Opinion
Case No. 1:19-cv-188 Erie
07-25-2019
MATT L. LOPER, Plaintiff v. SHEILS LAW ASSOCIATES P.C., Defendant
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is hereby recommended that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 1] be GRANTED, and the Clerk be ordered to docket the Complaint.
It is further recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Clerk of Courts should be directed to close this case.
II. REPORT
A. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff Matt L. Loper ("Plaintiff"), an inmate incarcerated at the Crawford County Correctional Facility, initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In his motion, Plaintiff states that he is unable to pay the filing fee associated with this case. Based upon this averment, it appears that Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to pay the costs and fees of the proceedings. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis should be granted.
B. Assessment of Plaintiff's Complaint
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is "frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed. Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed. Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in the complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
In his proposed complaint, Plaintiff identifies the lone defendant, Shiels Law Associates, as the attorney for another entity, Community Bank, N.A., in a legal action pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 2-3. According to Plaintiff, he entered into a "Retail Installment, and Security Agreement" on June 12, 2015, and received "a sum amount of money of $18984.24." Id. ¶¶ 6-7. On December 2, 2016, Community Bank filed a complaint against Plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County and requested a "bad judgment." Id. ¶¶ 8-9. A "praecipe to discontinue without prejudice" was filed in that action on June 17, 2019, and granted on June 17, 2019. Id. ¶ 12. Although the remainder of his complaint is somewhat incoherent, Plaintiff appears to contend that the litigation in Beaver County implicated "Federal question cases relating data" and violated unspecified federal statutes. Id. ¶ 16; ECF No. 1-1 at 5.
In a separate document titled "FEDERAL JURISDICTION," Plaintiff offers the following statements in further support of his claim:
Damages assessed are "Total Owner," and "Total Ownership," of Community Bank, N.A., with total monies awarded to in favor of Judgment Matt L. Loper, Pro Se, Litigant, in the amount of "Total Owner, and Total Ownership," of Community Bank, N.A.ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. By way of relief, Plaintiff appears to seek actual ownership of Community Bank and "the full amount of $999,000,000.00" in monetary damages. Id. at 3.
United States Government, and a Federal Court Judge in Order to make a finding under any section or any subsection that a "person," based on the "Evidence," presented to the Court that "Testimony," by the "person," as a witness, will result in the "person, suffering very serious emotional distress that will substantially impair the "persons," every ability to reasonably comprehend thoughts, to understand communication, or to function in any manner by which means of function, do not exist.
Because he is seeking monetary damages for an alleged violation of federal law, the Court will construe Plaintiff's claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Decker v. Northeast Revenue Service, 2017 WL 7052234, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2017) (construing a claim for monetary damages based on "a question of federal law" as arising under Section 1983 despite plaintiff's failure to identify "what federal or state law" gave rise to his claim). Section 1983 is not an independent source of substantive rights, but merely "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws." Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir.2004). To establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a deprivation under the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) by a person acting under color of state law. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint should be summarily dismissed for at least two reasons. First, it is well-settled that a Section 1983 plaintiff cannot prevail unless he can demonstrate that "each and every defendant was 'personal[ly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights." Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an "affirmative part" in the complained-of misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). Here, Plaintiff has failed to attribute any misconduct (or, indeed, conduct of any sort) to Sheils Law Associates. The only reference to Sheils Law Associates anywhere in the complaint is a single paragraph identifying it as the "attorney" that represented Community Bank in a state court action. In the absence of substantive allegations that the firm played an affirmative role in the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Second, and more critically, Plaintiff cannot establish that Sheils Law Associates, a private law firm, acted under color of state law. "Generally, private actors do not act under color of state law [and] thus are not liable under Section 1983." Gerhart v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 2018 WL 6589586, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2018) (quoting Luck v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, 901 F.Supp.2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2012)). Nor are attorneys considered state actors "solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court." Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999). Rather, an attorney's conduct can be "fairly attributed" to the state only where the attorney is a state official, acted together with or obtained significant aid from state officials, or engaged in conduct which, by its nature, is chargeable to the state. Id. None of these circumstances are alleged here. See ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 2 (alleging only that Sheils Law Associates represented Community Bank in a lawsuit against Plaintiff in state court). This deficiency is fatal to Plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Breslin v. Morgenstern, 2018 WL 4002857, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2018) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against a private attorney where "all of the acts charged to [the attorney] are those which private attorneys traditionally take in the course of representation in litigation."); Massey v. Crady, 2018 WL 4328002, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018) ("Private citizens, such as [defendants] are not state actors, and therefore . . . any § 1983 claims against [them] should be dismissed."); Little v. Hammond, 2016 WL 7324593, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016) (same).
Finally, because the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the allegations in this lawsuit are not amenable to any construction or revision that might plausibly support an inference that Sheils Law Associates is a state actor, leave to amend Plaintiff's § 1983 claims should be denied as futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (instructing Courts to provide leave to amend prior to dismissing a civil rights complaint unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile). III. CONCLUSION
In his complaint, Plaintiff explicitly avers that his claims stem from "violation[s] of federal law." ECF No. 1-1 at 5. However, to the extent that Plaintiff's complaint could be construed as an attempt to assert state law tort claims such as abuse of process, the Court notes that both parties are citizens of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. "The principal federal statute governing diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, gives federal district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions 'between ... citizens of different States' where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs." Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332). The statute requires "complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants," even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). This means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, "no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any defendant." Id. Because all of Plaintiff's federal claims have been dismissed, and both parties are citizens of the same state, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any state law claims that might have been raised. --------
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.
It is further recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Clerk of Courts should be directed to close this case.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: July 25, 2019