Opinion
Civil Action No. 17-241Erie
08-08-2018
WESLEY A. MASSEY, Plaintiff, v. RICK CRADY, et al, Defendants.
District Judge Schwab
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is hereby recommended that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Gredler and Tautin [ECF No. 14] be granted.
It is further recommended that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Crady [ECF No. 17] be granted.
It is further recommended that Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint [ECF No. 25] be denied and the Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated within the state correctional system, initiated this civil rights action on September 5, 2017. Named as Defendants to this action are: Rick Crady, a private citizen; and Police Chief Michael Tautin, Sgt. Gredler, and another Unknown Patrolman, all three of whom are employed by the Meadville Police Department. Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the two officers and Chief Tautin when Plaintiff was issued traffic citations for driving under suspension. Plaintiff claims that he was illegally seized, racially profiled, harassed, intimidated, and maliciously prosecuted. Furthermore, he complains that his arrest and prosecution constitute an abuse of process and violation of his right to due process. As to Defendant Crady, Plaintiff alleges that he provided the initial tip to police that Plaintiff was driving without a license.
Defendants Gredler and Tautin filed a motion to dismiss on several bases. ECF No. 14. Attached to the motion are a Certified Driver History of Plaintiff issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, copies of four traffic citations issued to Plaintiff and accompanying Magisterial District Judge docket sheets, and an affidavit by Defendant Sergeant David Gredler. Defendant Crady has also filed a motion to dismiss, which joins in the motion to dismiss filed by Gredler and Tautin and additionally argues that he is not a state actor who can be sued under § 1983. ECF No. 17.
In opposition to the pending motions, Plaintiff filed an untimely motion to file an attached amended complaint. ECF No. 25. In the Proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff "concedes to the dismissal of Chief Michael Tautin with prejudice" and seeks to substitute Justin Seath as the Unknown Patrolman. ECF No. 25-1, ¶ 6. Moreover, Plaintiff's factual allegations differ somewhat from those of the original complaint. In particular, he claims that the initial stop did not occur while he was driving, but outside his home when the car was parked. In addition, he now claims that he was stopped thirteen times in a three-week period between June and July 2016, which he alleges was "police harassment, intimidation, racial profiling and official oppression." ECF No. 25-1, page 9.
By Order dated January 4, 2018, Plaintiff was directed that he could file an Opposition Brief and/or an amended complaint to cure any procedural defects. The Order also warned that the motion to dismiss could be converted into a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 16.
B. Plaintiff's Allegations
From the Original Complaint
On June 11, 2016, Rick Crady, a private citizen, informed police that Plaintiff was driving without a driver's license. Plaintiff claims this was done "without probable cause or justification." That same day, and again on June 15th, Officer Gredler "activated the emergency lighting system of the patrol vehicle and stopped Plaintiff's vehicle," again allegedly without probable cause. Plaintiff was issued citations on both days for "driving while driving privileges are suspended or revoked." ECF No. 3.
On July 27, 2016, the Unknown Patrolman issued a citation to Plaintiff by mail. This citation was later withdrawn when Plaintiff produced evidence from the DMV stating that Plaintiff had a legal right to drive before this citation was issued. Id.
According to Plaintiff, he proceeded to court on the two June citations before "District Magistrate Judge Samuel Pendolino." In his defense, Plaintiff produced evidence that he had been racially profiled and that the police were acting solely on the tip from Crady. Plaintiff was convicted on both citations, fined $1000, and ordered to serve 30 days in jail. Id.
Plaintiff appealed and his hearing was set for September 29, 2017. Plaintiff claims that Gredler had other officers stop Plaintiff in order to harass and annoy him despite knowing that Plaintiff had a valid driver's license. Plaintiff does not indicate what happened at his appeal hearing, but he has attached court documents indicating that he was in Erie County Jail (presumably on other charges) on the date of the hearing. Id.
