MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN LUNGSTRUM, Chief Judge, District

Pro se plaintiff Robert L. Loeh filed this lawsuit as an inmate at the United States Disciplinary Barracks ("USDB"), alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by denying him access to a weekly newspaper, The Pitch. On April 12, 2004, plaintiff filed a notice of address change in which he advised the court that he has been released from confinement. The court sua sponte issued an order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as moot because plaintiff seeks relief only in the form of a declaratory judgment and an injunction, not damages. This matter is now before the court on plaintiff's response to the court's order to show cause.

Article III of the United States Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends only to actual "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Therefore, "the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction." Out of Line Sports, Inc. v. Rollerblade, Inc., 213 F.3d 500, 501 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). This constitutional Article III case-or-controversy requirement requires "that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where the award of any requested relief would be moot." McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). "[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Yellow Cab Coop. Ass'n v. Metro Taxi, Inc., 132 F.3d 591, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted).

It is well established in the Tenth Circuit that a prisoner's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are rendered moot upon his or her release from confinement. Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding an inmate's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered moot by his release from confinement); Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996) (same, where inmate sought injunctive relief); see also, e.g., Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, No. 97-3460, 2004 WL 825299, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 29, 2004) (same); Davis v. Bruce, 215 F.R.D. 612, 616-17 (D. Kan. 2003) (same, where inmate sought a temporary restraining order). In this case, plaintiff seeks relief only in the form of a declaratory judgment and an injunction, see Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 26, at 5; Mot. to Supplement (Doc. 3) ¶ 6, at 2; see also Order (Doc. 4), at 1 (granting plaintiff's motion to supplement his complaint), and therefore his claims are moot given his release from confinement. In plaintiff's response to the court's order to show cause, he raises three arguments why the court should not dismiss his case, all of which are without merit for the following reasons.

First, plaintiff contends that this case is not moot because he wants to recover his court costs (e.g., his filing fee and the costs associated with duplication and mailing) and the court must render a decision on the merits in order for plaintiff to recover those costs. If the potential for recovering costs was sufficient to keep an otherwise moot claim alive, it is indeed difficult to imagine any case that would ever be moot because such costs are awarded to prevailing parties as a matter of course. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). The Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts "to be sure that mooted litigation is not pressed forward, and unnecessary judicial pronouncement on even constitutional issues obtained, solely in order to obtain reimbursement of sunk costs." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990). In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that a claim for attorneys' fees is such a sunk cost, and therefore is "insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim." Id. Like the attorneys' fees at issue in Lewis, court costs are similarly sunk costs of litigation. Accordingly, plaintiff's desire to recover his costs is insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where the merits of his underlying claim are moot. See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 111 n. 1 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (observing that "[a]n unbroken line of cases establishes the rule that controversy as to costs alone does not salvage an otherwise moot case"); see, e.g., Labora v. MCI Telecommunications, No. 98-1073, 1998 WL 1572719, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 1998) (holding a request for costs did not create a case or controversy where the case was otherwise moot), aff'd, 204 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table opinion).

Second, plaintiff contends that military prisoners can only seek declaratory and injunctive relief, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding the United States is immune from monetary damages for "injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service"); Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 774 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding the Feres doctrine bars a military prisoner's claims for monetary damages), and therefore if the court dismisses this case without reaching a determination on the merits it would be "open season" on all USDB prisoners who are nearing release. The court need not decide whether the Feres doctrine actually bars plaintiff from asserting damage claims against USDB personnel because even if plaintiff is correct on this issue, that consideration does not change the fact that plaintiff's declaratory and injunctive relief claims are nevertheless still moot. The thrust of plaintiff's argument in this regard seems to be that this case falls under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. To satisfy this exception to the mootness doctrine, two conditions must be met: (1) the challenged action must be in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the action again. Fischbach v. New Mexico Activities Ass'n, 38 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 1994). Here, plaintiff's claim satisfies neither of these conditions. Plaintiff has not shown (and the court doubts that he could show) that defendants' denial of inmates' access to The Pitch is always of such a short duration as to evade review. Although this issue evaded review in this case because plaintiff was released from confinement, there are undoubtedly other inmates who have enough time left on their sentences that they can challenge this practice if they wish to do so. Further, and perhaps more obviously, the second element is not satisfied because plaintiff has been released from prison and has no reasonable expectation of suffering from continuing to be denied access to The Pitch. Cf. McAlpine, 187 F.3d at 1215 (holding an inmate's parole or supervised release status does not, absent some exceptional showing, bring an otherwise moot claim under the narrow "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine).

Lastly, plaintiff contends that this case has been stymied by delays resulting from the Prison Litigation Reform Act's screening requirements, see generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the fact that the court granted the Commandant's motion for a fourteen-day extension of time to answer or otherwise plead in response to plaintiff's complaint. According to plaintiff, the court would have been able to render a judgment on the merits of his claim in the absence of these delays. The court doubts that a decision in this case would have been rendered as quickly as plaintiff suggests. Nevertheless, even if plaintiff is correct that the alleged delays caused the case to become moot before the court rendered a decision, these delays do not change the fact that the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims because his claims are, quite simply, moot. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (recognizing that "mootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so" (emphasis added)).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.