Opinion
CIVIL 1:21-CV-1259
08-23-2021
STEVEN LUNDY, Petitioner, v. KATHY BRITTAIN, et al., Respondents.
Magistrate Judge Carlson
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Judge Mannion
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
According to state court records, Steven Lundy pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of strangulation in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County and was sentenced in March of 2019 to 21-to-60 months' imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Lundy, CP-45-CR0003000-2017. Lundy is well known to the court as a prolific pro se litigant whose past legal forays have been marked by eccentric and idiosyncratic legal theories. 1
See e.g., Lundy v. Pennsylvania, No. 3:20-CV-01898, 2021 WL 1537790, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Lundy v. PA, No. CV 3:20-1898, 2021 WL 1534977 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2021); Lundy v. Pocono Mountain Reg'l Police Dep't, No. 3:20-CV-01898, 2020 WL 7405407, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2020); Lundy v. Monroe Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. CV 3:17-2306, 2018 WL 2218824, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2018); Lundy v. Lenning, No. CV 3:18761, 2018 WL 2219296, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2018); Lundy v. Monroe C.ty.Dist. Attorney's Off., No. 3:18-CV-2396, 2018 WL 7049387, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018).
Both of these attributes are on display in the instant case.
Lundy has filed a document styled in the nature of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). Lundy's petition demands a great deal from the reader. In this pleading, Lundy describes himself in the following terms:
Divine: Rose, who is an international protected official in accordance with Title 18 U.S. Code Subsection 112(b)(3)(B)&(C) and is a Natural Person, In Full Life, In Propria Persona and NOT Pro-Se, Authorized Representative and considered the Accomodating Party (UCC §3-402(b)(1)) which is the executor for the ESTATE OF STEVEN LOVE LUNDY, who is at law and legal analysis a fictional entity, in rem, ex rel., Corporation, ens legis, Vessel, Seaman, artificial construct, and most definitely an ESTATE.
(Doc. 1, at 1).
What then follows is an unintelligible narrative that refers to the Uniform Commercial Code, bankruptcy laws, and other eccentric legal notions. The upshot of this confused and confusing narrative seems to be that Lundy is entitled to be released from custody immediately because he is not:
[A] signatory to the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, not a party to your "Social Compact", and not being named in Your statutes, and/or notice of agreement between the State of PENNSYLVANIA or the United States with undersigned, the undersigned did not, and does not understand the nature of the Jurisdiction imposed by the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA in respect to the2
Judgment received, or the Commercial nature of some invlovling [sic] commercial paper, bond, etc., created by the judge or others on request to above case.
(Id., at 5).
It is upon these fanciful theories that Lundy attempts to invoke the habeas corpus jurisdiction of this court and seeks his immediate release from prison.
We should decline this invitation. On its face, this petition fails for multiple reasons. Accordingly, as discussed below, it is recommended that this petition be summarily dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition Should Be Dismissed.
In this case, we find that the petitioner has not made out a valid case for pursuing habeas relief in this district at this time. Therefore, since the petitioner has not made a showing justifying habeas relief at this time, this petition is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Rule 4 applies to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts). See, e.g., Patton v. Fenton, 491 F.Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1979) (explaining that Rule 4 is “applicable to Section 2241 petitions through Rule 1(b)”). 3
Rule 4 provides in pertinent part: “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Summary dismissal of this habeas petition is appropriate for several reasons.
First, the petition is substantively without merit. In order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must satisfy the standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides in part as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b). 4
As this statutory text implies, state prisoners must meet exacting substantive and procedural benchmarks in order to obtain habeas corpus relief. At the outset, a petition must satisfy exacting substantive standards to warrant relief. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). By limiting habeas relief to state conduct that violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, ” § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings led to a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994). Thus, claimed violations of state law, standing alone, will not entitle a petitioner to § 2254 relief, absent a showing that those violations are so great as to be of a constitutional dimension. See Priester v. Vaughan, 382 F.3d 394, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, state court records reveal that Lundy pleaded nolo contendere to strangulation in 2019 and was sentenced to 21-to-60 months imprisonment. Given this nolo contendere plea conviction, there are no factual grounds justifying habeas 5 corpus relief in this case. Moreover, to the extent that they can be understood, Lundy's legal arguments are frivolous. Indeed, courts have frequently rebuffed efforts by pro se litigants to graft some sort of claim under the Uniform Commercial Code as grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. See e.g., Kingston v. Clark, No. 1:21-CV-31, 2021 WL 1549659, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2021) (citing Montalvo v. Montalvo, 2008 WL 4533935, *3 (W.D. Va. 2008)). Therefore, these factually bankrupt and legally fanciful claims should be dismissed.