Plaintiff claims these acts of Defendants "constitute a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights including, but not limited to: (a) Plaintiff's right pursuant to [the] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments [...] to be free from illegal seizures[;] (b) Plaintiff's rights to be free from police harassment, imtimadation [sic], racial profiling, and false reports to law enforcement as for in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments [...][;] (c) Plaintiff's right to be free from malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process and unlawful seizure as provided for the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment [...] and[;] (e) Plaintiff's right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments [...]. False arrest and false imprisonment." Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff claims that he has suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and incurred attorney fees and court costs, and suffered wage loss.
Because the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment only bind the federal government and not the state or city governments, the Fifth Amendment is not relevant here. Janicsko v. Pellman, 744 F.Supp. 331 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
Even liberally construing the pro se complaint, this Court does not find that Plaintiff has made any factual allegation that implicates any of the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Again, liberally construing Plaintiff's allegations, this Court does not find any factual allegations sufficient to state either a procedural or substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
From the Proposed Amended Complaint
In the Proposed Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiff's motion to amend, Plaintiff "concedes to the dismissal of Chief Michael Tautin with prejudice" and seeks to substitute Justin Seath as the Unknown Patrolman. ECF No. 25-1, ¶ 6. Beyond those changes, his factual allegations are as follows.
On June 11, 2016, Plaintiff was standing by a vehicle in front of his home talking to his mother when Sergeant Gredler "pulled behind his already parked vehicle and activated his emergency lights." Id. at ¶ 2. Gredler told Plaintiff he had received a tip that Plaintiff was driving without a license. Plaintiff told Gredler that he did have a driver's license. Plaintiff claims that both he and his mother told Gredler that his mother was driving the vehicle, but Gredler issued the citation anyway. Plaintiff also claims he received two citations (dated June 15th and June 16th) by mail. ECF No. 25-1.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped by various officers, at Gredler's direction, a total of thirteen times in a three-week period between June and July 2016. Plaintiff claims the officers were under orders from Gredler to stop "a black man driving an orange truck." Plaintiff claims this was done to harass and intimidate him even after he produced a valid driver's license. Id.
Plaintiff claims that at his hearing before Magisterial District Judge Pendolino on July 27, 2016, he presented evidence that he had a valid driver's license as of June 1st but that Gredler told Plaintiff he was going to answer for one of these tickets.
On September 14, 2016, at a hearing before Pendolino on the citation issued by Seath, Plaintiff presented evidence of a valid driver's license. Seath told Plaintiff he would withdraw the citation, but that Gredler would not permit it.
Plaintiff claims that the Defendants' actions constitute a deprivation of: " (a) Plaintiff's rights pursuant to 4th and 14th amendments ... to be free from illegal search and seizure; (b) Plaintiff's right to be free from police harassment, intimidation, racial profiling and official oppression, as established by the 6th and 14th amendments ...; (c) Plaintiff's right to be free from malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, Plaintiff's right to due process of law as guaranteed by the 4th and 14th amendments ..." ECF No. 25-1, page 9. Plaintiff claims he has suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment and that by being pulled over by the police constantly, he had to show up late or miss work altogether. Plaintiff also grieves that he was represented in the newspaper in a demeaning light and that he incurred attorney fees, court costs and suffered wage loss.
C. Standards of Review
1) Pro se Litigants
In reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Id.at 555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) citing Papasan v. Main, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Additionally, a civil rights claim "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a §1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution."). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim.
2) Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
A defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.3d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In reviewing a facial attack, which addresses a deficiency in the pleadings, the court must only consider the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, and any documents referenced in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.; Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002). "The plaintiff must assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims (here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are merely consistent with such a right." Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
But when a 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, "we are not confined to the allegations in the complaint and can look beyond the pleadings to decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction." Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 754 (3d Cir. 2000). In reviewing a factual attack, "the Court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself whether it has power to hear the case ... [N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations." Carpet Group Int'l. v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n., 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that it exists. Id.
3) Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A Court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del.) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3.
The Third Circuit has expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, we must take the following three steps:Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'
D. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendants move for dismissal based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of this Court over Plaintiff's claims. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the initial analysis must always be to determine whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.
