MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

MATASAVAGE, JUDGE.

This matter is before the court on a motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff's amended complaint, dated August 18, 2004, filed by the defendant, Waterbury Hospital Health Center.

The amended complaint presently at issue, filed July 2, 2004, alleges in three counts injuries to the plaintiff arising out of an error committed during the plaintiff's blood transfusion. The second count alleges negligence and, in three paragraphs added to the complaint, also alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Specifically, the paragraphs added to count two allege that "[f]ollowing plaintiff's release from the defendant's intensive care unit . . . she received vigorous and relentless collection efforts to compel the plaintiff to pay for the negligently administered incompatible blood which was transfused into her on July 26, 2001 and the treatment she received to help her survive the negligence;" that the "collection efforts of the defendant included threats to refer the bill to a collection agency as well as numerous telephone calls threatening her credit and suit against her if she did not pay; and that those collection efforts constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the plaintiff which distress was severe, continues to date and is likely to continue in the future."

The defendant's motion to strike these allegations was accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of its motion, also filed on August 19, 2004. On September 3, 2004, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike. The matter was heard at short calendar on September 20, 2004.

I.

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike . . . does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). The court must "take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and . . . construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003).

II.

Our Supreme Court has recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). In so doing, the court also provided guidelines for determining when such an action would lie: "(1) [where] the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or . . . knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) [where] the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) [where] the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) [where] the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." Id. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's amended complaint fails to sufficiently plead the first and second of the four requirements.

The court will first examine whether the defendant's conduct, as alleged, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous. This is "initially a question for the court to determine . . . Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). In Peytan, the court indicated that it relies on the requirements expressed in the Restatement (Second) Torts, § 46 to define this tort and the judicial role in dealing with claims of this nature. CT Page 931 Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 253. Comment (d) of that section says the following regarding extreme and outrageous conduct: "It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by `malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!'" 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46 comment (d), p. 73 (1965).

"A review of recent Connecticut decisions on the issue of extreme and outrageous conduct within the context of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress reveals that there is no bright line rule to determine what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to maintain this action. The court looks to the specific facts and circumstances of each case in making its decisions . . . The motion to strike must be denied if `reasonable people could differ as to whether the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous.'" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spencer v. Homer D. Bronson Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 04 0183416 (Aug. 13, 2004, Alvord, J.).

The review of decisions suggests that a very wide range conduct has the capacity to be found `extreme and outrageous' enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. See e.g. Hall v. Gallo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0476708 (Nov. 5, 2004, Devlin, J.) (efforts to force the plaintiff to drop her lawsuit through misuse of police power, prevarication and retaliatory discharge can support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bates v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 02 0088925 (May 28, 2003, Pickard, J.) (use of dishonest tactics by an insurer to force settlement of a workers' compensation claim can support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Arnold v. Thermospas, Inc., 49 Conn.Sup. 103 (2004) (courts do not typically strike claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress where physical contact has occurred; allegations of restraint by leaning over a chair can support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress even though actual physical contact not alleged).

It is true, as the defendant argues in its memorandum of law in support of this motion, that "[c]onduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Internal quotation marks.) Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 211. It is also true, however, that the "extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests . . . In particular police officers, school authorities, landlords, and collecting creditors have been held liable for extreme abuse of their position." (Emphasis added.) 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 46 comment (e). See e.g., Connecticut National Bank v. Montanari, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 92 0517808 (Jan. 26, 1994, Aurigemma, J.) ( 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 10) (allegations regarding bank's behavior with respect to a mortgage sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Champlin v. Washington Trust Co. of Westerly, 478 A.2d 985 (R.I. 1954) (affirming that continued petty acts of harassment over a period of time, such as a series of dunning letters by a creditor, may be sufficient to meet the extreme and outrageous requirement and citing compilations of debtor-harassment cases found in Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 786 (1979) and 46 A.L.R.3d 772 (1972)); Bundren v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.App.3d 784, 791 (1983) (for the jury to determine if the hospital's attempt to collect debt while debtor was still hospitalized is outrageous); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal.App.3d 258, 131 Cal.Rptr. 547 (1976) (a landlord's threats to evict a tenant for organizing other tenants substantially outrageous); Margita v. Diamond Mortgage Corp., 159 Mich.App. 181, 406 N.W.2d 268, 272 (1987) (noting that the defendant company had a great deal of power to affect the plaintiff's credit rating and future ability to borrow funds, the court upheld a refusal of summary judgment motion where the debt the defendant sought to collect never had been overdue yet the plaintiff was harassed through abusive phone calls, letters assessing late charges, and foreclosure threats).

Here, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant engaged in relentless collection efforts for a hospitalization bill that resulted from admitted malpractice. These efforts are alleged to have included numerous telephone calls and threats at a time when the defendant was aware that the hospitalization for which they were seeking to recover was a result of malpractice. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant's actions impaired her ability to maintain medical insurance coverage. This court has examined the allegations of the plaintiff's amended complaint to determine whether, given the allegations and the fair inferences that could be drawn from them, reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct alleged was extreme and outrageous. Following this examination the court cannot say that, as a matter of law, the scenario alleged is so trifling that it could never support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the motion to strike on the grounds that the defendant has failed to allege outrageous behavior is denied. See e.g. Connecticut National Bank v. Montanari, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 92 0517808.

Because "[i]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted (internal quotation marks omitted) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004); the motion to strike is also denied on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress and has failed to allege that the defendant knew or should have known that emotional distress was likely to result from its conduct. See e.g. Ward v. Benoit, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 558800 (Apr. 3, 2003, Corradino, J.) ("the first element must be examined carefully. What it says is `that the action intended to inflict emotional distress or that he (she) knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his (her) conduct.'" (Emphasis in the original.)).

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to strike.

Matasavage, J.