Second, this petition is presumptively time-barred. State prisoners seeking relief under Section 2254 must also satisfy specific, and precise, procedural standards. Among these procedural prerequisites is a requirement that petitioners timely file motions seeking habeas corpus relief. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244, established a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners. In pertinent part, § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an plication created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United6
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or,
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.See Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998).
The calculation of this limitations period is governed by a series of well-defined rules. At the outset, these rules are prescribed by statute, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which prescribes several forms of statutory tolling. First, with respect to tolling based upon a petitioner's direct appeal of his conviction: “The limitation period shall run from the latest of- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The courts have construed this tolling provision in a forgiving fashion, and in a manner that enables petitioners to toll their filing deadlines for the time periods in which they could have sought further direct appellate review of their cases, even if they did not, in fact, elect to seek such review. Thus, with respect to direct appeals, the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which a petitioner could have sought discretionary appellate court 7 review, by way of allocator or through a petition for writ of certiorari, even if no such petition is filed. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009). After this period of time passes, however, by statute, the judgment of conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Section 2244(d)(2), in turn, prescribes a second period of statutory tolling requirements while state prisoners seek collateral review of these convictions in state court, and provides that:
The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000).
In assessing § 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision, for purposes of tolling the federal habeas statute of limitations, a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” only includes applications which are filed in a timely fashion under state law. Therefore, if the petitioner is delinquent in seeking state collateral review of his conviction, that tardy state pleading will not be considered a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” and will not toll the limitations period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-14 (2005); Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 394-95 (3d. Cir. 2004). Moreover, in contrast to the direct appeal tolling provisions, this post-conviction petition tolling provision 8 does not allow for an additional period of tolling for the petitioner who does not seek further discretionary appellate court review of his conviction and sentence. Miller v. Dragovich, 311 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2002).
Beyond this tolling period mandated by statute, it has also been held that AEDPA's one-year limitations period is not a jurisdictional bar to the filing of habeas petitions, Miller, 145 F.3d at 617-18, and, therefore, is subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 618-19. Yet, while equitable tolling is permitted in state habeas petitions under AEDPA, it is not favored. As the Third Circuit has observed: “[E]quitable tolling is proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair.' Generally, this will occur when the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way ... been prevented from asserting his or her rights' The petitioner must show that he or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims' Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.” Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted). Indeed, it has been held that only:
[T]hree circumstances permit[ ] equitable tolling: if
(1) the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff,
(2) if the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or
(3) if the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.9
Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)).
Applying this exacting standard, courts have held that: “In non-capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling. See Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no basis for equitable tolling where the statute of limitations was changed to shorten the time for filing a PCRA only four months prior to the filing of the petition); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597 (7 th Cir. 1999) (finding lawyer's inadequate research, which led to miscalculating the deadline, did not warrant equitable tolling).” Id. While courts apply exacting standards to equitable tolling claims, it is evident that complete abandonment of a petitioner by his counsel can constitute one of the extraordinary circumstances justifying such equitable tolling. In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the Supreme Court of the United States held that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d). Id., at 645. Further, the Court in Holland held that an attorney's actions or inactions, if egregious enough, can constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” that justifies equitable tolling of a habeas petition. Id., at 651-52; see also Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding a district court's determination of equitable tolling based on attorney misconduct). 10
Here, state court records indicate that Lundy was convicted in March of 2019, more than two years ago. There is no indication on the docket of timely postconviction litigation by Lundy that would have tolled the one-year statute of limitations and Lundy identifies no grounds which would allow for equitable tolling of this limitations period. Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations presumptively applies here and bars consideration of this petition.
Lundy's state court docket reflects his March 21, 2019 sentencing, but there is no indication of any direct appeal of his conviction. Lundy filed a motion to reconsider his sentence on March 25, 2019, which was promptly denied on March 27, 2019. On August 8, 2019, Lundy moved to suspend his criminal fines, a request which was also promptly denied by the trial judge on August 14, 2019. Some 14 months after he was sentenced Lundy then filed some sort of document styled as a release and discharge of emergency war power jurisdictional duties, Monroe County District Attorney's Office. It then appears that beginning in the summer of 2021 Lundy filed a series of documents described as a Notice of Acceptance, Notice of Fault, and Final Notice of Default, with the state courts. None of these documents would appear to be timely and proper pleadings which would toll this limitations period. Commonwealth v. Lundy, CP-45-CR0003000-2
III. Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY this petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), and that no certificate of appealability should issue in this case.
Petitioner is placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the11
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.12