It is well-settled that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction "over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments." Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2011). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court does not have authority to review the propriety of a state court judgment where the losing party in the state court proceeding complains of injuries from that judgment. See Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008); Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 275 Fed. App'x 149 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that Rooker-Feldman applies to claims actually raised in state court, as well as to those that were not raised but are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court adjudication). In general, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable where the Court must either "determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered" or "take action that would render that judgment ineffectual" in order to grant plaintiff the relief he requests. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
This doctrine arises out of the decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
The Third Circuit has recognized four requirements for applying the jurisdictional bar of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) The federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the federal plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment; (3) the judgment was rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the federal plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state court judgments. In re Philadelphia Entertainment & Development Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018) citing Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 166.
These four requirements break down into procedural and substantive components. As to the procedural requirements, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can only be invoked "where a federal court action has been commenced after the rendering of a judgment by a state court." Van Tassel v. Piccione, 2014 WL 1884212, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 2014) quoting Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section ("Van Tassel I"), 659 F.Supp.2d 672, 689 (W.D. Pa. 2009). Here, the procedural component is satisfied as Plaintiff instituted this action after his conviction on the traffic violations. Turning to the substantive requirements of the doctrine, the critical task of the Court is to "identify those federal suits that ... actually complain of injury produced by a state court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it." Id. quoting Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 167.
Liberally construing the allegations of the original complaint, Plaintiff is attempting to bring the following claims: illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment; racial profiling under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; malicious prosecution; false arrest/false imprisonment; and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff's racial profiling claim is not the equivalent of an appeal of the state court's judgment and so is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Strickland v. Mahoning Township, 647 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2009). Similarly, Plaintiff's illegal seizure claim also survives the bar of Rooker-Feldman as a criminal defendant's guilt on charges against him is "irrelevant to the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment or to his right to compensation from state officials under section 1983." Rose v. Mahoning Township, 2008 WL 918214, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar.31, 2008) quoting Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316 (1983). Malicious prosecution claims are also not barred by the doctrine. See Mikhail v. Kahn, 2014 WL 114340, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2014) (noting that malicious prosecution claims are not typically barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they are caused by individual actors rather than any particular state court judgment). Because state law claims of infliction of emotion distress were not caused by the state court judgment, but instead by the acts of the officers before the conviction, these claims are also not barred by the doctrine.
Plaintiff's original complaint does not indicate that he was arrested or imprisoned before the conviction. Accordingly, Plaintiff would have been arrested and imprisoned as a direct result of the state court judgment, and his claims of false arrest/false imprisonment are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
To the extent that Plaintiff could amend his complaint to specify that he was arrested and imprisoned prior to the conviction in the state court, his false arrest/false imprisonment claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and any such amendment would be futile. See discussion infra.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be denied as to all of Plaintiff's claims with the exception of Plaintiff's false arrest/false imprisonment claim.
E. The State Actor Requirement of § 1983
Defendant Crady moves to dismiss the case against him arguing that he is not a state actor. This Court agrees.
In order to state a viable § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege that he "was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor." Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally, anyone whose conduct is "fairly attributable to the state" can be sued as a state actor under § 1983. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). "Action under color of state law requires that one liable under § 1983 have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Cirri v. Muroski, 2013 WL 2897868, at *4 (3d Cir. June 13, 2013) quoting Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011). Private citizens, such as Defendants Crady, are not state actors, and therefore, they cannot be held liable under § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint does not contain any allegations that overcome the state actor requirement, and therefore, any § 1983 claims against Defendant Crady should be dismissed.
Similarly, Plaintiff does not plead any factual allegations sufficient to impose liability upon Crady by virtue of his participation in any alleged conspiracy with the law enforcement Defendants. Generally, in order "to properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred." Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 178. Moreover, a plaintiff alleging that (non-state actor) defendants conspired with law enforcement must plead an agreement between the officers and the private citizens. Even bare allegations of conspiracy, or the assertion that "Defendants engaged in a concerted action of a kind not likely to occur in the absence of agreement," are insufficient. Id. Plaintiff has not pled any factual allegations (in either the original complaint or the proposed amended complaint) sufficient to infer a meeting of the minds necessary to render Crady a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.
