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concluding that the plaintiff's related case designation was invalid "[i]n light of the tenuous relationship of the claims in the[] two cases"
Summary of this case from Autumn Journey Hospice, Inc. v. SebeliusOpinion
Civ. Action No. 04-1262 (EGS).
March 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs are eight current and former employees of the U.S. Small Business Administration's Office of Certification and Eligibility ("the Agency"). Over the past several years, plaintiffs have filed a number of administrative Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaints against the Agency for employment practices that were allegedly motivated by unlawful discrimination and retaliation. Some of the plaintiffs in this action, including Keith Lucas, have additional lawsuits pending in this Court involving separate claims of employment discrimination. Plaintiffs filed the current action as a "related case" to one of Mr. Lucas's earlier cases, Lucas v. Barreto, et al., Civ. No. 03-2617(EGS), claiming that the instant case "grows out of the same event or transaction" as the earlier filed case. However, upon careful consideration of the vague allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, the Court is unable to determine whether this case is properly "related" within the meaning of Local Civil Rule 40.5, or whether the various claims in this case are sufficiently related to each other to survive a motion for severance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.
Accordingly, pursuant to the status conference held in this matter on March 8, 2005, and for the reasons described below, the Court will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and afford plaintiffs one final opportunity to refile their claims. Upon refiling, plaintiffs are directed to state with precision and clarity the bases for any joinder of claims or designation of any pending civil actions as related cases.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint catalogs a variety of administrative EEO actions filed over the past several years. Although not a model of clarity, the Complaint appears to break down into the following four categories of claims:
Plaintiffs have amended their complaint twice. The First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 10) does not alter the original complaint except to add new paragraphs 50a-50i, 74a and 74b, and 83a relating to the April 23, 2004 EEO complaint of plaintiff Kelly. The Second Amended Complaint (Docket No. 17) incorporates the original and First Amended Complaint and adds new paragraphs 50j-50p, 74c, and 83b relating to the July 23, 2004 EEO complaint of plaintiff Kelly. All citations are to the numbered paragraphs set forth in each of those respective filings, which, taken together, constitute the Second Amended Complaint.
1. Claims relating to a formal EEO class complaint of discrimination relating to the Agency's FY 2002 performance review process on behalf of plaintiffs Kevin Kelly, Salone Clary, Ernestine Baker, Gale Watson, Jennifer Weston, and Tracey Ebb-Murphy. See Compl. ¶ 75.
2. Additional claims relating to plaintiff Kelly's individual EEO complaints filed in conjunction with the class complaint, see Compl. ¶ 32, and challenging his placement on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) that ultimately led to his discharge from the agency. See Compl. ¶¶ 33-35, 50a-50p.
3. Claims relating to plaintiff Lucas's EEO complaints challenging the agency's FY 2003 performance review process. See Compl. ¶¶ 29-30, 61-66.
4. Claims relating to plaintiff Morrison's EEO complaints concerning her FY 2002 and 2003 performance ratings. See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 55-59.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on Feb. 7, 2005. Should the case go forward, defendant requested that the case be severed into four separate actions and that plaintiffs be required to file a new complaint making a more definite statement of their claims. See Def's. Mot. at 4.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Severance of Claims
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, multiple claims are properly joined if they (1) "aris[e] out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and (2) if any question of law or fact common to all [plaintiffs] will arise in the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). The purpose of this rule is "to promote trial convenience and expedite the final resolution of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits, extra expense to the parties, and loss of time to the court as well as the litigants appearing before it." See M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2002). If parties or claims appear to be improperly joined, the trial court may order such claims severed and proceeded with separately. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21; Brereton v. Communications Satellite Corp., 116 F.R.D. 162 (D.D.C. 1987).
