v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 395 F.3d 185, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2005) (remanding the case to the administrative hearing officer for the second time, for a reweighing of the evidence under the correct burden of proof allocation); JH ex rel. JD v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 326 F.3d 560, 568 (4th Cir. 2003) (remanding the case to the district court, with instructions to remand to the administrative hearing officer, where the officer failed to apply the correct standard in determining whether the child's summer IEP was sufficient to provide a FAPE, and there was conflicting evidence on the record); Carnwath v. Bd. of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, 33 F.Supp.2d 431, 433-34 (D.Md. 1998) (remanding the case for further administrative proceedings on the merits of the plaintiffs' IDEA claim; noting that "[t]his Court's limited IDEA jurisdiction permits review of factual findings and legal determinations by an ALJ, but does not generally permit consideration of the substantive merits of IDEA claims in the first instance"); M.E. ex rel. C.E. v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 72 F.App'x 940, 941-42 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the issue of whether the child's IEP provided a FAPE was before the ALJ but the ALJ did not consider the merits of the plaintiffs' claim).
III. Motion for Reconsideration
Because the court did not enter judgment in its earlier ruling, it is not entirely clear that Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), cited by Plaintiffs in support of their motion for reconsideration, is applicable. Nevertheless, regardless of whether Rule 59(e) or another standard (e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)) is applied, a motion for reconsideration is not the proper place to relitigate a case after the court has ruled against a party. See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pac. Ins. Co., 525 U.S. 1104 (1999).
Plaintiffs assert that the court should reconsider its ruling because the court made errors of law in rendering its decision. Plaintiffs maintain that the court "erroneously interpreted the plain language of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (10(C)(ii)" in determining that the IDEA requires that a child must have received public special education services in order for parents to be eligible for private school reimbursement. Plaintiffs assert three arguments in support:
(1) the Court did not address [P]laintiffs' argument that 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not include all students, but rather pertains only to the group of students explicitly referred to — those who have previously received special education and related services from the public school system, while 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) does in fact address all students in private schools, such as Lenny; (2) the Court did not interpret the IDEA consistent with expressed Congressional intent of its drafters; and (3) the Court did not adequately consider case law from this Circuit in which the Court of Appeals awarded private school tuition reimbursement to students who never attended public school or received special education.
(Paper 13, at 6-7) (footnotes omitted). In their opposition memorandum, Defendants state only that "the arguments advanced by the Plaintiffs either were made or could have been made prior to the issuance of this Court's Order of May 31, 2006." (Paper 14, at 1).
Plaintiffs first argue that the court erred because it failed to consider their argument that 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not include all students, but rather pertains only to those students who have previously received special education. Plaintiffs contend that the court should have considered 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) in determining whether Plaintiffs were eligible for reimbursement because 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(i) provides reimbursement for any child so long as the school system has not made FAPE available to that child. Plaintiffs assert that the court's interpretation of the statute is contrary to a general congressional intent "of ensuring the identification of all students eligible to receive special education and related services." (Paper 13, at 12). The court did not fail to consider Plaintiffs' argument with regard to the application of 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(i), but instead found it unpersuasive and contrary to the plain language of the statute when read in its entirety, the accompanying administrative regulations, and the legislative history of the 1997 IDEA amendments. In its earlier opinion, the court articulated in detail the reasons for its holding that receipt of prior special education and related services is a prerequisite to reimbursement for unilateral placement in private school. Any attempt to relitigate the issue is inappropriate at this procedural juncture.
The court's decision finds further support in a recent Supreme Court case, Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 2458-64 (2006). In Arlington Central, the Court held that the IDEA did not authorize prevailing parents to recover expert fees pursuant to an IDEA provision authorizing reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. 2463. The Court explained that the IDEA was passed pursuant to Congress's spending power, and, accordingly, the conditions which attach to a state's acceptance of federal funding must be set out unambiguously under the statute so that a state official clearly can understand the obligations the state undertakes in accepting IDEA funding. The Court concluded that the provision at issue did not "even hint" at the obligation to pay prevailing parents' expert fees. Id. at 2459. The Court emphasized: "When the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Court rejected the parents' arguments that their interpretation of the IDEA furthered the statute's "overarching goal of `ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE].'" Id. at 2463 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). The Court stated: "These goals, however, are too general to provide much support for respondents' reading of the terms of the IDEA. The IDEA obviously does not seek to promote these goals at the expense of all other considerations, including fiscal considerations." Id.
Plaintiffs also argue that the court failed to consider precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in which Plaintiffs contend the court awarded reimbursement to the parents of a child who had never received special education or related services. Plaintiffs state that in County School Board of Henrico County, Va. v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005), the court declined to consider the fact that the child had never attended public school in denying reimbursement for private school tuition, but instead focused solely on whether the school system had provided a FAPE to the child. Plaintiffs concede that the court never referred to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C), but argue that the fact that the court never raised the issue as a potential concern "indicates its implicit assumption that this subsection would not trump reimbursement." (Paper 13, at 13). Plaintiffs argue that if the Fourth Circuit adopted this court's interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C), the panel would have first had to consider whether the student had previously received special education and related services from the school system, which it did not. Plaintiffs state that "this Court should follow suit."
In Henrico County, the plaintiffs challenged the appropriateness of the school board's IEP for the 2002-2003 school year. Because whether the child, Z.P., had previously received public special education and related services was not at issue in the case, the court did not discuss the requirement of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), or what public special education and related services Z.P. may have received. However, in a footnote to a section of the opinion discussing whether the school system provided Z.P. with a FAPE, the court notes that an occupational therapist employed by the county provided therapy to Z.P. during the 2001-2002 school year. Henrico County, 399 F.3d at 306 n. 4. The court in Henrico County did not consider, let alone provide binding precedent as to the proper interpretation of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). Moreover, the facts in that case are not as clear as Plaintiff would suggest in that at least the child received related services in the form of occupational therapy prior to the year in which the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for private school tuition. This case does not provide a sufficient basis for the court to reconsider its earlier ruling.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration will be denied. The case will be remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion. A separate Order will follow.