As such, Defendant Crady's motion to dismiss based upon a failure to state a claim should be granted.
F. The Personal Involvement of Chief Tautin
Defendants argue that Chief Tautin should be dismissed from this action as Plaintiff has failed to allege his personal involvement in any of the alleged constitutional violations. This Court agrees.
To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well-settled that liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's "personal involvement" in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Gould v. Wetzel, 2013 WL 5697866, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct.21, 2013) citing Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 73 (3d Cir. 2011). This means that the defendant must have played an "affirmative part" in the complained-of misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) ("In a § 1983 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct."); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.App'x 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986).
Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, "a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates." Chinchello, 805 F.2d at 133; Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991). Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated solely on the theory of respondeat superior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See also Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293-95 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff has made no factual allegations that Chief Tautin was involved in any capacity in any of the alleged constitutional violations. Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges in his proposed amended complaint that Tautin should be dismissed from this action with prejudice. Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in this regard and Defendant Tautin should be terminated from the docket.
G. The Favorable Termination Requirement of Heck v. Humphrey
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are precluded by the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 486-87. "A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." Id. at 487.
The Third Circuit has reiterated that in Heck's context of a malicious prosecution claim "the purpose of the requirement ... is to avoid parallel litigation of probable cause and guilt. It also prevents the claimant from succeeding in a tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, which would run counter to the judicial policy against creating two conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction." Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining Heck). A court faced with a suit for damages under § 1983 must first "consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his ... sentence." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. If so, the complaint must be dismissed "unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the ... sentence has already been invalidated." Id.
So then, this Court must undertake an analysis of whether a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his current claims would invalidate his underlying conviction of Driving While Under Suspension, 75 Pa. § 1543A. Accordingly, this Court must look to the state court records relating to Plaintiff's underlying convictions, and then compare those crimes for which Plaintiff was convicted to the elements of the present legal claims. See generally Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1997); Wisneski v. Denning, 2014 WL 1758118, at *12 (W.D. Pa. 2014) ("Application of the Heck rule is, of necessity, a fact-intensive inquiry ...").
Moreover, the Court takes judicial notice of the state court records and Plaintiff's driving record for these purposes. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014). Consideration of the traffic court dockets alone is appropriate on Rule 12(b)(6) review as these records are subject to judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Pristas v. Esper, 2018 WL 1427089, at * 6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2018) quoting Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Because the inclusion and review of the Affidavit to explain the traffic court dockets necessitates conversion of the present motion into one for summary judgment, and is not needed for the court's determination, it will not be reviewed. See Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 139 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir.1998).
State Court Records
Plaintiff's Certified DOT Driver's History reveals that Plaintiff has a lengthy history of traffic violations and has had his driver's license suspended or revoked multiple times. ECF No. 14-3. The traffic court docket reflects that Plaintiff was cited for Driving While Under Suspension, 75 Pa. § 1543A four times during the time period at issue in this case.
See 75 Pa. § 1543A, which provides: "any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension, revocation or cancellation of the operating privilege and before the operating privilege has been restored is guilty of a summary offense..."
The first citation (C3452018-3) was issued on June 11, 2016, by Officer Gredler, but was withdrawn on June 15, 2016. ECF No. 14-5, p.1. On the next day, June 16, 2016, however, Officer Gredler issued a citation (C3452107-1) charging Plaintiff for the same conduct of June 11, 2016 (which had been the subject of the withdrawn citation (C3452018-3)), but this time listing Plaintiff as a habitual offender. ECF No. 14-6, p.1. A separate citation (C3452112-6) was also issued by Officer Gredler for driving under suspension as a habitual offender on June 15, 2016. ECF No. 14-8, p.1. Finally, the fourth citation (C3452113-0), also for driving under suspension as a habitual offender, was issued by Patrolman Justin Seath on June 16, 2016. ECF No. 14-10, p.1.