Although not clear from the Complaint, the common thread tying plaintiffs' disparate Title VII claims together appears to be the Agency's failure to act on plaintiffs' various EEO complaints within the 180 days required by law. See Pls.' Opp. (Docket No. 19) at 3 ("The one thing that the Defendant does not argue is that none of the Plaintiffs' EEO claims was acted upon within 180 days."). However, as defendant rightly points out, "if such shared experiences were sufficient to justify joinder, every SBA employee who filed an EEO complaint and did not receive an agency decision within 180 days could be joined in this case as a co-plaintiff. . . ." Def's. Rep. (Docket No. 20) at 4. This cannot be the intent of the Rule. The various claims in plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint appear to arise out of at least four different "transactions" or "series of transactions" within the meaning of Rule 20. Thus, it appears that the claims comprising this case belong in at least four separate civilactions, unless plaintiffs, upon refiling, can clearly identify a proper justification for joinder under the Rule 20 test.
Under Title VII, an employee may file a civil action after an agency 1) has taken final action on a complaint, or 2) fails to take final action within 180 days from the initial charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
Plaintiffs' counsel also made several statements to this effect at the status hearing in open court on March 8, 2005.
B. The "Related Case" Rule
Local Rule 40.5 stands as an exception to the general rule of random assignment of cases in the District Court. See Tripp v. Executive Office of the President, 194 F.R.D. 340, 342 (D.D.C. 2000). The rule allows "related cases" to be assigned to the same judge when they "(i) relate to common property, or (ii) involve common issues of fact, or (iii) grow out of the same event or transaction, or (iv) involve the validity or infringement of the same patent." LCvR 40.5(a)(3). When a party notifies the Clerk of a related case at the time of filing, the Clerk assigns the case to the judge to whom the older related case is assigned. LCvR 40.5(c)(1).
Plaintiffs filed a notice of related case in this action, claiming that Civ. No. 04-1262 "grows out of the same event or transaction" as Civ. No. 03-2617. Although the rationale is not clear from the Complaint, plaintiffs' counsel asserts that these cases are related because the issue of disparate treatment in the Agency's FY 2002 performance review process arises in both cases. See Civ. No. 04-1262, Compl. ¶ 75; Civ. No. 03-2617, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207-224.
Civ. No. 03-2617 involves plaintiff Keith Lucas's Privacy Act and Title VII claims against the U.S. Small Business Administration arising out of the Agency's disclosure of his Official Personnel Folder and the Agency's FY 2002 performance ratings process.
It is far from clear whether these cases are related within the meaning of the rules. As described above, it appears to the Court that the scatter-shot claims in Civ. No. 04-1262 are tied together by nothing more than the Agency's failure to act on plaintiffs' underlying EEO claims. The "hook" tying this case to Civ. No. 03-2617 may well be the Agency's 2002 Performance Review Process, but this hook links at most one claim from 04-1262 (the EEO Class Complaint) to one claim in 03-2617 (Count Six). It can hardly be said that the cases, on the whole, "grow out of the same event or transaction."
The general rule requiring random assignment of cases "guarantees fair and equal distribution of cases to all judges, avoids public perception or appearance of favoritism in assignments, and reduces opportunities for judge-shopping." Tripp v. Executive Office of the President, 196 F.R.D. 201, 202 (D.D.C. 2000). In some cases, the interests of judicial economy served by the related case rule outweigh the fundamental interests served by the random assignment rule. In light of the tenuous relationship of the claims in these two cases, this is not such an instance.
III. CONCLUSION
Although defendant raises significant concerns about the merits of plaintiffs' claims (in particular, whether plaintiffs' allegations even rise to the level of adverse personnel actions), the Court does not reach the merits here. Rather, the Court finds that it would be in the interests of judicial economy to dismiss this action without prejudice and allow plaintiffs an opportunity to rethink and refile their claims. Plaintiffs are specifically directed to consider the rules governing joinder of claims and relation of cases before refiling their claims.
The Court initially considered transferring this case to the Calendar Committee for random reassignment pursuant to LCvR 40.5(c)(1). However, plaintiffs' counsel preferred dismissal without prejudice, apparently so that additional ripened claims may be added in future filings.
Furthermore, plaintiffs are directed to spell out with clarity the actual allegations of discrimination in any future filings, rather than rely on vague references to the underlying administrative proceedings. Plaintiffs are reminded that the Federal Rules require a "short and plain statement" of each claim in order to permit defendants to file a responsive answer and prepare an adequate defense. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Accordingly, plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the Clerk will be directed to remove this case from the active calendar of the Court. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.