Opinion
A-13545
03-09-2022
LEROY LOPEZ JR., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Leroy Lopez Jr., in propria persona, Seward, Appellant. Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Trial Court No. 3AN-18-06254 CI, Jennifer S. Henderson, Judge.
Leroy Lopez Jr., in propria persona, Seward, Appellant.
Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Leroy Lopez Jr. appeals the dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief. In Lopez's application, he challenged the Department of Corrections' calculation of his discretionary parole eligibility date. In particular, Lopez argued that the Department of Corrections erred in failing to deduct his statutory good time when determining his "active term of imprisonment" for purposes of determining his eligibility for discretionary parole under AS 33.16.090.
Lopez pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and received a sentence of 75 years with 15 years suspended (60 years to serve).
Our recent opinion in Seaman v. State is dispositive of Lopez's appeal.Seaman made essentially the same arguments as Lopez makes here. First, that the superior court should have relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in State v. Leathers to interpret the phrase "active term of imprisonment." And second, that this Court's decision in Perotti v. State-an unpublished decision where this Court held that "good time" credit was generally not included in the discretionary parole calculation - was wrongly decided. Our opinion in Seaman addressed and rejected both of these arguments and concluded that the Department of Corrections is not required to deduct a defendant's statutory good time when calculating a defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole unless the statute expressly requires such a deduction. We reach the same conclusion here.
Seaman v. State, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska App. 2021).
Id. at 1035-37 (citing State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 2011)).
Id. at 1029-34 (citing Perotti v. State, 2008 WL 2469147 (Alaska App. June 18, 2008) (unpublished)).
Id. at 1029-37.
Lopez frames his claim as involving the proper interpretation of the statutory term "total term of imprisonment" rather than "active term of imprisonment." But this is a distinction without a difference. The discretionary parole statute refers to a defendant's "active term of imprisonment" and further states that this phrase "has the meaning given in AS 12.55.127." That statute states, in turn, that '"active term of imprisonment' means the total term of imprisonment imposed for a crime, minus suspended imprisonment." Lastly, the truth-in-sentencing statute, AS 12.55.015(g), refers to a defendant's statutory good time as comprising no more than one-third of the defendant's "total term of imprisonment." In other words, a defendant's statutory good time is necessarily considered part of a defendant's "total term of imprisonment."
AS 33.16.090(c)(1).
AS 12.55.127(e)(1).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.