The Disposition of C3452018-3 and C3452107-1 - As stated above, citation C3452018-3 was withdrawn. ECF No. 14-5, p. 1. Citation C3452107-1, the citation that appears to charge the same conduct as C3452018-3, but with the addition of the notation that Plaintiff is a habitual offender, was the basis of a guilty plea. According to the docket, Plaintiff pled guilty to citation C3452107-1 on July 27, 2016. ECF No. 14-7, p. 2. Despite his guilty plea, Plaintiff filed a summary appeal with respect to the sentence imposed by Magisterial District Judge Pendolino, which was to be a period of confinement from September 6, 2016, until October 5, 2016. ECF No. 14-7, pp. 2, 3. On the summary appeal, Plaintiff was found guilty on September 29, 2017, by the Honorable Anthony J. Vardaro. Plaintiff was ordered to pay $1000.00 in fines and was committed to the Crawford County Jail for two to six months concurrent to any other sentence he was serving. ECF No. 14-12, pp. 2, 4.
The Disposition of C3452112-6 and C3452113-0 - Plaintiff pled guilty to citation C3452112-6 on July 27, 2016. ECF No. 14-9, p. 1. The docket reflects that despite the guilty plea before Magisterial District Judge Pendolino, the citation and conviction were "cancelled." ECF No. 14-9, p. 2. There are two dates listed on the docket sheet for the cancellation of the citation and conviction: September 12, 2016 and October 14, 2016. Id. As to citation C3452113-0, it was withdrawn on September 14, 2016. ECF No. 14-11, p. 1.
In sum, according to these docket sheets, one of the citations (C3452107-1) had the following history, which is relevant to the review here: Plaintiff pled guilty to driving while his license was under suspension as charged, he appealed the sentence imposed, the conviction was summarily affirmed on appeal by a county judge one year later and a longer sentence of incarceration was imposed on Plaintiff. This means that Plaintiff was, in fact, driving with a suspended license during the time period at issue, despite his claims to the contrary in the complaint and proposed amended complaint.
The Elements of Plaintiff's Present Legal Claims
The lack of probable cause is an essential element of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim and malicious prosecution claim (as well as any potential false arrest/false imprisonment claim), and such claims cannot proceed if probable cause existed. See Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1988); McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447 (3d Cir. 2009). So then, in order for Plaintiff to prevail on these claims, this Court must find the absence of probable cause, which necessarily implicates the invalidity of Plaintiff's underlying conviction and sentence. Accordingly, these claims are precluded by Heck unless Plaintiff can show a favorable termination. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005) citing Heck ("The purpose of the requirement, the Court explained, is to avoid parallel litigation of probable cause and guilt. It also prevents the claimant from succeeding in a tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, which would run counter to the judicial policy against creating two conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction."). Plaintiff has not challenged the guilty plea he entered and he cannot under Heck. See Ianuale v. Keyport Township, 2016 WL 5955527 (D.N.J. 2016). Summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution claims as they are barred by Heck because Plaintiff entered a guilty plea to driving while his license was suspended during the time period of which he complains. ECF No. 14-7, p. 2.
Plaintiff's claim that he was subject to an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment is not borne out by any of the factual allegations as pled in either the original or the proposed amended complaint. --------
Plaintiff's racial profiling claim is not barred by Heck as Plaintiff need not prove that he is innocent of the underlying charge or that the state court judgment was invalid in order to prevail on such a claim. See Strickland v. Mahoning Township, 2009 WL 2168773, at * 4 (M.D. Pa. 2009); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 834 (3d Cir. 2002). Finally, neither of Plaintiff's infliction of emotional distress claims negates or calls into question any element of the violation of the traffic code and neither challenges the validity of Plaintiff's convictions. See Garrison v. Porch, 376 Fed.App'x 274 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that arrestee's § 1983 and state law claims were not barred by the Heck doctrine despite his guilty plea to assaulting a police officer). Accordingly, these claims are not barred by the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey. Defendants' motion should be denied in this regard.
