MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION #127 MOTION TO STRIKE

PAVIA, J.

On December 5, 2007, the plaintiff Anthony Long, filed a four-count revised complaint against the defendants Carl Taranto and Raymond Taranto. The plaintiff alleges in count one that on or about January 11, 2005, the defendants, as owner landlords of the property occupied by the plaintiff, negligently attempted to repair a faulty furnace resulting in severe carbon monoxide exposure. The plaintiff alleges that he has suffered permanent brain injury as a result thereof.

Count one sounds in both common law and statutory negligence. The plaintiff alleges in the second count of his complaint that the defendants were reckless by knowingly exposing the plaintiff to a risk of great magnitude. In the third count, the plaintiff alleges a breach of the warranty of habitability in that, pursuant to the terms of a written lease, the defendant assumed an obligation to provide a safe place of occupancy. The plaintiff alleges in the fourth count that the defendants' conduct violated Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).

On December 10, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to strike, which is currently before this court. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike as to counts one, two and four and grants the motion as to count three.

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). It does not, however, admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

"A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 480. "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).

The defendants move to strike count one asserting that that statutory and common law claims of negligence are erroneously combined in a single count. The basis of the defendants' claim is that separate causes of action, in this case common law and statutory allegations of negligence, must be pled in distinctly separate counts. The Connecticut Supreme Court has approved allegations of multiple causes of action within one count of a complaint. "If . . . the plaintiff's claims for relief grow out of a single occurrence or transaction or closely related occurrences or transactions they may be set forth in a single count and it does not matter that the claims for relief do not have the same legal basis." Burgess v. Vanguard Ins. Co., 192 Conn. 124, 126, 470 A.2d 244 (1984). "Whether the conduct which is alleged to have caused the plaintiff's injury involves a breach of a common law duty or a violation of one or more statutes or both there is but one cause of action." Id., 126-27. There being but one cause of action the plaintiff has sufficiently pled count one. As such, the defendants' motion to strike count one is denied.

The defendants claim that the second count must be stricken as it alleges reckless, wanton and willful conduct which incorporates, without the necessary specific factual predicate, the same facts as those pled in the first count. The defendants primarily argue that the second count of the complaint fails to state a cause of action for recklessness because the plaintiff has chosen to plead the same factual allegations to support his claims of negligence and recklessness. It is, however, of no legal consequence if identical facts are alleged to support separate causes of action providing allegations are sufficient to support both claims. Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 343, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). "The plaintiff may claim alternative relief, based upon an alternative construction of the cause of action." Practice Book § 10-25. "[W]here the allegations of a count of a contested pleading support a cause of action of recklessness, the count sounding in recklessness may well be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in a count sounding in negligence." Haley v. Connecticut Light Power, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford Docket No. CV 059027 (November 9, 1999, Nadeau, J.).

Our courts have consistently defined the term recklessness. "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . [R]eckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 64 Conn.App. 699, 720-21, 781 A.2d 440 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 312, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).

The court, for the purposes of determining this motion, takes the factual allegations of the complaint as proven and must then consider if count two states a cause of action in recklessness. Count two specifically alleges that the defendants knew of and advised the plaintiff of the defective furnace and indicated his intent to repair said furnace. Thereafter, the defendants took it upon themselves to repair the furnace, disregarding the risks that such conduct posed to the plaintiff. Such conduct, the plaintiff alleges, resulted in numerous health and safety code violations. If these facts are taken as proven, then the defendants had knowledge of the defect and the need for compliance. From these allegations, a trier of fact could infer "such conduct . . . indicates a reckless disregard for the just rights and safety of others . . ." Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). The defendants' motion to strike count two is, therefore, denied.

The defendants seek to strike the third count of the amended complaint asserting that the claim of breach of warranty of habitability as pled is legally insufficient. They claim it does not allege an existing defect at the inception of the lease and does not plead actual or constructive knowledge on the pad of the landlord as to this defect. The court sustains the motion to strike as to this count as the plaintiff, by incorporating only paragraphs eighteen through twenty-one of the second count to this count, have failed to plead sufficient facts to support this claim.

The defendants move to strike count four of the complaint asserting that a single instance of misconduct is legally insufficient to support a CUPTA violation. To establish a CUPTA violation the plaintiff must prove that he was injured as a result of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b(a). As a single act of misconduct may constitute a violation of CUPTA the defendants' argument is without merit. See Hart v. Carrunthers, 77 Conn.App. 610, 619, 823 A.2d 1284 (2003). Pursuant to Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Assoc., 72 Conn.App. 342, 353, 805 A.2d 735, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 922, 812 A.2d 864 (2002), the defendant's motion to strike count four is denied.