Opinion
CIVIL 1:22-CV-578
06-27-2022
STEVEN LUNDY, Petitioner, v. KATHY BRITTAIN, et al., Respondents.
(CARLSON, MAGISTRATE JUDGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(MANNION, JUDGE)
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
On April 1, 2022, the petitioner, Steven Lundy, who also goes by the name Divine Rose, filed this federal habeas corpus petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). On April 21, 2022, this petition was ordered transferred to this court, and this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for review.
We are familiar with the petitioner, who had previously filed a virtually identical petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. That prior petition was dismissed by the court. See Lundy v. Brittain, No. 1:21-CV-1259, 2021 WL 5442243, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:21-1259, 2021 WL 5416279 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2021). Thus, Lundy is a serial petitioner who is well known to the court as a prolific pro se litigant, and whose past legal forays have been marked by eccentric and idiosyncratic legal theories.
See e.g., Lundy v. Pennsylvania, No. 3:20-CV-01898, 2021 WL 1537790, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Lundy v. PA, No. CV 3:20-1898, 2021 WL 1534977 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2021); Lundy v. Pocono Mountain Reg'l Police Dep't, No. 3:20-CV-01898, 2020 WL 7405407, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2020); Lundy v. Monroe Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. CV 3:17-2306, 2018 WL 2218824, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2018); Lundy v. Lenning, No. CV 3:18761, 2018 WL 2219296, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2018); Lundy v. Monroe C.ty. Dist. Attorney's Off., No. 3:18-CV-2396, 2018 WL 7049387, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018).
So it is in the instant case.
According to state court records, Steven Lundy pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of strangulation in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County and was sentenced in March of 2019 to 21-to-60 months' imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Lundy, CP-45-CR0003000-2017. In this case, and in his prior habeas petition, Lundy attempts to challenge this conviction by stitching together an unintelligible legal fabric consisting of the Uniform Commercial Code, bankruptcy laws, and other eccentric notions, to argue that he may not be imprisoned by the state following his nolo contendere plea to the crime of strangulation. It is upon these fanciful theories that Lundy endeavors to invoke the habeas corpus jurisdiction of this court and seeks his immediate release from prison.
As we have done in the past, we should once again decline this invitation. On its face, this petition-which is substantively the same as a prior petition dismissed by this court-fails for multiple reasons. Accordingly, as discussed below, it is recommended that this petition be summarily dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition Should Be Dismissed.
In this case, we find that the petitioner has not made out a valid case for pursuing habeas relief in this district at this time. Therefore, since the petitioner has not made a showing justifying habeas relief at this time, this petition is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Rule 4 provides in pertinent part: “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Summary dismissal of this habeas petition is appropriate for several reasons.
First, the petition is substantively without merit. In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b).
As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. At the outset, a petition must satisfy exacting substantive standards to warrant relief. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct that violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, state court records reveal that Lundy pleaded nolo contendere to strangulation in 2019 and was sentenced to 21-to-60 months imprisonment. Given this nolo contendere plea conviction, there are no factual grounds justifying habeas corpus relief in this case. Moreover, to the extent that they can be understood, Lundy's legal arguments are frivolous. Indeed, courts have frequently rebuffed efforts by pro se litigants to graft some sort of claim under the Uniform Commercial Code as grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. See e.g., Kingston v. Clark, No. 1:21-CV-31, 2021 WL 1549659, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2021) (citing Montalvo v. Montalvo, 2008 WL 4533935, *3 (W.D. Va. 2008)). Therefore, these factually bankrupt and legally fanciful claims should be dismissed.
Second, dismissal of this petition pursuant to Rule 4 is appropriate here since in this case Lundy seeks to pursue what is undeniably a successive federal habeas corpus petition challenging his 2019 state court strangulation conviction. Prisoners, like Lundy, seeking habeas relief must satisfy specific and precise procedural standards. These procedural prerequisites include an explicit gate-keeping requirement for second and successive petitions, which must be approved in advance by the Court of Appeals before they may proceed in the district court.
In this regard, § 2244 provides in clear and precise terms that:
(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, . . . .
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless-
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).
The mandatory nature of this gate-keeping function has been underscored by the United States Supreme Court, which has emphasized that:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a stringent set of procedures that a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), must follow if he wishes to file a “second or successive” habeas corpus application challenging that custody, § 2244(b)(1). In pertinent part, before filing the application in the district court, a prisoner “shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel of the court of appeals may authorize the filing of the second or successive application only if it presents a claim not previously raised that satisfies one of the two grounds articulated in § 2244(b)(2). § 2244(b)(3)(C); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529-530, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996).Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152-53 (2007).
As the Court of Appeals has explained:
Pursuant to this gate-keeping function, AEDPA instructs the courts of
appeals to dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive petition that the petitioner presented in a previous application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If a petitioner presents a new claim in a second or successive habeas corpus application, we must also dismiss that claim unless one of two narrow exceptions applies:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)(ii). Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A petitioner's failure to seek such authorization from the appropriate appellate court before filing a second or successive habeas petition “acts as a jurisdictional bar.” United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir.2000).Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 411-12 (3d Cir. 2011).
Given this clear statutory command, we lack jurisdiction to hear Lundy's second and successive federal habeas corpus petition. Instead, Lundy's avenue for relief lies with the Court of Appeals through a motion pursuant to § 2244(b)(3) for leave to file a successive petition. Recognizing that this is the exclusive course available to Lundy at this juncture to secure further judicial review of this strangulation conviction, we do not opine further regarding the merits of any new or additional claims Lundy might pursue in the future. Rather, these are matters to be addressed by another court at another time if Lundy seeks leave to file a successive habeas corpus petition. Instead, we simply conclude that we lack jurisdiction to entertain this petition absent the express approval of a successive petition by the Court of Appeals.
III. Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY this petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), and that no certificate of appealability should issue in this case.
Petitioner is placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.