H. Negligent or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Both of Plaintiff's state law claims for the infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to state a claim. In order to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) it must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) that distress must be severe. Hooten v. Penna. College of Optometry, 601 F.Supp. 1151, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The facts as alleged by Plaintiff in either the original or proposed amended complaint do not support an intentional infliction claim against Defendant Gredler under this standard. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should be granted as to this claim.
Plaintiff has also failed to make factual allegations to support a claim on negligent infliction. A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is limited to four factual scenarios: "(1) situations where the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to a physical impact; (3) the plaintiff was in a zone of danger, thereby reasonably experiencing a fear of impending physical injury; or (4) the plaintiff observed a tortious injury to a close relative." Goodson v. Kardashian, 413 Fed. App'x 417, 418 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 197-98 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2008). Plaintiff has not alleged facts in either the original complaint or the proposed amended complaint that states a claim under any of these four scenarios. The negligent infliction claim should be dismissed as well.
I. Racial Profiling
The only claim remaining at this juncture is Plaintiff's racial profiling claim. Plaintiff's racial profiling claim is vague at best (see Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F.Supp.2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2014) aff'd, 572 Fed. App'x 68 (3d Cir. 2014); Davila v. Northern Regional Joint Police Bd., 979 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D. Pa. 2013) vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 2014 WL 3735631 (W.D. Pa 2014)) and consists of allegations that are best quoted from the proposed amended complaint at Paragraph 8:
The plaintiff was stopped by various Meadville City Police Officers under Sgt. David Gredler's orders a total of 13 times in a 3 week period between June and July. When asked why the plaintiff was being stopped. ALL officers stated that they were under orders from Sgt. Gredler that a Black man driving an orange
truck was driving without a licence and to stop him when seen, this continued after defendant showed a valid driver's licence. This was done in a attempt to harass, intimidate and threaten the Plaintiff.ECF No. 25-1, Proposed Amended Complaint, p. 5.
Despite this claim, Plaintiff's driving record and the docket sheets of the four citations discussed previously, which have been judicially noticed, demonstrate that Plaintiff pled guilty and was convicted of driving with a suspended license during this precise period. In fact, having lost on appeal, Plaintiff was incarcerated for this offense. His official driving record, again judicially noticed, also shows that Plaintiff was listed as without a valid license during this period. ECF No. 14-3, Certified Driver History, p. 7. Plaintiff has no factual basis to claim a Fourteenth Amendment violation by the defendant officers if his official driving record showed his license as suspended, especially when he pled guilty to the same charge during the time period he claims he was harassed and profiled. It is important to note that a court "need not credit a complaint's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse, 132 F.3d at 906. As the Supreme Court held in Twombly, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. at 555.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679 (emphasis added). Moreover, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
In this matter, Plaintiff's allegations, even if taken as true with regard to the number of stops in a 3-week time period in June and July of 2016, do not state a racial profiling case when the officers who stopped Plaintiff checked an official driving record that listed Plaintiff as having a suspended license. Further, the plausibility requirement of the Court's review is not satisfied with regard to Plaintiff's claim that he showed a valid license during this period, when not only does his official driving record show otherwise, but he pled guilty to driving without a license during that same time period. Plaintiff's racial profiling claim, ostensibly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, should be dismissed.
J. Leave to Amend
The Court's final inquiry is whether the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims is with or without prejudice and whether to grant him leave to amend his claims. Leave to amend is appropriate unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that leave to amend Plaintiff's claims would be futile as he cannot change the official records of the occurrences of which he complains. In re NAHC, Inc. Securities Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (An amendment would be futile when the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby recommended that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Gredler and Tautin [ECF No. 14] and Defendant Crady [ECF No. 17] be granted, and the Clerk of Courts be directed to close this case.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: August 8, 2018